State and local government organizations and the formation of the help America vote act

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 515-535

  Palazzolo, Daniel J ^a   McCarthy, Fiona R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b Dominion Resources Corporation   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28444499375     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pji039     Document Type: Review

References (109)

1. John Dinan, "State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: Lessons from the 104th Congress," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 27 (Spring 1997): 141.
2. Donald H. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington (New York: Free Press, 1973);
3. Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).
4. As Cammisa notes, our understanding of how state and local governments lobby is based almost entirely on generalists. Governments as Interest Groups, p. 26.
5. Haider and Camissa both make reference to functional groups in their case studies, but their findings are based on the behavior of generalists. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington;
6. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups.
7. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, p. 213;
8. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups, p. 21.
9. Scholars have long noted the tendency of state and local governments to represent their spatial interests. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, pp. 233-234. The parallel observation that functionalists represent their programmatic or administrative interests is certainly intuitive, but the consequences are not well developed in the literature.
10. We discuss the informational, conditional party government, and committee leadership theories below. By using these theories, we begin to address Dale Krane's observation that studies of state and local government lobbying should attempt to "weave together loose theoretical threads," including institutional theories. Dale Krane, "American Federalism, State Governments, and Public Policy: Weaving Together Loose Theoretical Threads," PS: Political Science and Politics 26 (June 1993): 189.
11. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, pp. 89-90;
12. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups, p. 26;
13. Charles H. Levine and James A. Thurber, "Reagan and the Intergovernmental Lobby: Iron Triangles, Cozy Subsystems, and Political Conflict," Interest Group Politics, 2nd ed., ed. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986), pp. 207-209. These studies are not in complete agreement on which organizations should be considered generalists. For instance, Cammisa identifies five generalists: the National Association of Counties (NACo), the National League of Cities (NLC), the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and the National Governors' Association (NGA). Levine and Thurber add two more organizations to the list of major generalists - the International City Management Association (ICMA) and the Council of State Governments (CSG).
14. Levine and Thurber, "Reagan and the Intergovernmental Lobby," pp. 207-209.
15. The generalist classification is defined below in the text; an umbrella functionalist organization "represents the broad spectrum of actors" in a functional area; and the affiliate of generalist refers to a functional group that is part of a generalist organization (Levine and Thurber, "Reagan and the Intergovernmental Lobby,", ibid., 209). The list of primary organizations that lobbied Congress is derived from interviews with various participants, including committee staff and the representative organizations.
16. Election administration is a very important part of the job of most secretaries, but many also handle registration of businesses, securities, trademarks, nonprofit organizations, publication of administrative rules and state documents, and legislative functions; see http://www.nass.org/sos/ duties_survey/, accessed 28 September 2005.
17. A few notable secretaries with functional expertise are Donetta Davidson of Colorado, Rebecca Vigil-Giron of New Mexico, and Sharon Priest, former Arkansas secretary of state. Those interested in the biographical backgrounds of current secretaries can find them at http://www.nass.org/sos/ sos_bios.htm, accessed 28 September 2005.
18. The lobbying tactics of state and local government organizations are well established. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, chap. 6, esp. pp. 213-214, 217, and 229;
19. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups, pp. 122-123.
20. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, p. 229.
21. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Voting in America: Final Report of the NCSL Elections Reform Task Force (Washington, DC: National Conference of State Legislatures, 2001), p. xiv;
22. testimony by Sharon Priest, President of the National Association of Secretaries of State and Arkansas secretary of state, House Administration Committee on Election Reform, 25 April 2001; http://www.house.gov/cha/business/ 042501testimonies/body_042501testimonies.html, accessed 28 September 2005;
23. National Association of Secretaries of State, National Association of Secretaries of State Election Reform Resolution, February 2001; http://www.naco.org/content/contentgroups/publications/ special/ edition_commission_report.pdf, accessed 28 September 2005.
24. National Commission on Election Standards and Reform, Report and Recommendations to Improve America's Election System, May 2001; http://www.naco.org/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentTD=14037, accessed 28 September 2005;
25. National Election Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2000: Review and Recommendations by the Nation's Elections Administrators, July 2001, p. 9; http://www.electioncenter.org/, accessed 28 September 2005.
26. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, p. 217.
27. Interview with Alysoun McLaughlin, associate legislative director, National Association of Counties, 28 July 2004. NASS went through a similar process. Interview with Leslie Reynolds, executive director of NASS, 28 July 2004.
28. Interview with R. Doug Lewis, executive director of the Election Center, 25 August 2004. See also National Election Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2000, p. 22.
29. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, p. 217.
30. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups, pp. 119-120.
31. http://www.nga.org/nga/lobbyIssues/1,1169,C_LOBBY_ISSUE^D_1194,00.html, accessed 13 July 2005.
