Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 405-424

  Aoyagi, Masaki ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Two armed bandit; experimentation; mutual observability; herd behavior

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040678262     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1995.2450     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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