Intelligence failure and need for cognitive closure: On the psychology of the Yom Kippur surprise

Political Psychology

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 75-99

  Bar Joseph, Uri ^a   Kruglanski, Arie W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Need for cognitive closure; Strategic surprise; Yom Kippur war

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944436453     PISSN: 0162895X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0162-895X.00317     Document Type: Review

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