The creativity of the European Court of Human Rights

Human Rights Law Review

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 57-79

  Mowbray, Alastair ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 23844517001     PISSN: 14617781     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hrlrev/ngi003     Document Type: Review

References (160)

1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, ETS 5.
2. For example, in respect of serious environmental pollution caused by private sector companies: See Hatton and Others v United Kingdom 2003-VIII 189;
3. (2003) 37 EHRR 28 and infra n. 74 and accompanying text.
4. For example, to accord legal recognition to the new identity of a post-operative transsexual: See Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom 2002-VI 1;
5. (2002) 35 EHRR 18.
6. See the Collected Edition of the 'Travaux Preparatoires' of the European Convention on Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975);
7. and Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
8. At least one judge of the Court has expressed the view that such an impermissible development has occurred: I also concede that the Convention organs have in this way, on occasion, reached the limits of what can be regarded as treaty interpretation in the legal sense. At times they have perhaps even crossed the boundary and entered territory which is no longer that of treaty interpretation but is actually legal policy-making. But this, as I understand it, is not for a court to do; on the contrary, policy-making is a task for the legislature or the Contracting States themselves, as the case may be.
9. Matscher, 'Methods of Interpretation of the Convention', in Macdonald, Matscher and Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 63 at 69-70.
10. 155 UNTS 331. See Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
11. Golder v United Kingdom A 18 (1975);
12. (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524,
13. and see Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 2001) at 278.
14. This states: 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
15. Supra n. 7 at paras 29-30.
16. Ost, 'The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights', in Delmas-Marty (ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: International Protection versus National Restrictions (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 288.
17. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) at 69.
18. Van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) at 72.
19. Bernhardt, 'Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human-Rights Treaties', in Matscher and Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension (Koln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1988) 65 at 65-6.
20. Soering v United Kingdom A 161 (1989);
21. (1989) 11 EHRR 439 at para. 87, and see infra n. 49 and accompanying text.
22. A 26 (1978);
23. (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1.
24. Note, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has more recently adopted this methodology to interpret the American Convention on Human Rights in its Advisory Opinion on The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law IACtHR Series A 16 (1999).
25. See Cançado Trindade, 'The Development of International Human Rights Law by the Operation and Case Law of the European and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights', a speech given by the President of the Inter-American Court at the opening of the judicial year of the European Court of Human Rights on 22 January 2004 (available at http://www.echr.coe.int).
26. Ibid. at para. 31.
27. Ibid. at para. 38.
28. The dissentient Judge Fitzmaurice considered that the use of such punishment for juveniles was not degrading; see Mowbray, supra n. 7 at 133-5.
29. Defined by Merrills, supra n. 11, as an ideology which '... emphasises using and developing [legal rules] to achieve results'. Note,an eminent academic critic of judicial activism has directly linked its rise throughout the world to 'growing international concern with the protection of human rights'.
30. See Goldsworthy, in Campbell and Goldsworthy (eds), Judicial Power, Democracy and Legal Positivism (Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2000) at xiii.
31. For example, it has refused to offer a general theory of the positive obligations upon States arising under the Convention: Plattform 'Ärzte für das Leben' v Austria A 139 (1988);
32. (1991) 13 EHRR 204 at para. 31.
33. A 264 (1993);
34. 13 EHRR 204 at para. 31.
35. A 44 (1981);
36. (1982) 4 EHRR 38.
37. By 18 votes to 3.
38. Supra n. 21 at para. 55.
39. Ibid. at para. 35.
40. Including the European Committee of Social Rights expressing the view that the European Social Charter contained an implicit negative right. Generally on the Charter see Harris, The European Social Charter, 2nd edn with Darcy (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001).
41. In 1989, 11 members of the EC adopted the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers which provided workers/employers with the freedom to join/not join trade unions/professional organisations.
42. The practice of the Organisation's Freedom of Association Committee determined that laws allowing compulsory union membership were in violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
43. Golsong, 'Interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights beyond the Confines of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties', in Macdonald, Matscher and Petzold (eds), supra n. 5, 147 at 150.
44. A 310 (1995);
45. (1995) 20 EHRR 99.
46. Under Articles 25 and 46 of the pre-Protocol 11 Convention.
47. Supra n. 30 at para. 71.
48. Created by Protocol 11. The full-time Court began to function officially on 1 November 1998. See Mowbray, 'The Composition and Operation of the New European Court of Human Rights', [1999] Public Law 219.
