'A "special relationship" Sometimes in spite of ourselves': Britain and Jordan, 1957-73

Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 221-244

  Ashton, Nigel J ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444589791     PISSN: 03086534     EISSN: 17439329     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03086530500123812     Document Type: Review

References (143)

1. The literature on Britain and the Suez crisis is extensive. A selection of the more important works in the field includes: D. Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis (Oxford, 1988);
2. P.L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-56: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991);
3. D. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill, NC, 1990);
4. Keith Kyle, Suez (London, 1991);
5. W.R. Louis and R. Owen, Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford, 1989);
6. W.S. Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London, 1991). For the British role in the region in the aftermath of Suez,
7. see N.J. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-1959 (Basingstoke, 1996);
8. and idem, 'A Great New Venture? Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution, July 1958', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4, 1 (March 1993);
9. R. McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967 (London, 2003);
10. R. Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962 (Leicester, 1996);
11. and idem, 'Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958', International History Review, 16, 2 (May 1994);
12. M. Elliot, 'Defeat and Revival: Britain and the Middle East', in W. Kaiser, and G. Staerck (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64: Contracting Options (Basingstoke, 2000). For Britain, the Gulf and South Arabia after Suez,
13. see M. Alani, Operation Vantage: British Military Intervention in Kuwait, 1961 (London, 1990);
14. N. Ashton, 'Britain and the Kuwaiti Crisis, 1961', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9, 1 (1998);
15. S. Smith, Kuwait, the al-Sabah and Oil (London, 1999);
16. M. Snell-Mendoza, 'In Defence of Oil: Britain's Response to the Iraqi Threat towards Kuwait, 1961', Contemporary British History, 10, 3 (1996);
17. G. Balfour Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge, 1991);
18. W.T. Fain, 'John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan: Managing the "Special Relationship" in the Persian Gulf Region, 1961-63', Middle Eastern Studies, 38, 4 (2002);
19. S. Mawby, 'Britain's Last Imperial Frontier: The Aden Protectorates, 1952-59', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 29, 2 (2001);
20. T.T. Petersen, 'Crossing the Rubicon? Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez, 1964-1968: A Bibliographic Review', International History Review, 22, 2 (2000);
21. J. Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment (Basingstoke, 1998).
22. Balfour Paul to Parsons, 12 Feb. 1973, FCO 93/84, the National Archives, Kew, Surrey (hereafter NA).
23. Author's Interview with Marwan al-Qasim, Amman, 23 May 2001. For a useful introductory survey of the structure of decision-making in Jordan under Hussein, see Samir Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge, 1987), 1-18.
24. See, for example, the survey of the Hussein-Hassan relationship penned by Glen Balfour Paul on his arrival in Amman in 1972, Balfour Paul to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 'Jordan: First Impressions', 26 Sept. 1972, FCO 17/1690.
25. Broad literature in this field, going beyond the study of a specific crisis such as that of September 1970, is rather limited. See A. Bligh, The Political Legacy of King Hussein (Brighton, 2002);
26. U. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967 (Oxford, 1989);
27. D. Little, 'A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein, and Jordan, 1953-1970', International History Review, 17, 3 (Aug. 1995).
28. One historian who has tried to integrate analysis of both the British and American roles into a somewhat broader study is Z. Shalom, The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan, 1960-3: The Perils of the Pro-Nasser Policy (Brighton, 1998).
29. K. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London, 1993), 108.
30. P.J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan (London, 1967), 7.
31. J. Crawford, 'Israel (1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States', in G. Goodwin-Gill and S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality of International Law (Oxford, 1999), 99. The 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan confirms the western boundary of Jordan as being the line laid down in 1922.
32. For Abdullah's role in negotiating the creation of Transjordan with Churchill, see M. Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Volume 1: The Creation and Development of Transjordan; 1920-1929 (Oxford, 1989), 44-48;
33. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, 108-09.
