The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and functional structure

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 1-32

  Horgan, John ^a   Taylor, Max ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE CORK   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031321333     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546559708427413     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. The original IRA was born from the ashes of the 1916 Easter rebellion in Dublin. For a good account of the IRA's early development, see J. Bowyer-Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979 (Dublin: Poolbeg Press Ltd. 1989). For a discussion of the durability of terrorist groups and the exceptionally long lives of religious ones, see David C. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', APSR 78/3 (Sept. 1984) pp.658-77.
2. The original IRA was born from the ashes of the 1916 Easter rebellion in Dublin. For a good account of the IRA's early development, see J. Bowyer-Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979 (Dublin: Poolbeg Press Ltd. 1989). For a discussion of the durability of terrorist groups and the exceptionally long lives of religious ones, see David C. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', APSR 78/3 (Sept. 1984) pp.658-77.
3. The Official IRA (OIRA) still exists today. It declared a cease-fire in 1972, but has been involved in a number of successful armed robberies including a haul of £17,000 from Heuston Station in Dublin in September 1973 and £10,000 from the Larne-Stranraer ferry in September 1984. The OIRA's political wing, the Marxist 'Official Sinn Fein', later became known as the Sinn Fein Workers' Party (soon dropping 'Sinn Fein' to just Workers' Party) from which the Democratic Left movement in the Irish Republic (under Pronsias deRossa) has more recently arisen. The Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) broke away from the OIRA/OSF in September 1975 and spawned the militant Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Amid a history of bitter feuding and factionalism, the INLA persists as a viable security threat to both sides of the Border. It has many members based in Tallaght, Co. Dublin. In 1986, an INLA faction calling itself the Irish People's Liberation Organisation (IPLO) was formed. This was decimated by the PIRA in October 1992 after a spate of shootings and punishment beatings of IPLO members resulting from their extensive involvement in racketeering and the drugs trade, not least while colluding with some members of the Loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). In 1986, a split occurred within PIRA/PSF ranks. Two senior PIRA figures, Ruairi O'Bradaigh and Daithi O'Conaill, helped form Republican Sinn Fein (RSF) which security forces in the Republic believe maintains a militant wing (the Irish National Republican Army (INRA)). The split emerged following dissension over Sinn Fein's decision, made at the Party's Annual Ard Fheis (annual convention), to end its members' traditional policy of abstention from the Dail (Irish Government). Many believe that RSF/INRA has failed to flourish as a result of the death of O'Conaill in 1991.
4. The Provisional Irish Republican Army have been referred to as Oglaigh Na hEireann (Gaelic for 'Irish Volunteers'), the Provos, the 'Ra, IRA (most commonly), Provies, Pinheads, Pinnies (these last two names are not meant to be derogatory: 'Pinheads' refers to the use of pins with which the traditional Easter lilies have been attached to clothing to commemorate the original IRA's uprising in 1916; this contrasts with the sticky gum seen to be used by the Official IRA, hence their nickname 'Stickies' or 'Sticks').
5. Literally the Gaelic for 'ourselves'. Sometimes Sinn Fein is translated as 'ourselves alone' or 'we ourselves', the latter being the party's own preferred translation.
6. In authors' possession.
7. This ironically was one of the reasons which contributed to the subsequent isolation in 1969 of what was to become the OIRA, and although it may be quite difficult to see why, the PIRA still claims to hold a socialist outlook as encouraged by the Green Book, the manual issued to all PIRA recruits.
8. Whom Republicans describe as 'members of the armed wing of the British Government'. See, for example, Neil Forde and Liam O'Coileain, 'Declarations, contradictions, but no clarifications', An Phoblacht/Republican News (Dublin), 13 July 1994.
9. Now disbanded.
10. See 'A dozen other Gardai killed in last 26 years', Irish Times (Dublin), 8 June 1996.
11. See Jim Cusack and Maol Muire Tynan, 'Government accepts IRA killed Garda in Adare', Irish Times (Dublin) 14 June 1996. One such example was a bombing in Enniskillen in 1987 in which a PIRA bomb killed 11 people at the annual Remembrance Day parade. For a discussion of the question when do terrorists claim responsibility, see exchanges between Bruce Hoffman, Dennis Pluchinsky and David C. Rapoport in Terrorism and Political Violence (hereafter TPV) 9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.1-20.