49. Guaranteeing the right to free elections 'in the choice of the legislature'.
50. 1999-I 251;
51. (1999) 28 EHRR 361.
52. More generally, see Mowbray, 'The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in the Promotion of Democracy', [1999] Public Law 703.
53. Ibid. at para. 39.
54. 1999-V 149;
55. (2000) 29 EHRR 403.
56. Ibid. at para. 101.
57. Ibid. at para. 97.
58. 2002-IV 115;
59. (2002) 35 EHRR 32.
60. Delivered in Wynne v United Kingdom A 294-A (1994);
61. (1995) 19 EHRR 333.
62. Supra n. 40, at paras 68-9.
63. Speech by Luzius Wildhaber,President of the European Court of Human Rights, on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year on 23 January 2003 (available at http://www.echr.coe.int).
64. Supra n. 3.
65. See Mowbray, supra n. 7 at 402-4.
66. Supra n. 3 at para. 85.
67. Ibid. at para. 56.
68. Ibid. at para. 93.
69. Supra n. 14.
70. Ibid. at para. 102.
71. Protocol 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty 1983, ETS 114.
72. Supra n. 14 at para. 103.
73. (2003) 37 EHRR 10.
74. The remaining member State, Russia, had introduced a moratorium on it use.
75. Supra n. 53 at para. 195.
76. Which provides 'No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law'.
77. Supra n. 53 at para. 198.
78. However, the Chamber did, by six votes to one, determine that there had been a violation of Article 3 due to the imposition of a death penalty (which had not been implemented) on the applicant following an unfair trial (which breached the standards of Article 6). See Mowbray, 'ECHR: Institutional Reforms Proposals and Recent Cases', (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 301 at 305.
79. 2002-III 155;
80. (2002) 35 EHRR 1.
81. Ibid. at paras 54-5.
82. Reflected in Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1418 (1999), Protection of the Human Rights and Dignity of the Terminally Ill and the Dying: Notably '... that the Committee of Ministers encourage the member states of the Council of Europe to respect and protect the dignity of terminally ill or dying persons in all respects ... by upholding the prohibitions against intentionally taking the life of terminal ill or dying persons' (as cited ibid. at para. 24).
83. Embodied in the Report of the House of Lords' Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL Paper 21-I (1994), that there should be no change in the law prohibiting assisted suicide (para. 262) (as cited supra n. 59 at para. 21).
84. Supra n. 15.
85. Supra n. 40.
86. Verhoeven, 'Europe beyond Westphalia: Can Postnational Thinking Cure Europe's Democracy Deficit?', (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 369.
87. For an interdisciplinary perspective on this problem see Dehousse, 'Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in a Polycentric Polity', in Weiler and Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 135.
88. Supra n. 35.
89. Supra n. 21.
90. Supra n. 3.
91. In Rees v United Kingdom A 106 (1986);
92. (1987) 9 EHRR 56 at para. 47.
93. Supra n. 14.
94. Supra n. 53.
95. Supra n. 58.
96. (2002) 34 EHRR 1.
97. Ibid. at para. 97.
98. Under Article 43 of the Convention.
99. Supra n. 2 at para. 122.
100. See also Mowbray, 'European Convention on Human Rights: The Issuing of Practice Directions and Recent Cases', (2004) 4 Human Rights Law Review 151 at 152.
101. Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Turmen, Zupancic and Steiner, supra n. 2 at paras 2 and 5.
102. For example, in Lopez Ostra v Spain A 303-C (1994);
103. (1995) 20 EHRR 277
104. and see Mowbray, supra n. 7 at 385-6.
105. Supra n. 15.
106. Supra n. 37.
107. Ibid. at para. 101.
108. See Matscher, supra n. 5.
109. A 31 (1979);
110. (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305.
111. Ibid. at para. 31.
112. See Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2004).
113. A 32 (1979);
114. (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305.
115. Ibid. at para. 24.
116. Ibid. at para. 26.
117. See Golder v United Kingdom, supra n. 7.
118. 2002-VI 197;
119. (2002) 35 EHRR 1075.
120. A form of psychiatric illness, mainly found in women, who seek attention by causing or inventing illnesses in their children.
121. Supra n. 89 at para. 95.
122. A 37 (1980);
123. (1981) 3 EHRR 1.
124. Ibid. at para. 33.
125. A 91 (1985);
126. (1986) 8 EHRR 235.
127. Ibid. at para. 23.
128. More generally on this topic, see Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).
129. Supra n. 20.
130. Ibid. at para. 32.
131. Ibid. at para. 34.
132. See Marckx v Belgium, supra n. 82 and accompanying text.
133. 2000-II 1;
134. (2001) 31 EHRR 49.
135. Ibid. at para. 43.
136. More generally, see Mowbray, 'Duties of Investigation under the European Convention on Human Right', (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 437.
137. A 324 (1995);
138. (1996) 21 EHRR 97.
139. Ibid. at para. 161.
140. As in Ergi v Turkey 1998-IV 1751;
141. (2001) 32 EHRR 18.
142. In McKerr v United Kingdom 2001-III 325;
143. (2002) 34 EHRR 553.
144. Supra n. 82.
145. Supra n. 94.
146. Supra n. 20.
147. Supra n. 101.
148. Supra n. 104.
149. See Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus 1997-VI 2059;
150. (1998) 25 EHRR 491 at para. 199.
151. See Glasser v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 1 at para. 99.
152. Plattform, supra n. 20.
153. McKerr, supra n. 107 at para. 96.
154. Marckx, supra n. 82.
155. See Tyrer, supra n. 15.
156. See Selmouni, supra n. 37.
157. See Hatton, supra n. 2.
158. For example, regarding the legal status of transsexuals, see Christine Goodwin, supra n. 3.
159. A key tool in the Court's case-law. See, for example, Özgür Gündem, supra n. 101.
160. For example, by not dynamically interpreting the Convention to replicate the requirements of optional Protocols. See Soering, supra n. 14.