34. E. Rogan, The Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921 (Oxford, 1999).
35. M.C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge, 1987), 148-50:
36. P. Robins, A History of Jordan (Cambridge, 2004), 57-58.
37. The key sources on Abdullah's negotiations with Jewish and subsequently Israeli leaders between 1947 and 1951 include the following: A. Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford, 1988);
38. A. Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London, 2000), 29-30; 62-68;
39. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan;
40. Idem, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51 (London, 1988);
41. idem, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51 (London, 1992);
42. U. Bar-Joseph, The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London, 1987);
43. E. Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The 'New Historians' (London, 2000);
44. J. Nevo, King Abdallah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition (Basingstoke, 1996);
45. A. Sela, 'Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography, and Reality', Middle Eastern Studies, 28 (1992);
46. E.L. Rogan, 'Transjordan and 1948: The Persistence of an Official History', in E.L. Rogan and A. Shlaim (eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge, 2001).
47. His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head (London, 1962), 21-29.
48. Record of a Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and King Hussein of Jordan at 1 Carlton Gardens on Wednesday 11 July 1973 at 2.00pm, FCO 93/97.
49. Queen Noor, Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life (London, 2003), 281, 420.
50. The most detailed account of the raid's planning and aftermath is in B. Morris, Israel's Border Wars: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to the Suez War (Oxford, 1993), 244-62.
51. For the British attempt to get Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, see R. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (Oxford, 1994), 108-25;
52. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 21-30;
53. and idem, 'The Foreign Office, the Baghdad Pact and Jordan', Asian and African Studies, 21 (1987);
54. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 61-68;
55. M.B. Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent: Britain's Crisis in Jordan, December 1955-March 1956', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 22 (1990).
56. For Glubb's dismissal, see Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 126-43;
57. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 31-38.
58. Author's interview with former Free Officer, Mahmud al-Mu'ayta, Amman, 5 Sept. 2001.
59. See also Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 138-40.
60. E. Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951-56 (London, 1986), 343.
61. Eden to Lloyd, 15 April 1956, M.69/56, PREM 11/1420, NA; Note by Bishop, 16 April 1956, ibid.; Duke's telegram no.570, 7 April 1956, ibid.; Foreign Office to Amman, 17 April 1956, telegram no.782, ibid.
62. Lucas, Divided We Stand, 228. For a treatment of this issue from the Jordanian perspective,
63. see Z. Raad, 'A Nightmare Avoided: Jordan and Suez, 1956', Israel Affairs, 1, 2 (Winter 1994), 288-308.
64. Text of Hussein's letter in Amman to Foreign Office, 28 July 1956, PREM 11/1422.
65. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 41; author's interview with former Foreign Minister, Hazem al-Nusseibeh, Amman, 4 Sept. 2001.
66. C. Johnston, The Brink of Jordan (London, 1972), 34-48.
67. For explanations as to why the US intelligence community did not predict the coup, see 'Intelligence Indications of Coup in Iraq', Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60 (hereafter FRUS], XII (Washington, DC, 1993), 322-23.
68. For differing explanations of the British intervention in Jordan, see Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 165-89;
69. and idem, 'A Great New Venture?';
70. Ovendale, 'Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958';
71. W.R. Louis, 'Britain and the Crisis of 1958', in W.R. Louis and R. Owen (eds.), A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958 (London, 2002), 15-76;
72. L. Tal, 'Britain and the Jordan Crisis of 1958', Middle Eastern Studies, 31, 1 (Jan. 1995).
73. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 174-75.
74. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 86-87, provides more detail on the earlier Rusan plot which had been uncovered in late June.
75. These moves were reported to the Americans. See Conference with the President, 20 July 1958, Box 35, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL); State to London, 21 July 1958, 'Summary of Lloyd-Dulles meetings', RG 59, Central Decimal File, 780.00/7-2158, United States National Archives (hereafter USNA).
76. For contemporary views of Nasser's role, see N. Daniel, 'Contemporary Perceptions of the Revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958', in R. Fernea and W.R. Louis (eds.), The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited (London, 1991), 13.
