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Volumn 137, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 45-66

Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

Author keywords

(j,k) simple games; Abstention; Banzhaf measures; Several levels of approval

Indexed keywords


EID: 23844536464     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-005-2244-9     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (50)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.