32. Interview with Frank Shafroth, former legislative director of the NGA, 15 July 2005. See also Robert Tanner, "Legislatures Take Stance on Election Reform, Seek Federal Money with No Strings Attached," Associated Press, 10 August 2001 (Lexis-Nexis database).
33. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, pp. 233-234.
34. National Conference of State Legislatures, Voting in America, p. vii.
35. These points are highlighted in task force reports and made repeatedly in congressional testimony.
36. These differences did not prohibit the organizations from working together. As Cammisa points out, it is less important for state and local governments to agree on everything than to avoid disagreement on major issues. Governments as Interest Groups, pp. 122-123.
37. National Commission on Election Standards and Reform, Report and Recommendations to Improve America's Election System, p. 5.
38. Interview with Reynolds, 11 July 2005; interview with McLaughlin, 6 July 2005.
39. National Conference of State Legislatures, Voting in America, p. xiv;
40. National Commission on Election Standards and Reform, Report and Recommendations to Improve America's Election System, pp. 5-6;
41. National Association of Secretaries of State, National Association of Secretaries of State Election Reform Resolution.
42. This quotation and the next are from National Election Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2000, p. 11.
43. Election 2000, Ibid., 22-23, for this reference and others related to standards.
44. Election 2000, Ibid., 19.
45. Election 2000, Ibid., 20.
46. See statements by the Honorable Martin R. Stephens, speaker of the House for the State of Utah and cochair of the NCSL Special Task Force on Election Reform, and five secretaries of state who testified before the Committee on House Administration, 25 April 2001: J. Kenneth Blackwell of Ohio, Sharon Priest of Arkansas, Katherine Harris of Florida, Rebecca Vigil-Giron of New Mexico, and Ron Thornburgh of Kansas. U.S. Congress, Committee on House Administration, Hearing on Election Reform, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 25 April 2001; http://www.house.gov/cha/business/ 042501testimonies/body_042501testimonies. html, accessed 28 September 2005.
47. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, Hearing on Election Reform, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 10 May 2001; http://frewebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp. cgi?ipaddress=162.140.64. 88&filename=87419.wais&directory=/diskc/wais/data/107_house_hearings, accessed 28 September 2005.
48. The four other election officials were Pam Iorio (supervisor of elections, Hillsborough County, FL), Connie Schmidt (election commissioner, Johnson County, KS), Carolyn Jackson (administrator of elections, Hamilton County Election Commission, Chattanooga, TN), and Linda Lamone (administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections). The responses McCormack, Lewis, and these four officials gave to questions by members of Congress also demonstrate extensive knowledge of elections (Hearing on Election Reform, ibid).
49. Haider and Cammisa identify various exogenous forces - political circumstances, institutional changes, and fiscal conditions - that affect the roles of state and local government organizations. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington;
50. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups. Levine and Thurber, likewise, look specifically at how the fortunes of state and local governments were affected by the Reagan presidency.
51. Levine and Thurber, "Reagan and the Intergovernmental Lobby."
52. For more details on information theory, see Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
53. For more details on conditional party government theory, see David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), chap. 2.
54. It is possible for some dimensions of an issue to evoke informational demands while other dimensions of the same issue feature sharp partisan differences. Mark S. Hurwitz, Roger J. Moiles, and David W. Rohde, "Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House," American Political Science Review 95 (December 2001): 911-922.
55. Peter H. Argersinger, "Electoral Reform and Partisan Jugglery," Political Science Quarterly 119 (Fall 2000): 499-520;
56. '"Motor Voter' Enacted After 5 Years," 1993 CQ Almanac: 103rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994), pp. 199-201.
57. See, e.g., C. Lawrence Evans, Leadership in Committee: A Comparative Analysis of Leadership Behavior in the U.S. Senate (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
58. For details on nominate scores, see http://www.pooleandrosenthal.com/, accessed 28 September 2005.
59. John Cochran, "Election 'Reform' Movement Gives Way to Caution," CQ Weekly, 2 June 2001, p. 1294 (online version).
60. Interview with anonymous Republican staff person, Committee on House Administration, 28 July 2004.
61. Democrat investigative staff of the House Committee on the Judiciary, "How to Make over One Million Votes Disappear" (2001), p. 4; www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/electionreport.pdf;
62. U.S. Congress, Senate, Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Hearing on Election Reform, Committee on Rules & Administration, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 14 March 2001; http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2001/ 031401hrg.htm, accessed 28 September 2005.
63. John Conyers Jr., "Voting Rights in Peril" New York Times, 20 January 2002; http://www.house. gov/conyers/news_press_speeches.htm, accessed 28 September 2005.
64. Interview with Congressman Robert Ney, 13 July 2005. See also David Broder, "No Small Miracles: School, Election Promises," Orlando Sentinel, 19 December 2001 (Lexis-Nexis database).
