Brain-inspired Genetic Complementary Learning for Stock Market Prediction

2005 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, IEEE CEC 2005. Proceedings

Volumn 3, Issue , 2005, Pages 2653-2668

  Tan, T Z ^a   Quek, C ^a   Ng, G S ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FUZZY SETS; INVENTORY CONTROL; LEARNING SYSTEMS; MARKETING; NEURAL NETWORKS; PREDICTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS; STATISTICS;

BRAIN-INSPIRED GENETIC COMPLEMENTARY LEARNING; HUMAN RECOGNITION; MULTIYEAR TREND PREDICTION; STOCK MARKET PREDICTION;

GENETIC ALGORITHMS;

EID: 27144496066     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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