Britain, Nasser and the outbreak of the six day war

Journal of Contemporary History

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2000, Pages

  McNamara, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444529726     PISSN: 00220094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002200940003500406     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. Bundy/Komer Memo for the President, 29 April 1964. NSF Country File UK. Box 213. LBJL
2. De Zulueta-Samuel, 26 February 1960. PRO PREM 11/4358
3. Hansard, 710, Commons Oral Answers, col. 142. 14 May 1963
4. Hansard, 710, Commons Oral Answers, col. 1153-56, 13 April 1965
5. Stewart desp-Hadow (Tel Aviv), 29 March 1966. E1051/13 PRO PREM 13/1617
6. For instance, 17 December 1963, Cairo Radio broadcast. The UAR will not let itself be pressured into the adventure of a war against Israel as long as all the Arab states are not unified.' Lacouture, Nasser (London 1972), 291
7. Nasser justified many of his actions as having the ultimate aim of destroying Israel. For instance in 1962, it is reported that he said: 'The liberation of Yemen is a step towards getting rid of Zionism', cited in David Pryce Jones, The Closed Circle (London 1986), 253
8. See Robert McNamara, 'Britain's Other Cold War: A Study of British Policy Towards Nasser's Egypt from Suez to the Six Day War' (unpublished PhD dissertation, National University of Ireland, Cork, 1999) especially chap. 2
9. Cited in Ben D. Mor, 'Nasser's Decision-making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rationalchoice Explanation', JPR, vol. 28, no. 4 (1991), 359-75
10. New Statesman, 26 May 1967
11. While it seems that Israel would very much like to have seen the fall of the Syrian regime, there is a fair degree of evidence from UN observers that Israel had not concentrated troops on her northern frontier and certainly not on the scale suggested by the Soviets. Laqueur points out that the Soviets were claiming Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian frontier for many months prior to May. Laqueur, The Road to War 1967 (London 1968), 74-5. What is certain is that Nasser believed or chose to believe the Soviet claims in May. An American NSC official opined that the 'Soviet advice to the Syrians that the Israelis were planning an attack was not far off, although they seem to have exaggerated the magnitude. The Israelis were planning an attack - but not an invasion.' Saunders Memo to MG Bundy, no date but drafted some time before 19 June 1967. Middle East Crisis, vol. 1. National Security File. NSC History. Box 17. LBJL
12. William B. Quandt, 'Lyndon Johnson and the June 1 967 War: What Color was the Light?', MEJ, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992)
13. U Thant, Report on the Withdrawal of the UNEF, 27 June 1967
14. George Brown, In my Way (Harmondsworth 1971), 136
15. Walter Laqueur, The Road to War 1967, 90
16. Meeting between Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, 23 May 1967, PRO PREM 13/1617
17. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister (London 1975), vol. II, 355
18. Cabinet Conclusions (67) 31.1, 23 May 1967. CAB 128/42, pt. 2. Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70 (London 1984), 258
19. State to AmEmbassy, London, no. 9751, 23 May 1967. Middle East Crisis Chronological, May 21-23. Middle East Crisis Files, Box 7. American National Archives
20. Dean-FO, no. 1729, 23 May 1967. See also Dean-FO, no. 1746, 24 May 1967, PRO PREM 13/1617
21. The Times, 25 May 1967
22. This support had been diminishing since the early part of the decade. The French no longer needed Israeli help for their own nuclear project. The end of the Algerian war had seen France's relationship with the Arab world improve dramatically. Israel had also lessened her dependence on French arms with much of her military equipment sourced from the USA and Britain. The collapse of the Franco-Israeli alliance is outlined in Sylvia K. Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance. France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War (Princeton 1974), 170-214
23. They did so repeatedly. See Quandt, op. cit., 209-1 1
24. Record of National Security Council meeting, 24 May 1967, Middle East Crisis, NSF, NSC History, Box 17, LBJL
25. De Gaulle, evidently believing that Eban was seeking French military support for a preemptive attack on the Arabs, warned that France would take no risks for Israel. He explicitly warned against Israel firing the first shot. It was a disastrous and depressing meeting for the Israelis; their key western ally had deserted them. Crosbie, Middle East Crisis, NSF, NSC History, Box , op. cit., 190-1
26. State to AmEmbassy, London, no. 203624. 26 May 1967, Middle East Crisis Chronological, May 26-28. Middle East Crisis Files, Box 7, National Archives
27. Castle, Middle East Crisis, NSF, NSC History, Box , op. cit., 259
28. Record of Meeting with President Progeny, PRO PREM 13/1618
29. See the following correspondence. Caradon (New York)-FO nos 1106, 1107 and 1108 (all 26 May 1967), PRO PREM 13/1618
30. Nasser's speech of 26 May 1967 to Arab Trade Unionists, reprinted in Appendix 4 of Laqueur, The Road to War 1967, 294-7
31. Gore-Booth-Brown, 26 May 1967, 'Middle East Crisis-Balance of Power', PRO PREM 13/1618
32. Wilson to Johnson in AmEmbassy London to State no. 203986, 28 May 1967. Secret Middle East Crisis Chronological, May 26-28, Box 7, National Archives
33. Quandt, op. cit., 214
34. See the following correspondence: Hadow-FO, no. 402, 28 May 1967, PRO PREM 13/1618. Dean-FO, no. 1811, 28 May 1967, PRO PREM 13/1618
35. Annex B, Practical Aspects of International Action, C (67) 88 PRO CAB 129/130, 29 May 1967. The Chiefs of the Defence Staff had already worked out a plan which described in greater detail the military options that could be taken in the event of military force being needed. It had already been decided that 'risks to escort force will be accepted and the onus of initiating hostile action will be placed on the UAR'. The paper goes on through the various military scenarios likely. COS 42nd meeting DP 49/67 Min 2. DEFE 4/218. Other material relating to this is contained in COS 58/67 DEFE 5/174
36. Bruce (London)-State, no. 9932, 30 May 1967, Situation Reports May 29-31, Middle East Crisis Files, Box 14, National Archives
37. Hadow-FO, no. 390, 27 May 1967, PRO PREM 13/1618. Dean-FO, 1840, 30 May 1967, PRO PREM 13/1619
38. AmEmbassy London to State, no. 9931, 30 May 1967, Middle East Crisis Chronological, May 29-31, Middle East Crisis Files, Box 7, National Archives
39. London-State, 10100, 2 June 1967, Secret/Nodis Chronological, June 1-3, Middle East Crisis Files, Box 7, National Archives
40. Amman-FO, no. 417, 23 May 1967, PRO PREM 1617
41. Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars, 2nd edn (London 1991), 202-3
42. Hansard 747, House of Commons Debates, col. 110, 31 May 1967
43. Hansard 747, House of Commons Debates, col. 212, 31 May 1967, Crossman, op. cit., 360
44. Bergman and El Tahris, The Fifty Years War (London 1998), 84-5
45. Arthur Goldberg Oral History, LBJL, 22