12. See Jim Cusack and Maol Muire Tynan, 'Government accepts IRA killed Garda in Adare', Irish Times (Dublin) 14 June 1996. One such example was a bombing in Enniskillen in 1987 in which a PIRA bomb killed 11 people at the annual Remembrance Day parade. For a discussion of the question when do terrorists claim responsibility, see exchanges between Bruce Hoffman, Dennis Pluchinsky and David C. Rapoport in Terrorism and Political Violence (hereafter TPV) 9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.1-20.
13. See Jack Holland, 'IRA policing serves practical purpose', Irish Echo (New York), 10-16 Jan. 1996.
14. The PIRA increased its operations in England since the early 1990s. In February 1991, the PIRA targeted then Prime Minister Major in No. 10 Downing Street when they conducted a mortar attack as Major met with senior Cabinet members. Bombings in Britain have targeted police stations, railway stations and shopping centres. The PIRA's campaign of attacks have in recent years focused on so-called 'economic' targets including London's financial districts (e.g. the Baltic Exchange and Canary Wharf areas), resulting in what was described as 'astronomical' damage; see Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: HarperCollins 1995) p.587. Damage estimates for the Bishopsgate bomb in April 1993, for example, range from £1.5 to £2 billion.
15. 'Bloody Friday' in 1972 saw the almost-simultaneous detonation of 22 car bombs across Belfast. Nine people were killed and hundreds were injured. The Birmingham, Guildford and Woolwich pub bombings in 1974 claimed the lives of 28 people.
16. Martha Crenshaw, Decisions to Abandon Terrorism: A Preliminary Case Study of the IRA. Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago Hilton, 31 Aug.-3 Sept. 1995, p.3.
17. In two of the most well-received works on Republican terrorism, Tim Pat Coogan (note 12) and J. Bowyer-Bell (note 1) make all-too scant references to the Provisionals' command structures and functioning.
18. This distinction is equally important in the context of discussions about the concept of a 'terrorist': should the person who helps store rifles, explosives or ammunition be held equally responsible for the active terrorist's crimes?
19. For a more detailed discussion, see Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents. ETA: 1952-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1984) and Max. Taylor, The Terrorist (London: Brassey's 1988).
20. For a more detailed discussion, see Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents. ETA: 1952-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1984) and Max. Taylor, The Terrorist (London: Brassey's 1988).
21. Taylor (note 17)p.136.
22. See J. Butler, 'IRA admits Osnabruck mortar attack', Press Association, 30 June 1996. Also, the German intelligence agency, the Bundeskriminalamt, issued a press release noting that no less than seven vehicles were used in the attack.
23. Informers, who receive prison sentence remission as a result of having supplied security forces with valuable information pertaining to former comrades.
24. Coogan (note 12) p.539.
25. Taylor (note 17) p.136.
26. Clark (note 17).
27. 'Army* hereafter refers to Provisional IRA.
28. Dail Eireann is the Irish Government.
29. See Jim Cusack, 'Doves are winning power battle inside the IRA', Irish Times (Dublin), 16 Sept. 1996, and also Jim Cusack, 'IRA failures - informers or just incompetence?', Irish Times (Dublin), 24 Sept. 1996.
30. See Jim Cusack, 'Doves are winning power battle inside the IRA', Irish Times (Dublin), 16 Sept. 1996, and also Jim Cusack, 'IRA failures - informers or just incompetence?', Irish Times (Dublin), 24 Sept. 1996.
31. It is currently thought that all Chiefs of Staff have been male. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of 'his' or 'he' necessarily means that the person is a male.
32. Italic (emphasis) ours: hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, emphasis in conversations or interviews with sources is indicated by italics.
33. See, for example, Elaine Keogh, 'Explosives found as Garda search extended in Louth', Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Nov. 1996.
34. That this does not always happen is demonstrated by the murders of Gardai by the PIRA throughout the Provisionals' campaign. The Army Council officially does not encourage this tactic, as outlined in the Green Book's General Order no. 8 (Pt. 1) which states that: 'Volunteers are strictly forbidden to take any military action against 26 County forces any circumstances whatsoever. The importance of this order...especially in the border areas cannot be over-emphasised.'
35. See Veronica Guerin, 'IRA unit "intent on killing Garda"', Sunday Independent (Dublin), 9 June 1996.
36. Sinn Fein still receives a tiny share of the vote in the Republic of Ireland. See Jimmy Woulfe, One violent act does not make a hotbed', Sunday Independent (Dublin), 16 June 1996, p.13.
37. See John Horgan and Max. Taylor, The Provisional IRA and Drugs in the Republic of Ireland', in preparation. Also see Jim Cusack, 'Republicans linked to rise of the vigilantes', Irish Times (Dublin), 31 May 1996.
