Finite memory and imperfect monitoring

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 59-72

  Cole, Harold L ^a,b   Kocherlakota, Narayana R ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26844548382     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.07.001     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. D. Abreu D. Pearce E. Stacchetti Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring Econometrica 58 1990 1041-1063
2. R. Aumann S. Sorin Cooperation and bounded recall Games and Economic Behavior 1 1989 5-39
3. V. Bhaskar Informational constraints and the overlapping generations model: Folk and anti-folk theorems Review of Economic Studies 65 1998 135-149
4. E. Kalai W. Stanford Finite rationality and interpersonal complexity in repeated games Econometrica 56 1988 397-410
5. Kandori, M., Obara, I., 2000. Efficiency in repeated games revisited: The role of private strategies, unpublished
6. E. Lehrer Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies Journal of Economic Theory 46 1988 130-144
7. G. Mailath S. Morris Repeated games with almost-perfect monitoring Journal of Economic Theory 102 2002 189-228
8. G. Mailath S. Mathews T. Sekiguchi Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring Contributions to Theoretical Economics 2 1 2002
9. R. Radner R. Myerson E. Maskin An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and uniformly inefficient equilibria Review of Economic Studies 53 1986 59-70
10. H. Sabourian Repeated games with M-period bounded memory (pure strategies) Journal of Mathematical Economics 30 1998 1-35