The Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 185-195

  Freixas, Josep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE CATALUNYA   (Spain)

Author keywords

(j, k) simple games; 91A40; 91A80; 91C15; Abstention; AMS, 91A12; Several levels of approval; Shapley Shubik index

Indexed keywords

MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING;

(J, K) SIMPLE GAMES; ABSTENTION; AMS SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION 91A12; AMS SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION 91A40; AMS SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION 91A80; AMS SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION 91C15; PERMUTATION; SEVERAL LEVELS OF APPROVAL; SHAPLEY-SHUBIK INDEX;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 10444258095     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2003.10.006     Document Type: Article

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