Federalism and the subnational separation of powers

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 245-272

  Cameron, Maxwell A ^a   Falleti, Tulia G ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25144469436     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pji012     Document Type: Review

References (101)

1. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The Principle of Federation and the Need to Reconstitute the Party of Revolution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1863), pp. 68-69.
2. Ronald Watts, "The Relevance Today of the Federal Idea" (paper presented at the International Conference on Federalism 2002, Saint Gallen, Switzerland, 2002); http://www.forumfed.org/federalism/Watts.asp?langn, accessed 8 June 2005.
3. Edward L. Gibson, ed., Federalism and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
4. Exceptions are recent studies on the European Union. For example, see Tanja A. Börzel and Madeleine O. Hosli, "Brussels between Bern and Berlin: Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union," Governance - An International Journal of Policy and Administration 16 (April 2003): 179-202;
5. Thomas O. Hueglin, "From Constitutional to Treaty Federalism: A Comparative Perspective," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 30 (Fall 2000): 137-153;
6. and David McKay, "On the Origins of Political Unions: The European Case," Journal of Theoretical Politics 9 (July 1997): 279-296.
7. th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
8. Although the term "subnational" refers in general to all levels of government below the central level, in this article we use it to refer exclusively to the intermediate level of government. Therefore, we exclude local or municipal government.
9. See Gerardo L. Munck, "Tools for Qualitative Research," Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Took, Shared Standards, eds. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 107-112.
10. The distinction between functional and territorial division of powers is based on Stein Rokkan. See Peter Flora, ed. State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 5-7.
11. Bruce A. Ackerman, "Neo-federalism?" Constitutionalism and Democracy, eds. J. Elster and R. Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 170.
12. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 79.
13. The distinction between laws and constitutions can be traced to Aristotle, The Politics (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1962), p. 151.
14. An earlier literature in political science attempted to use Montesquieu's separation of powers but eliminate its doctrinaire elements. For example, Gabriel Almond argued that rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication are features of all political systems. See his "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," The Politics of Developing Areas, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 17.
15. The generalization that all constitutions have deliberative, executive, and judicial elements was first made by Aristotle, Politics, p. 179.
16. Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 282.
17. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Article 16, states, "A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all."
18. As Kant put it, the three elements of a constitution - legislatoria, rectoria, judiciaria - complement each other to complete the constitution of the state and ensure its autonomy. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, transl. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1887), p. 170.
19. The point that the U.S. model is not necessarily the best for all countries is well made by Alfred Stepan, "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model" Federalism and Territorial Clfavages, ed. Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
20. M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998), p. 14.
21. Vile, Constitutionalism, p. 14.
22. See also Bernard Manin, "Checks, Balances and Boundaries: The Separation of Powers in the Constitutional Debate of 1787," The Invention of the Modern Republic, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 27-62.
23. Diverse critics have made this point. See Louis Althusser, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx: Politics and History (London: Verso, 1982)
24. and Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945).
25. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States of America, Being a Collection of Essays Written in Support of the Constitution Agreed upon September 17, 1787, by the Federal Convention (New York: The Modern Library, 1941), p. 314, italics in original.
26. Ibid., 314-315, italics in original.
27. Ibid., 315.
28. There are many varieties of parliamentary and presidential systems, as well as systems that combine features of both. We focus on the Westminister model only because it is the crucial point of reference for the argument that parliamentarism is inimical to the separation of powers.
29. This term is from Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective," The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, Vol. 1, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 119-136.
30. Peter C. Ordeshook, "Some Rules of Constitutional Design," Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (July 1993): 226-227.
31. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Introduction: Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy," Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, eds. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 3.
32. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 393.
33. rd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1977), pp. 628-631.
34. There is an extensive literature on this, some of which questions whether the superior record of regime survival in parliamentary constitutions can be attributed to intrinsic differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism. For a review of this debate, see José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered," Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002): 151-179.
35. On the lower level of rule of law in presidential democracies, see Josephine T. Andrews and Gabriella R. Montinola, "Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies," Comparative Political, Studies 37 (February 2004): 81-82.
36. Lord Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship: The Richard Dimbleby Lecture (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1976).
37. Stepan and Skach, "Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism," pp. 128-129.
38. Walter Bagehot, English Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 59.
39. Bagehot, English Constitution
40. and Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1959).
41. Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery of Decline? (London: Heinemann, 1992), p. 86. Mount offers a trenchant rebuke to Dicey and Bagehot.
42. Dicey, Introduction, pp. 165-168.
43. Ordeshook, "Some Rules," 226-227.
44. Wheare, Federal Government, p. 80.
45. I b i d.
46. Ibid., 81.
47. I b i d.
