Economic performance of 'weak' governments and their interaction with central banks and labour: Deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation, 1961-1998

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 44, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 801-836

  Sakamoto, Takayuki ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26244465326     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00248.x     Document Type: Review

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