Agency problems in law enforcement: Theory and application to the U.S. Coast Guard

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 11, 2005, Pages 1593-1609

  Gawande, Kishore ^a   Bohara, Alok K ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

Author keywords

Micropanel data; Oil spills; Optimal penalty; Public policy; Violations

Indexed keywords

MICROPENAL DATA; OPTIMAL PENALTY; VIOLATIONS;

COASTAL ENGINEERING; CONTRACTS; INSPECTION; OIL SPILLS; PROBLEM SOLVING; PUBLIC POLICY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

LAW ENFORCEMENT;

EID: 27744569848     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0422     Document Type: Article

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