Spinoffs and information

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 153-176

  Habib, Michel A ^a   Johnsen, D Bruce ^b   Naik, Narayan Y ^a  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031116622     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1997.0212     Document Type: Article

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