The leaderless nexus: When crime and terror converge

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 237-252

  Dishman, Chris ^a  

^a NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27944483736     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100590928124     Document Type: Review

References (69)

1. Ron Ashkenas, Dave Ulrich, Todd Jick, and Steve Kerr, The Boundaryless Organization: Breaking the Chains of Organizational Structur (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2002).
2. Ron Ashkenas, Dave Ulrich, Todd Jick, and Steve Kerr, The Boundaryless Organization: Breaking the Chains of Organizational Structur (2002). Ibid.
3. Horizontal organization experts, however, still stress that some amount of hierarchy is necessary to guid eand orchestrate the horizontal organizations. Ron Ashkenas, Dave Ulrich, Todd Jick, and Steve Kerr, The Boundaryless Organization: Breaking the Chains of Organizational Structur (2002). Ibid.
4. There are many works that provided the basis for this analysis. See John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, "Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 22, pp. 207-229 (1999).
5. "Networks and Netwars," edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, RAND Report (2001).
6. "In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age," edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, RAND report (1997).
7. "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Washington, DC: RAND, 1999).
8. Other paths were also chosen. Some organizations like Islamic Jihad chose to leave Egypt, while others, like the Muslim Brotherhood, gave up violence to pursue a political path..
9. Michele Zanini and Sean J. A. Edwards, "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age," in Networks and Netwars," edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, RAND Report (2001).
10. Magnus Ranstorp, "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: It's Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions," Terrorism and Political Violence (Autumn 1994)
11. and from Hala Jaber, "Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance" (New York: Columbia Press, 1997), pp. 63-66.
12. Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia Press, 1997), p. 64.
13. Gordon McCormick, "The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism," Inside Terrorist Organizations, edited by David Rapaport.
14. Also see Gordon McCormick, "The Shining Path and the Future of Peru," RAND report (March 1990).
15. The same dynamic exists in Colombia. See Joseph Contreras and Steven Ambrus, "The DEA's Nightmare: Colombian Targets Get Smart, Techno-Hip and Phenomenally Successful," Newsweek, 21 February 2000.
16. Also see Jeremy McDermott and Oscar Becerra, "Mexican Drug Trade Faces Fragmentation," Jane's Intelligence Review (May 2003).
17. Jeremy McDermott and Oscar Becerra, "Mexican Drug Trade Faces Fragmentation," Jane's Intelligence Review (2003). Ibid.
18. Tijuana La Frontera, UEDO Director Says Mexican Drug Cartels Operate Like Companies, 1 July 2003.
19. Tijuana La Frontera, 2003. Ibid.
20. Tijuana La Frontera, 2003. Ibid.
21. Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks," Networks and Netwars, edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, RAND Report (2001).
22. Marsha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," Inside Terrorist Organizations, edited by David Rapaport, p. 14.
23. John Horgan and Max Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(3) (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-32.
24. John Horgan and Max Taylor, Terrorism and Political Violence, Ibid., p. 3.
25. The network form described in this section is an "all-channel network." See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt "The Advent of Netwar: Analytic Background," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2(1999), p. 193.
26. See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 70-71.
27. Jeremy Pressman, "Leaderless Resistance: The Next Threat?" Current History (December 2003).
28. Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," Terrorism and Political Violenc (Autumn 1997), p. 43.
29. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), pp. 148, 165.
30. Jo Thomas, "New Face of Terror Crimes: 'Lone Wolf Weaned on Hate," New York Times (16 August 1999).
31. Stefan Leader and Peter Probst, "The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence (Winter 2003).
32. Stefan Leader and Peter Probst, " The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence (2003). Ibid.
33. "Overview of the Enemy," The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 15.
34. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Books, 2002), p. 76.
35. Peter Bergin, Holy War, Inc. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 31.
36. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Books, 2002), p. 77.
37. A recent report by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks cites two other committees: A foreign purchase committee and security committee. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Books, 2002), p. 77. U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden, 98 Cr. 1023 (SDNY) Indictment. Bergin, Holy War, Inc. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 31.
38. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 77.
39. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 76. U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden, 98 Cr. 1023 (SDNY) Indictment.
40. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York, Berkeley Books, 2002), p. 77. U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden, 98 Cr. 1023 (SDNY) Indictment.
41. "Outline of the 9/11 plot," The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 16.
42. "Overview of the Enemy," The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 16.
43. Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, J. Cofer Black, "Al-Qaida: The Threat to the United States and Its Allies," 1 April 2004.
44. It is important to note that it's unclear to what extent Al Qaeda's centralized element still exists and functions. Rohan Gunaratana believes the four committees still existed after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 78.
45. Also see "Overview of the Enemy."
46. Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, J. Cofer Black.
47. The word "political" will be used loosely in this article. The purpose of "political" is to differentiate it from the financial goals of an organized crime group. As defined here, the word will encompass a wide range of motivations including irredentism, desire to overthrow a government, sectarian violence, and the host of religious motivations including establishment of an Islamic caliphate, pushing the United States out of the Middle East, overthrowing Western-minded Middle Eastern government, etc.
48. Mark Basile, "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2004.
49. Some leaders might not be interested in steering the organization back to its original cause in which case the organization's ends and objectives have transformed. See Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation, " Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24, pp. 43-58 (January 2001).
50. Tijuana La Frontera, UEDO Director Says Mexican Drug Cartels Operate Like Companies.
51. Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime and Transformation," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (January 2001).
52. Rachel Ehrenfield, Funding Evil - How Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003), pp. 33-71. Al Qaeda reportedly taxes Afghanistan poppy growers and heroin refiners; launders money for the Taliban; purchases poppy crops directly; and distributes refined heroin throughout the Balkans to Europe. Al Qaeda cells also laundered over $20 million by purchasing illegitimate diamonds from Liberia and Revolutionary United Front rebels.
53. Series of CNN wire reports describe the boat seizures: 29 December 2003. "U.S. holds al Qaeda drug suspects: Navy intercepts hauls of hashish, heroin and methamphetamines," 20 December 2003, "U.S. seizes drugs on boats in Persian Gulf," 2 January 2004, "More drugs seized in Gulf-U.S."
54. Rachel Ehrenfield, Funding Evil - How Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003), pp. 147-149.
55. Sari Horwit, "Cigarette smuggling linked to terrorism." Washington Post, 8 June 2004 (New York: St. Martins Press), p. 53.
56. Prepared testimony of Dr. Phil Williams before the House International Relations Committee, 31 January 1996.
57. Patrick Clawson and Rensselear Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 53.
58. "Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking And Terrorism - A Dangerous Mix," United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Tuesday, 20 May 2003. Available at (http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64. 88&filename=90052.wais&directory=/diskb/wais/data/108_senate_hearings).
59. See Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, pp. 11-12.
60. "Drug Money For Hezbollah?," CBSNEWS.COM, Washington, D.C., 1 September 2002.
61. Also see DEA transcript release, "More Than 100 Arrested In Nationwide Methamphetamine Investigation," available at (http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/major/me3.html).
62. Members of the cash-strapped cell were discovered when they attempted to get back their deposit on the rental van. Cited in Testimony of Matthew A. Levitt Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Before the United States Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs "Charitable And Humanitarian Organizations in the Network of International Terrorist Financing," 1 August 2002.
63. Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks," p. 70.
64. Fatwa quoted in Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, pp. 143-145.
65. Sebastian Rotella, "The World; Jihad's Unlikely Alliance; Muslim extremists who attacked Madrid funded the plot by selling drugs, investigators say," Los Angeles Times, 23 May 2004.
66. Sebastian Rotella, "The World; Jihad's Unlikely Alliance; Muslim extremists who attacked Madrid funded the plot by selling drugs, investigators say," Los Angeles Times, 2004. Ibid.
67. One of the Madrid suspect bombers was also an informant for authorities investigating a drug gang. See Rotella, "The World; Jihad's Unlikely Alliance."
68. See Douglas Farah, "Colombian Drug Cartels Exploit Tech Advantage," Washington Post, 15 November 1999.
69. See Joseph Contreras and Steven Ambrus, "The DEA's Nightmare: Colombian Targets Get Smart, Techno-Hip and Phenomenally Successful," Newsweek, 21 February 21, 2000.