48. The independence of the judiciary means that judges are impartial and decide cases based on the law not political pressures. See Christopher M. Larkins, "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis," American Journal of Comparative Law, 44 (1996): 611.
49. Ronald Watts, "Provinces, States, Länder and Cantons: Content and Variations Among Subnational Constitutions of the World" (paper presented at a conference on Subnational Constitutional Governance, Rietvleidam, Pretoria, 16-18 March 1999), p. 18; http://www.kas.org.za/Publications/ SeminarReports/SubnatlConstGovernance/Subnationa.asp, accessed 8 June 2005.
50. John Kincaid, "Introduction," Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002, eds. Ann L. Griffiths and Karl Nerenberg (Montreal and Kingston: McGill/Queen's University Press, 2002), pp. 8-9.
51. See Enrique Ochoa-Reza, "Multiple Arenas of Struggle. Federalism and Mexico's Transition to Democracy," Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Gibson, pp. 255-296;
52. Caroline Beer, "Assessing the Consequences of Electoral Democracy: Subnational Legislative Change in Mexico," Comparative Politics 33 (July 2001): 421-440.
53. Robert Dahl, "Federalism and the Democratic Process," Democracy, Liberty, and Equality (Oslo, Denmark: Norwegian University Press, 1986), p. 114.
54. Watts, "Federalism Today."
55. nd ed., ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Essex, UK: Longman, 1994), p. xv.
56. Ibid., xv.
57. Kincaid, "Introduction," p. 7.
58. Wheare, Federal Government.
59. Nancy Bermeo, "The Importance of Institutions: A New Look at Federalism," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002): 98.
60. Kincaid, "Introduction," p. 5.
61. Heidrun Abromeit, "Contours of a European Federation," Regional and Federal Studies 12 (Spring 2002): 8-10.
62. Elazar, "Introduction," p. 271.
63. See Vernon Bogdanor, "Devolution: Decentralization or Disintegration?" Political Quarterly 70 (April-June 1999): 185-194;
64. Michael Keating, "What's Wrong with Asymmetrical Government?" Regional and Federal Studies 8 (Spring 1998): 195-218;
65. Robert Hazell and David Sinclair, "The British Constitution in 1997-1998: Labour's Constitutional Revolution," Parliamentary Affairs 52 (April 1999): 161-178;
66. Bernard Crick, "Ambushes and Advances: The [UK] Scottish Act 1998," Political Quarterly 66 (October-December 1995): 237-249;
67. B. Guy Peters, "The United Kingdom Becomes the Untied Kingdom? Is Federalism Imminent or Even Possible?" British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3 (April 2001): 71-83;
68. James G. Kellas, "The Constitutional Options for Scotland," Parliamentary Affairs 43 (October 1990): 426-434;
69. Juliet Berger, "Bye-Bye Britain? Devolution and the United Kingdom" SAIS Review 20 (Summer-Fall 2000): 145-157;
70. Martin Laffin and Alys Thomas, "The United Kingdom: Federalism in Denial?" Publius: The Journal of Federalism 29 (Summer 1999): 89-108.
71. K. M. De-Silva, "Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict and the Search for a Durable Peace, 1978-1999," Ethnic Studies Report 17 (July 1999): 338.
72. Robert C. Oberst, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 18 (Summer 1988): 189.
73. Elazar, "Introduction," p. 239.
74. Oberst, "Federalism," 189.
75. Peter C. Ordeschook and Olga Shvetsova, "Federalism and Constitutional Design," Journal of Democracy 8 (January 1997): 29.
76. Lucio Levi, "Federalismo," Dizionario Di Politica, eds. Norberte Bobbio and Nicola Matteucci (Torino: U.T.E.T, 1976), p. 392, our translation.
77. Barry Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (April 1995): 1-31.
78. Hamilton et al. The Federalist, p. 299.
79. Dahl, "Federalism and Democratic Process";
80. Alfred Stepan, "Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy," Federalism and Democracy, ed. Gibson, pp. 29-84.
81. Notice that this is related to, albeit different from, the "encroachment on the states by the center" approach. We are not making a general claim about the powers of the national government vis-à-vis the subnational governments, but rather slicing a very specific aspect of this problem. Here, we are concerned only with one type of national power: the ability to dissolve the separation of powers at the subnational level.
82. Alfred Stepan, "New Comparative Politics of Federalism."
83. A notable exception is Edward L. Gibson's recent edited volume Federalism and Democracy in Latin America.
84. Leo B. Lott, "The Nationalization of Justice in Venezuela," Inter-American Economic Affairs 13 (Summer 1959): 3-19.
85. Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
86. Tulia Falleti, "Federalism and Decentralization in Argentina. Historical Background and New Intergovernmental Relations," Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson Center Report on the Americas 12, eds. Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew Selee (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004), pp. 67-100.
87. This problem was addressed in Jenna Bednar, "Crisis in Argentina: How Interventions Intertwine Federalism, Democracy, and Economic Stability," (unpublished manuscript, Ann Arbor, MI, 2002).
88. David Samuels and Fernando Luiz Abrucio, "Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The 'New' Politics of the Governors in Brazil," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 30 (Spring 2000): 49.
89. Daniel J. Elazar, "From Statism to Federalism - A Paradigm Shift," International Political Science Review 17 (1996): 426.
90. Samuels and Abrucio, "Federalism and Democratic Transitions," 56.
91. See Ochoa-Reza, "Multiple Arenas of Struggle."
92. Jorge V. Alcocer, "Recent Electoral Reforms in Mexico: Prospects for a Real Multiparty Democracy," The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 57-75, at 70.
93. Yemile Mizrahi, "Democracia, eficiencia y participación: los dilemas de los gobiernos de oposición en México," Política y Gobierno II (Segundo Semestre 1995), pp. 177-205.
94. In 1997, the states with opposition governors and divided state legislatures were Guanajuato, Chihuahua, Querétaro, and the government of Mexico City. Those with opposition governors and simple majorities in the state legislatures were Baja California, Jalisco, and Nuevo León.
95. Alonso Lujambio, El Poder Compartido. Un Ensayo Sobre La Democratización Mexicana [Shared Power. An Essay on Mexico's Democratization] (Mexico: Editorial Oceano de Mexico, 2000).
96. For examples of both types of studies, see John Gerring, Strom C. Thacker, and Carola Moreno, "Good Government: A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance," American Political Science Review (Forthcoming)
97. and Weingast, "The Economic Role."
98. Robert Barros makes a compelling case that not all dictatorships rule unlawfully or arbitrarily, and even the harshest forms of military rule may respect certain key features of the constitutional separation of powers. See his Constitutionalism and Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
99. Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994): 151-184.
100. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 153.
101. Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method," Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (Spring 2001): 93-110.