The quantitative problem of old evidence

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 249-264

  Barnes, Eric Christian ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039107755     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/50.2.249     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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