Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls

Public Choice

Volumn 125, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 1-15

  Berlemann, Michael ^a  

^a IFO INSTITUTE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28444484278     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3324-8     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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