38. See John Morgan and Max. Taylor, The Provisional IRA and Drugs in the Republic of Ireland', in preparation. Also see Jim Cusack, 'Republicans linked to rise of the vigilantes', Irish Times (Dublin), 31 May 1996.
39. One security force member in the Republic described areas of Co. Limerick as 'worse than Crossmaglen' (interview conducted by the first author). Also see Max. Taylor and John Horgan, 'The 1994-96 Provisional IRA Cease-fire in Northern Ireland', TPV, under submission.
40. See Jim Cusack and Suzanne Breen, 'Reputed head of Munster IRA arrested over killing', Irish Times (Dublin), 10 June 1996.
41. Ibid.
42. This contradicts some authoritative reports - see Veronica Guerin, 'We'll get them: Gardai', Sunday Independent (Dublin), 16 June 1996.
43. Interview conducted by the first author.
44. Sometimes there is such overlap that confusion abounds. GHQ's 'Education' and 'Publicity' departments often contain the same individuals.
45. It is not difficult to see now how investigative efforts of security forces and intelligence services are hampered by 'pictures' of these apparently formalised command structures, whose function and personnel seem to overlap each other, as in the case of QMG.
46. The Green Book's General Order No. 11 states that: 'Any Volunteer who seizes or is party to the seizure of arms, ammunition or explosives which are being held under Army control, shall be deemed guilty of treachery. A duly constituted Court-martial shall try all cases. Penalty for breach of this order: Death'.
47. Interview conducted by the first author.
48. Ibid.
49. See Max. Taylor and Ethel Quayle, Terrorist Lives (London: Brassey's 1994).
50. Interview conducted by the first author.
51. One of the most horrific assaults in the history of this brutal behaviour occurred in February 1996. Martin Doherty, a Belfast teenager, was literally 'crucified', having had steel spikes driven through his hands and knees, nailing him to a post, by a PIRA punishment-gang. Events such as this must surely raise questions about the mental health of the individuals responsible. Is it unrealistic to presuppose the existence of sadism in these instances? 47. Also see Jack Holland, 'IRA policing serves practical purpose', Irish Echo (New York), 10-16 Jan. 1996.
52. Interview conducted by the first author.
53. See A. Percival, 'The secret world of the IRA sleeper', Press Association News, 19 Feb. Also see Tom Squitieri, 'IRA seeks members with clean face, clean record', USA Today, 14 March 1996; Jim Cusack, 'Co-ordinated British effort to combat IRA is paying off and 'Hunger strike revived IRA in Britain', both in Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Sept. 1996, and Rachel Donnelley, 'Attacks on cities may have been "imminent"', Irish Times (Dublin), 24 Sept. 1996.
54. See A. Percival, 'The secret world of the IRA sleeper', Press Association News, 19 Feb. Also see Tom Squitieri, 'IRA seeks members with clean face, clean record', USA Today, 14 March 1996; Jim Cusack, 'Co-ordinated British effort to combat IRA is paying off and 'Hunger strike revived IRA in Britain', both in Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Sept. 1996, and Rachel Donnelley, 'Attacks on cities may have been "imminent"', Irish Times (Dublin), 24 Sept. 1996.
55. See A. Percival, 'The secret world of the IRA sleeper', Press Association News, 19 Feb. Also see Tom Squitieri, 'IRA seeks members with clean face, clean record', USA Today, 14 March 1996; Jim Cusack, 'Co-ordinated British effort to combat IRA is paying off and 'Hunger strike revived IRA in Britain', both in Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Sept. 1996, and Rachel Donnelley, 'Attacks on cities may have been "imminent"', Irish Times (Dublin), 24 Sept. 1996.
56. See A. Percival, 'The secret world of the IRA sleeper', Press Association News, 19 Feb. Also see Tom Squitieri, 'IRA seeks members with clean face, clean record', USA Today, 14 March 1996; Jim Cusack, 'Co-ordinated British effort to combat IRA is paying off and 'Hunger strike revived IRA in Britain', both in Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Sept. 1996, and Rachel Donnelley, 'Attacks on cities may have been "imminent"', Irish Times (Dublin), 24 Sept. 1996.
57. Interestingly, this contradicts the Green Book's instructions on how to live one's life as an invisible person: Volunteers in training are specifically instructed to remain as distant as possible from any political activities (although perfectly legitimate of course) which might alert the security forces to their 'sympathies', although it is probable that such 'sympathisers' become involved in Active Service after a period of time while involved in more 'general' Republican activities, such as those described (i.e. selling newspapers).
