Rent-seeking for a risky rent: A model and experimental investigation

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 403-429

  Öncüler, Ayse ^a   Croson, Rachel ^b  

^a INSEAD   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiment; Inefficiency; Political decision making; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 26644442131     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629805056895     Document Type: Review

References (56)

1. Anderson, Lisa and Sarah Stafford (2003) 'An Experimental Analysis of Rent Seeking Under Varying Competitive Conditions', Public Choice 115(1-2): 199-216.
2. Anderson, Simon, Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt (1998) 'Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All Pay Auction', Journal of Political Economy 106(4): 828-53.
3. Baye Michael R., Dan Kovenock and Casper G. de Vries (1993) 'Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction', American Economic Review 83: 289-94.
4. Becker, Gary (1968) 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', Journal of Political Economy 76: 169-217.
5. Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard Thaler (1995) 'Myopic Loss Aversion and The Equity Premium Puzzle', Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 73-92.
6. Boadu, Fred, Fred Ruppel and Amy Angel (1992) 'An Empirical Model of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions', European Journal of Political Economy 8: 281-93.
7. Bohnet, Iris, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck (2001) 'More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding', American Political Science Review 95: 131-44.
8. Buchanan, James, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock (eds) (1980) Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press.
9. Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel and John Zaller (2003) 'Polls or Pols?', Brookings Review 21: 36-9.
10. Davis, Doug and Robert Reilly (1998) 'Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer', Public Choice 95: 89-115.
11. Dawes, Robyn M., John Orbell, Randy Simmons and Alphons van de Kragt (1986) 'Organizing Groups for Collective Action', American Political Science Review 80 (December): 1171-85.
12. Dorussen Han and Jongryn Mo (2001) 'Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-seeking as Commitment Strategies', Journal of Conflict Resolution 45: 395-426.
13. Eckel, Catherine, Martin Johnson and Rick Wilson (2002) 'Fairness and Rejection in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game', Political Analysis 10: 376-93.
14. Friedman, Daniel and Shyam Sunder (1994) Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Gneezy, Uri and Jan Potters (1997) 'An Experiment on Risk-Taking and Evaluation Periods', Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 631-46.
16. Gradstein, Mark (1995) 'Intensity of Competition, Entry and Entry Deterrence in Rent Seeking Contest', Economics and Politics 7: 79-91.
17. Guarnaschelli, Serena, Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey (2000) 'An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules', American Political Science Review 94: 407-23.
18. Herzberg, Roberta Q. and Rick Wilson (1988) 'Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting', Journal of Politics 50 (May): 471-86.
19. Hillman, Arye L. and Eliakim Katz (1984) 'Risk Averse Rent-Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power', Economic Journal 94: 104-10.
20. Hillman, Arye L. and John G. Riley (1989) 'Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers', Economics and Politics 1: 17-39.
21. Hillman, Arye L. and Heinrich Ursprung (2000) 'Political Culture and Economic Decline', European Journal of Political Economy 16: 189-213.
22. Hindmoor, Andrew (1999) 'Rent Seeking Evaluated', Journal of Political Philosophy 7: 434-52.
23. Kinder, Donald R. and Thomas Palfrey (eds) (1993) Experimental Foundations of Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
24. Krueger, Anne (1974) 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64: 291-303.
25. Lake, David (1992) 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review 86: 24-37.
26. Lambsdorff, Johann (2002) 'Corruption and Rent-Seeking', Public Choice 113: 97-125.
27. Lopez, Rigoberto (2001) 'Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies', Economics and Politics 13 (November): 257-79.