77. For early hopes that the situation in Iraq might be retrievable, see Lloyd to Hood, 15 July 1958, PREM 11/2380. For an intriguing recent study of Hussein's dynastic ambitions in relation to Iraq, albeit for a later period, see M. Mufti, 'A King's Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein's Jordan', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 13, 3 (Sept. 2002).
78. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 182-89.
79. Little, 'A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer?', 523-28.
80. State Visit of King Hussein of Jordan: Confidential Background Note, undated July 1966, PREM 13/988.
81. Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister [Harold Wilson] and His Majesty King Hussein at 10 Downing Street, 22 July 1966, PREM 13/988.
82. 'Training of Jordanian Special Forces in Jordan by SAS', 2 March 1971, FCO 17/1504.
83. N.J. Ashton, 'A Microcosm of Decline: British Loss of Nerve and Military Intervention in Jordan and Kuwait, 1958 and 1961', Historical Journal, 40, 4 (1997), 1072-73.
84. Record of a meeting in the Foreign Office, 11am, 18 Aug. 1961, FO 371/156888.
85. For British covert operations in Yemen, see S. Mawby, 'The Clandestine Defence of Empire: British Special Operations in Yemen, 1951-64', Intelligence and National Security, 17, 3 (2002).
86. For the defection of the pilots and the consequences for the Jordanian regime, see Amman to State, 14 Nov.1962 (section three of three), Folder Jordan General 11/62-3/63, Box 125A, National Security File, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL).
87. Amman to State, 30 Jan. 1962, Folder Jordan General, 1/61-3/62, Box 125, National Security File, JFKL.
88. Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 228.
89. Private Information.
90. Memorandum for the Record, 27 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, XVIII (Washington, DC, 1995), 486.
91. FRUS, 1961-1963, Ibid., footnote 1, 487. For more detail on the British view of this process, see DEFE 13/423, NA. For further discussion of the April 1963 crisis,
92. see Shalom, The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan, 1960-1963, 38-104;
93. Bligh, The Political Legacy of King Hussein, 8-26;
94. E. Podeh, 'To Unite or Not to Unite - That is Not the Question: The 1963 Tripartite Unity Talks Reassessed', Middle Eastern Studies, 39 (Jan. 2003), 155-62;
95. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 133-34.
96. State Visit of King Hussein of Jordan: Confidential Background Note, undated July 1966, PREM 13/988.
97. Phillips to Foreign Office, 22 Nov. 1970, PREM 15/107.
98. Amman to Foreign Office, 23 May 1967, PREM 13/1617.
99. Ibid.
100. Adams to Brown, 29 June 1967, PREM 13/2742.
101. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, 103.
102. Amman to State, 3 June 1967, Folder POL 15-1, Jordan 1/1/67, Box 2253, Central Foreign Policy File, RG 59, USNA.
103. Amman to Foreign Office, telegram no.525, 4 June 1967, PREM 13/1619; Adams to Brown, 29 June 1967, PREM 13/2742.
104. For further discussion of the British role here, see R. McNamara, 'Britain, Nasser and the Outbreak of the Six Day War', Journal of Contemporary History, 35, 4 (2000), 619-39.
105. See, for example, 'Note of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr George Thomson) at No. 10 Downing Street before midnight', 23 May 1967, PREM 13/1617; Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no. 1729, 23 May 1967, ibid.
106. See also M. Gat, 'Letting Someone Else Do the Job: American Policy on the Eve of the Six Day War', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 14, 1 (March 2003), 131-58;
107. W.B. Quandt, 'Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Colour Was the Light?', Middle East Journal, 46, 2 (1992).
108. Private Information.
109. Text of Hussein interview with Pauline Fredericks on NEC's 'Today Show', 27 June 1967, in FCO to Certain Missions, 28 June 1967, PREM 13/1622.
110. Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 68-70, 75-77, 94, 106.