58. See John Morgan, 'Terrorism and Organised Crime in the Republic of Ireland: A Case Study - Provisional IRA Fund-raising', Ph.D. dissertation, in preparation.
59. See Jeffrey Robinson, The Laundrymen (London: Simon and Schuster 1994).
60. Interviews conducted by the first author.
61. See Horgan (note 51).
62. See, for example, C. Parkin, 'Men still quizzed after likely IRA raid foiled', Press Association News, 28 Oct. 1996.
63. Coogan (note 12, p.479) also makes reference to this in an interview with a former senior command figure.
64. Interview conducted by the first author.
65. See, for example, Richard Clutterbuck, 'Trends in Terrorist Weaponry', TPV 5/2 (Summer 1993) pp. 134-7.
66. See C.J.M. Drake, 'The Provisional IRA: A Case Study', TPV 3/2 (Summer 1991) p.51. Also see Clutterbuck (note 57) p.134.
67. Liz Allen, 'IRA units still "alive and kicking"', Sunday Tribune (Dublin), 23 June 1996.
68. Interview conducted by the first author.
69. This manual, entitled A Reporter's Guide to Ireland as viewed by the first author, is actually believed to have been written by a member of the OIRA in the mid-1970s. The present copy as viewed by JH has been used as training material for PIRA members in the Republic of Ireland.
70. See Liam Clarke, 'IRA hackers break into phone network to plot RUC killings', Sunday Times (London), 17 Nov. 1996, and Liam Clarke, 'MI5 uncovers IRA's white-collar spies', Sunday Times (London), 1 Dec. 1996. Also see Liam Clarke, 'IRA uses hi-tech international intelligence bank', Sunday Times (London), 9 March 1997.
71. See Liam Clarke, 'IRA hackers break into phone network to plot RUC killings', Sunday Times (London), 17 Nov. 1996, and Liam Clarke, 'MI5 uncovers IRA's white-collar spies', Sunday Times (London), 1 Dec. 1996. Also see Liam Clarke, 'IRA uses hi-tech international intelligence bank', Sunday Times (London), 9 March 1997.
72. See Liam Clarke, 'IRA hackers break into phone network to plot RUC killings', Sunday Times (London), 17 Nov. 1996, and Liam Clarke, 'MI5 uncovers IRA's white-collar spies', Sunday Times (London), 1 Dec. 1996. Also see Liam Clarke, 'IRA uses hi-tech international intelligence bank', Sunday Times (London), 9 March 1997.
73. Intelligence Officer.
74. Special Branch.
75. Informants.
76. An Phoblacht/Repubtican News is the Republican newspaper, founded in 1970 following the PIRA's emergence.
77. This estimate up to January, 1997.
78. The journalist Liz Allen (note 60) also cites an estimate of 70.
79. Yorkshire Television, Talking to the Enemy, ITV, 20 Dec. 1994.
80. See Taylor and Horgan (note 34).
81. See note 70. The Yorkshire documentary refers to this and also cites membership estimates.
82. Coogan (note 12) p.479.
83. Ibid.; also p.560.
84. Yorkshire Television (see note 70).
85. Ibid.
86. Interview conducted by the first author.
87. See Tom Brady, 'Era of the renegade IRA', Irish Independent, 23 Dec. 1994.
88. Interview conducted by the first author.
89. See Horgan (note 51).
90. For a discussion of psychological issues, see Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: a Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1980), and also Ken Heskin, 'Terrorism in Ireland: the Past and Future', Irish Journal of Psychology 15/2-3 (1994) pp.469-79. Also see Taylor and Quayle (note 44) and Taylor (note 17).
91. For a discussion of psychological issues, see Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: a Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1980), and also Ken Heskin, 'Terrorism in Ireland: the Past and Future', Irish Journal of Psychology 15/2-3 (1994) pp.469-79. Also see Taylor and Quayle (note 44) and Taylor (note 17).
92. For a discussion of psychological issues, see Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: a Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1980), and also Ken Heskin, 'Terrorism in Ireland: the Past and Future', Irish Journal of Psychology 15/2-3 (1994) pp.469-79. Also see Taylor and Quayle (note 44) and Taylor (note 17).
93. See R.W. White and T. Falkenberg White, 'Revolution in the city: on the resources of urban guerrillas', TPV 3/4 (Winter 1991) pp.100-32.
94. It is also cost-effective - an issue which the PIRA holds very dear to its heart and which has very important implications not only for recruitment, but for operational successes, organisational survival in the face of competition, internal cohesion and possible splitting.