28. McDermott, Rose (2001) 'The Psychological Ideas of Amos Tversky and Their Relevance for Political Science', Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(1): 5-33.
29. Millner, Edward L. and Michael D. Pratt (1989) 'An Experimental Investigation of Efficient Rent-Seeking', Public Choice 62: 139-51.
30. Millner, Edward L. and Michael D. Pratt (1991) 'Risk Aversion and Rent-Seeking: An Extension and Some Experimental Evidence', Public Choice 69: 81-92.
31. Morikawa, Tomonori, John Orbell and Audun Runde (1995) 'The Advantage of Being Moderately Cooperative', American Political Science Review 89 (September): 601-11.
32. Morton, Rebecca, Kathleen McGraw and Kenneth Williams (forthcoming) Laboratory Experimental Methods in Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
33. Morton, Rebecca and Kenneth Williams (1999) 'Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting', American Political Science Review 93 (March): 51-67.
34. Nitzan, Shmuel (1994) 'Modeling Rent-Seeking Contests', European Journal of Political Economy 10: 41-60.
35. Orbell, John, Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Randy Simmons (1984) 'Do Cooperators Exit More Readily Than Defectors?', American Political Science Review 79 (March): 147-62.
36. Orbell, John and Robyn M. Dawes (1991) 'A "Cognitive Miser" Theory of Cooperators' Advantage', American Political Science Review 85: 515-28.
37. Osborne, Evan (2000) 'Diversity, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Conflict: A Rent-Seeking Perspective', Kyklos 53: 509-26.
38. Ostrom, Elinor (1998) 'A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997', American Political Science Review 92 (March): 1-18.
39. Posner, Richard A. (1975) 'The Social Cost Of Monopoly and Regulation', Journal of Political Economy 83: 807-27.
40. Potters, Jan, Casper G. de Vries and Frans van Winden (1998) 'An Experimental Examination of Rational Rent-Seeking', European Journal of Political Economy 14: 783-800.
41. Reiter, Dan and Allan Stam (1998) 'Democracy, War Initiation and Victory', American Political Science Review 92 (June): 377-89.
42. Roth, Alvin E. and Michael W. Malouf (1979) 'Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining', Psychological Review 86: 574-94.
43. Rowley, Charles K., Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock (eds) (1988) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer.
44. Schmidt, David, Robert Shupp and James Walker (2004) 'Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence.' Working Paper, Federal Trade Commission.
45. Schmitt, Pamela, Robert Shupp, Kurtis Swope and John Cadigan (2004) 'Multi-Period Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryover: Theory and Experimental Evidence', Economics of Governance 5(3): 187-211.
46. Shogren Jason F. and Kyung Hwan Baik (1991) 'Reexamining Efficient Rent-Seeking in Laboratory Markets', Public Choice 69: 69-79.
47. Shupp, Robert (2004) 'Single versus Multiple Winner Rent-Seeking Contests: An Experimental Investigation.' Working Paper, Ball State University.
48. Theilmann, John and Allen Wilhite (1995) 'Congressional Turnover: Negating the Incumbency Advantage', Social Science Quarterly 76: 594-606.
49. Tollison, Robert D. and Roger D. Congleton (eds) (1995) The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking. London: Edgar Elgar Press.
50. Tullock, Gordon (1967) 'The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5: 224-32.
51. Tullock, Gordon (1980) 'Efficient Rent Seeking', in James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock (eds) Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, pp. 97-112. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press.
52. Tullock, Gordon (1989) The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
53. Van de Kragt, Alphons, John Orbell and Robyn Dawes (1983) 'The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems', American Political Science Review 77 (March): 112-22.
54. Ward, Hugh (2004) 'Pressure Politics: A Game-Theoretical Investigation of Lobbying and the Measurement of Power', Journal of Theoretical Politics 16(1): 31-52.
55. Wilson, Rick (1986) 'Forward and Backward Agenda Procedures: Committee Experiments on Structurally-Induced Equilibrium', Journal of Politics 48 (May): 390-409.
56. Wilson, Rick and Roberta Q. Herzberg (1987) 'Negative Decision Powers and Institutional Equilibrium: Theory and Experiments on Blocking Coalitions', Western Political Quarterly 40 (December): 593-609.