The fate of spatial dilemmas with different fuzzy measures of success

JASSS

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2005, Pages

  Fort, Hugo ^a   Pérez, Nicolás ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Artificial Societies; Complex Adaptive Agents; Cooperation; Spatial Game Theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 23944485739     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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