Government growth in the twenty-first century

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 95-114

  Holcombe, Randall G ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24144476670     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-4748-x     Document Type: Article

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