Governance and performance: Theory-based evidence from U.S. Coast Guard inspections

Policy Studies Journal

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 283-306

  Moffett, Maurice ^a   Bohara, Alok K ^b   Gawande, Kishore ^c  

^a BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

^c TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LAW ENFORCEMENT; MARINE POLICY; POLLUTION CONTROL;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES; WESTERN HEMISPHERE; WORLD;

EID: 20444474580     PISSN: 0190292X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2005.00106.x     Document Type: Article

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