Federalism and constitutional design

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1997, Pages

  Ordeshook, Peter C ^a   Shvetsova, Olga ^b,c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 16744362871     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.1997.0010     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Quoted in Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1991), 96.
2. Two notable exceptions to this generalization are William H. Riker's essay Federalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), and William M. Chandler's general survey of parties in federal states in "Federalism and Political Parties," in Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler, eds., Federalism and the Role of the State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 149-70.
3. Two notable exceptions to this generalization are William H. Riker's essay Federalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), and William M. Chandler's general survey of parties in federal states in "Federalism and Political Parties," in Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler, eds., Federalism and the Role of the State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 149-70.
4. On ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), and A Democratic South Africa? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). On protectionist policies, see James M. Buchanan, "Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform," Publius 25 (Winter 1995): 19-28.
5. On ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), and A Democratic South Africa? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). On protectionist policies, see James M. Buchanan, "Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform," Publius 25 (Winter 1995): 19-28.
6. On ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), and A Democratic South Africa? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). On protectionist policies, see James M. Buchanan, "Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform," Publius 25 (Winter 1995): 19-28.
7. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (1885; reprint, New York: Meridian Books, 1956), 171.
8. For an implicit and sometimes explicit adoption of this view in the context of offering policy prescriptions for Russia, see Christine Wallich, ed., Russia and the Challenges of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994).
9. See, for instance, Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976); James W. Friedman, Oligopoly and the Theory of Games (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977); or virtually any text on game theory for the precise mathematical formulation of this discussion.
10. See, for instance, Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976); James W. Friedman, Oligopoly and the Theory of Games (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977); or virtually any text on game theory for the precise mathematical formulation of this discussion.
11. Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), no. 9, 55.
12. Federalist 9, 55.
13. Eric L. McKitrick, "Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts," in William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham, eds., The American Party System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 35-68. McKitrick acknowledges that the roots of his argument are to be found in David M. Potter, "Jefferson Davis and the Political Factors in Confederate Defeat," in David Donald, ed., Why the North Won the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960).
14. Eric L. McKitrick, "Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts," in William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham, eds., The American Party System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 35-68. McKitrick acknowledges that the roots of his argument are to be found in David M. Potter, "Jefferson Davis and the Political Factors in Confederate Defeat," in David Donald, ed., Why the North Won the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960).
15. Richard A. Easterlin, "Interregional Differences in Per Capita Income, Population, and Total Income, 1840-1950," in National Bureau of Economic Research, Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 24:73-140.
16. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 200-201; Roger Gibbins, Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworth, 1982), 141.
17. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 200-201; Roger Gibbins, Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworth, 1982), 141.
18. Robert S. Erickson and Mikhail G. Filippov, "Ideological Balancing in Elections: The Case of Canada" (paper presented at the Ninety-second Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 29 August-1 September 1996).
19. Gibbins, Regionalism.
20. In addition to being anointed "the guarantor of the Russian Constitution," the president of the Russian Federation is constitutionally authorized to suspend administrative actions of regional governments that the president deems unconstitutional (Article 85.2), and to issue lawlike decrees to the extent that they do not conflict with any existing federal law (Article 90). In addition, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, in language that harks back to Lenin's old notion of democratic centralism, proclaims that "federal executive bodies and the bodies of executive authority of the members of the Russian Federation shall form a single system of executive authority" (Article 77.2).
21. For an elaboration of the arguments offered in this section, see Peter C. Ordeshook, "Russia's Party System: Is Russian Federalism Viable?" Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (July-September 1996): 195-217; and Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "Federalism and Parties: Will Russia Be Mexico or Germany?" (paper presented at the Ninety-second Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 29 August-1 September 1996).
22. For an elaboration of the arguments offered in this section, see Peter C. Ordeshook, "Russia's Party System: Is Russian Federalism Viable?" Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (July-September 1996): 195-217; and Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "Federalism and Parties: Will Russia Be Mexico or Germany?" (paper presented at the Ninety-second Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 29 August-1 September 1996).