65. For references to the bipartisan style of Ney and Hoyers, see Brian Nutting and H. Amy Stern, eds. CQ's Politics in America 2002: The 107th Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001), pp. 462 and 810;
66. Michael Barone, Richard E. Cohen, and Charles E. Cook Jr, eds. The Almanac of American Politics: 2002 (Washington, DC: National Journal, 2001), p. 1235.
67. Nutting and Stern, CQ's Politics in America 2002, p. 184.
68. Nutting and Stern, CQ's Politics in America 2002, Ibid., 403;
69. "'Motor Voter' Enacted After 5 Years," pp. 199-201.
70. This account is from the interview with Lewis.
71. "Bill summary and status," S. 218, 107th Cong., 1st sess.; http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ bdquery, accessed 28 September 2005.
72. S. 565, Title III, Section 301, 107th Cong., 1st sess.; http://thomas.loc.gov, accessed 28 September 2005.
73. Interviews with Reynolds (28 July 2004), McLaughlin (28 July 2004), and Lewis.
74. U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 14 March 2001, p. S2307; http://thomas.loc.gov, accessed 28 September 2005.
75. Interview with Lewis.
76. Karen Foerstel with Emily Pierce, "Hopes for Quick Accord on Election Standards Bill Face Liberals' Objections," CQ Weekly, 13 April 2002, p. 957 (online version).
77. John Kincaid, "The State of U.S. Federalism, 2000-01: Continuity in Crisis," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 31 (Summer 2001): 11.
78. Interview with Ney.
79. Interview with Lewis. This point is corroborated by Hoyer in an exchange with Lewis during a committee hearing. Committee on House Administration, Hearing on Election Reform, 10 May 2001.
80. We define "bipartisan" here as the "active and cooperative involvement of Republicans and Democrats." Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 21.
81. Interview with anonymous Democrat staff person, Committee on House Administration, 28 July 2004.
82. Interview with anonymous Republican staff person, Committee on House Administration, 28 July 2004.
83. Interview with Reynolds (28 July 2004).
84. Interview with McLaughlin (28 July 2004).
85. Committee on House Administration, Hearing on Election Reform, 10 May 2001; http://www.house. gov/cha/cb.html.
86. Interview with anonymous Democrat staff person, 28 July 2004.
87. Interview with anonymous Republican staff person, Committee on House Administration, 13 July 2005.
88. Interview with Ney.
89. Interview with Ney.
90. This quotation by Congressman Ney and those in the next two paragraphs are from U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 107th Cong., 1st sess., pp. H9287-H9288; http://thomas.loc.gov, accessed 28 September 2005.
91. Election Reform Information Project, What Has Changed, What Hasn't and Why: Election Reform Since November 2000 (Washington, DC: elecuonline.org, 2001), p. 16.
92. David Nather, "Election Overhaul May Have to Wait in Line behind Other 'Crisis' Issues," CQ Weekly, 27 July 2002, p. 2034 (online version);
93. Robert Montjoy, "HAVA and the States," Election Reform: Politics and Policy, ed. Daniel J. Palazzolo and James W. Ceaser (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2004), p. 27.
94. Interview with Ney.
95. Derek Willis, "Election Upgrades Could Prove Expensive for States Seeking Federal Help," 12 October 2002, CQ Weekly, p. 2652 (online version).
96. Derek Willis and David Nather, "Election Overhaul Measure on Brink of Approval After Two Years, Many Setbacks," CQ Weekly, 5 October 2002, p. 2585.
97. Derek Willis, "Election Upgrades Could Prove Expensive," 2652. In the final version of HAVA, identification is required only of first-time voters who register by mail, and in lieu of a picture identification, the voter can present another identification, such as a bank statement or a paycheck.
98. Interview with Ney.
99. Interview with Ney. See also Brian Kim, "Help America Vote Act," Harvard Journal on Legislation 40 (Summer 2003): 596.
100. Willis, "Election Upgrades Could Prove Expensive," 2652.
101. The White House did not play a major role in the formation of HAVA. The president endorsed the principles of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, the so-called Carter-Ford Commission, but the White House did not attempt to manage the process. Interview with Ney.
102. Interview with anonymous Republican staff person, Committee on House Administration, 13 July 2005.
103. Interviews with Reynolds, 11 July 2005; McLauglin, 6 July 2005; and Ney.
104. As Cammisa concludes in her study of generalists, there is some evidence to suggest that state and local governments are more successful when they offer concrete provisions as opposed to abstract ideas. Cammisa, see Governments as Interest Groups, 126-127.
105. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups, Ibid., 124
106. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, p. 229;
107. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups, p. 126.
108. The following points were highlighted by Lewis, Reynolds, and McLaughlin. See also Jack McGuire, "Governments as Interest Groups: State and Local Government Officials' Organizations in American Politics" (PhD diss., Washington State University, 2004), p. 183.
109. Interview with Ney.