111. Quoted in J. Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (London, 1989), 126.
112. Prime Minister Edward Heath presents a rather different picture of the British and American positions over this issue in his memoirs; see The Autobiography of Edward Heath: The Course of My Life (London, 1998), 322-23. For Anglo-American exchanges over the hostages during the crisis, see 'Telephone discussion between Sir Denis Greenhill, Dr Kissinger and Mr Sisco at approx. 0345 Hours on September 16 1970', PREM 15/124;
113. and 'Report of a Telephone Conversation between Sir Denis Greenhill, Dr Henry Kissinger and Mr Joe Sisco, held on Thursday, September 17, at approx. 1.00pm', ibid. For US concerns over the British position,
114. see Hoskinson to Kissinger, 'The Situation in Jordan', 16 Sept. 1970, Folder Jordan V, Box 615, NSC, Country Files, Middle East, Richard Nixon Presidential Papers, USNA.
115. Amman to State, no.4997, 8.50am, 21 Sept. 1970, ibid.; State to Amman, no.155208, 5.55 a.m, 22 Sept. 1970, ibid.
116. Kissinger to Nixon, 18 Sept. 1970, ibid. See also Amman to State, no.4918, 8.00pm, 18 Sept. 1970, ibid.
117. A. Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom (Washington, DC, 1999), 185-86.
118. FCO to Tel Aviv, 201000Z, 20 Sept. 1970, FCO 17/1044; Middle East Crisis SITREP at 0700 hours [London time], 21 Sept. 1970, PREM 15/123.
119. 'The Situation in Jordan', GEN (14) 70 2nd meeting, 10.30pm, 20 Sept. 1970, CAB 130/479, NA.
120. Conversation between Sir Denis Greenhill and a member of Dr Kissinger's staff, 2am [London time], 21 Sept. 1970, PREM 11/123.
121. H. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 618-19.
122. H. Kissinger, White House Years, 618-19, Ibid.
123. There seems to be no foundation for Alexander Haig's claim that the Israeli air force participated in this process; see Inner Circles: How America Changed the World (New York, 1992), 250-51.
124. Conference with the President, 23 July 1958, Box 35, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.
125. Hood to Lloyd, 15 July 1958, PREM 11/2380.
126. 'Report of a telephone Conversation between Sir Denis Greenhill, Dr Henry Kissinger and Mr Joe Sisco, held on Thursday, 17 September [1970] at approx. 1pm', 6-7, PREM 15/124.
127. 'The Situation in Jordan', GEN (14) 70 2nd meeting, 10.30pm, 20 Sept. 1970, CAB 130/479.
128. The Situation in Jordan, Ibid.
129. Author's interview with Henry Kissinger, New York, 2 June 2003.
130. Le Quesne to Evans, undated memorandum [June 1971], FCO 17/1504.
131. Moon to Heath, 26 June 1970, PREM 15/123.
132. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 155-56.
133. Variations on the theme of this thesis can be found in Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan;
134. Bar-Joseph, The Best of Enemies;
135. Y. Lukacs, Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process (Syracuse, 1997);
136. A. Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place (New York, 1992).
137. Balfour Paul to Douglas-Home, Jordan: Annual Review, 1972, FCO 93/79; Craig to Balfour Paul, 22 Jan. 1973, FCO 93/97; Parsons to Balfour Paul, 29 Jan. 1973, FCO 93/84.
138. Balfour Paul to Parsons, 12 Feb. 1973, FCO 93/84.
139. Balniel to Wood, 22 March 1973, FCO 93/84.
140. Record of Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and King Hussein of Jordan at 1 Carlton Gardens on Wednesday 11 July 1973 at 2.00pm, FCO 93/97.
141. Phillips to FCO, 7 Jan. 1972, FCO 17/1693; Balfour Paul to Parsons, 2 Oct. 1972, ibid.
142. Author's interview with Maan Abu Nowar, Oxford, 5 Dec. 2000.
143. Craig to Balfour Paul, 22 Jan. 1973, FCO 93/97.