95. The apparent use of forged documents was demonstrated more recently in an attack (claimed by the 'Continuity Army Council') on the Lisbum Army barracks near Belfast (see Martin Crowley, 'Northern Irish bombers may have had fake passes', Reuters, 8 Oct. 1996).
96. As outlined in Coogan (note 12) p.466.
97. Ibid., p.465.
98. Ibid.
99. Not necessarily the Volunteer's real first name.
100. See Martin Dillon, Stone Cold (London: Arrow 1993) p.78.
101. V. Guerin, 'IRA used ceasefire to plan bomb campaign', Sunday Independent (Dublin), 23 June 1996.
102. White and Falkenberg White (note 82).
103. The PIRA's successes, however, in conducting surveillance in 'foreign' operational areas have been especially noteworthy.
104. Not least functional organisational achievements.
105. Interview conducted by the first author.
106. Interview conducted by the first author.
107. Interview conducted by the first author.
108. See Andrew P. Silke, 'Terrorism in Northern Ireland: an Application of Rational Choice Theory', Paper presented at the British Psychological Society Annual Conference, Brighton, April 1996.
109. Interview conducted by the first author.
110. See Catherine Cleary, 'Search continues of area where car was found', Irish Times (Dublin), 10 June 1996.
111. For an indicator of such planning, see Rachel Borrill, 'Police trace driver who paid cash for bomb track', Irish Times (Dublin), 18 June 1996.
112. Crenshaw (note 14) pp.5-6.
113. Ibid., p.6.
114. Interview conducted by the first author.
115. Also see Cusack and Breen (note 35). Aside at all from the Gardai in the Republic seeking McCabe's killers, the PIRA themselves are said to be 'concerned' that 'disciplinary actions' be brought against at least three people; one from Strabane in Northern Ireland and two based in Munster (one a former INLA member).
116. This has, however, begun to change dramatically since the early 1990s - the UDA having incurred their own reorganisation in what Cusack and Taylor describe (in the words of a senior UDA figure) as 'a return to basic principles' (Jim Cusack and Max. Taylor, 'Resurgence of a Terrorist Organisation - Part 1: The UDA, a Case Study', TPV 5/3 (Autumn 1993) pp.1-27. Also see Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: OUP 1992).
117. This has, however, begun to change dramatically since the early 1990s - the UDA having incurred their own reorganisation in what Cusack and Taylor describe (in the words of a senior UDA figure) as 'a return to basic principles' (Jim Cusack and Max. Taylor, 'Resurgence of a Terrorist Organisation - Part 1: The UDA, a Case Study', TPV 5/3 (Autumn 1993) pp.1-27. Also see Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: OUP 1992).
118. J.M. Post, 'Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist Policy', in Paul Wilkinson and Alisdair Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1987) pp.307-17. Also see J.M. Post, 'Terrorist Psycho-logic: terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces', in W. Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: phsychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind (Cambridge: CUP 1990) pp.25-40. Jerrold Post and Martha Crenshaw have presented different views on terrorist behaviour in Walter Reich's book. Crenshaw has examined the strategic bases of terrorist behaviour while Post believes that members of terrorist organisations do not 'reason' logically, that it is the internal group and organisational dynamics which determine terrorist behaviour. While the present authors do not agree with Post's proposition, we must agree that, as Post notes, 'the specific group [in this case the PIRA] must be understood in its historical, cultural, and political context' (in Reich (ed.) p.38).
119. J.M. Post, 'Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist Policy', in Paul Wilkinson and Alisdair Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1987) pp.307-17. Also see J.M. Post, 'Terrorist Psycho-logic: terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces', in W. Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: phsychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind (Cambridge: CUP 1990) pp.25-40. Jerrold Post and Martha Crenshaw have presented different views on terrorist behaviour in Walter Reich's book. Crenshaw has examined the strategic bases of terrorist behaviour while Post believes that members of terrorist organisations do not 'reason' logically, that it is the internal group and organisational dynamics which determine terrorist behaviour. While the present authors do not agree with Post's proposition, we must agree that, as Post notes, 'the specific group [in this case the PIRA] must be understood in its historical, cultural, and political context' (in Reich (ed.) p.38).
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.,p.315.
122. According to a Sunday Times report (12 March 1995) which Crenshaw (note 14) cites, socalled 'hardliners' (presumably members of the Army Council and regional brigadiers) agreed to Gerry Adams' proposals for the 1994 cease-fire in exchange for 'greater influence over the internal affairs of the organisation'. Also see Taylor and Horgan (note 34).
123. See Garret Fitzgerald, 'Only clear thing about IRA strategy is uncertainty', Irish Times (Dublin), 4 Jan. 1997.