Riker and federalism

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 93-111

  Filippov, Mikhail ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Balance; Bargain; Credible commitments; Federal theory; Safeguards

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444606988     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2230-x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (42)

1. Amadae, S. M., and de Bueno Mesquita, B. (1999) "The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory." Annual Review of Political Science 2: 269-95.
2. de Bueno Mesquita, B., and Shepsle, K. (2001) William Harrison Riker, 19201993. Biographical Memoirs 79. Washington: National Academy Press.
3. Cheng, Seymour C.-Y. (1931) Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire. New York: Columbia University Press.
4. Dikshit, R. D. (1971) "Military Interpretation of Federal Constitutions: A Critique." The Journal of Politics 33(1): 180-89.
5. Dikshit R. D, (1975) The Political Geography of Federalism; An Inquiry into Origins and Stability. New York: Wiley.
6. Elster, J. (1989) Nuts and Bolts For the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Fink Evelyn, C., and W.H.Riker, (1989) The Strategy of Ratification In: Bernard, (ed.), The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. pp. 220-55. New York: Agathon.
8. Friedrich, C. J. (1966) "Book Reviews." The American Political Science Review 60(2): 403-05.
9. Friedrich, C. J. (1968) Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger.
10. Hardin, R. (1989) Why a Constitution? In: Bernard, (eds.) The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. New York: Agathon Press.
11. Hayek, F. [von] (1942/44) "Scientism and the Study of Society." Economica 9: 267291
12. Hayek, F. [von] Economica & 10, 34-63
13. Hayek, F. [von] Economica & 11, 27-39
14. King, P. (1982) Federalism and Federation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
15. Knight, J. (1992) Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Knight J., and Sened, I. (eds) (1995) Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
17. Lemco, J. (1991) Political Stability in Federal Governments. New York: Praeger Publishers.
18. McKay, D. H. (1996) Rush to Union: Understanding the European Federal Bargain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19. Moe, T. (1984) "The New Economics of Organization." American Journal of Political Science 28(November): 739-77.
20. Nash, J. Jr. (1950) "The Bargaining Problem." Econometrica 18: 155-62.
21. North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. North, D., and Weingast, B. (1989) "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." Journal of Economic History 49(4): 803-32.
23. Osborne, M. J., and Rubinstein, A. (1990) Bargaining and Markets. San Diego: Academic Press.
24. Stepan, A. (2001) Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. Riker, W. (1953) Democracy in the United States, New York.
26. Riker, W. (1955) "The Senate and American Federalism." The American Political Science Review 49(2): 452-69.
27. Riker, W. (1957) Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy. Washington, D.C: Public Affairs Press.
28. Riker, W. (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
29. Riker, W. (1964) Federalism; Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston: Little Brown.
30. Riker, W. (1969) "Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It Matter?." Comparative Politics 2(1): 135-46.
31. Riker, W. (1982) Liberalism against Populism: a Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
32. Riker, W. (1975) Federalism, In: Fred Greenstein, I., and Nelson Polsby, (eds.) The Handbook of Political Science, Volume V: Government Institutions and Processes. Reading MA: Addison Wesley.
33. Riker, W. (1986) The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
34. Riker, W. (1992) "The Merits of Bicameralism." The International Review of Law and Economics 12(2): 166-68.
35. Riker, W. (1996) The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the Ratification of the Constitution. New Haven: Yale University Press.
36. Riker, W. (1996) European federation: Lessons of Past Experience, In: Joachiim Jens Hesse, and Vincent Wright, (eds.) Federalizing Europe: The Costs, Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems. pp. 9-24, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
37. Riker, W., and Ronald, S. (1957) "Disharmony in Federal Government." Behavioural Science 2: 276-90.
38. Riker, W. and Lemco, J. (1987) The Relations between Structure and Stability. In: Riker W. (ed.) The Development of American Federalism, pp. 113-134. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
39. Sehofield, N. (2001) "Constitutions, Voting And Democracy: A Review." Social Choice and Welfare 18: 571-600.
40. Schofield, N. (2002) "Evolution of the Constitution." The British Journal of Political Science 32(1): 1-20.
41. Weingast, B. R. (1995) "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. (Spring) 11: 1-31.
42. Wheare, K. C. (1953) Federal Government. London: Oxford University Press.