Variations on a theme

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 98-112

  Elgie, Robert ^a  

^a DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23744490983     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0045     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69;
2. and Juan J. Linz, "The Virtues of Parliamentarism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Fall 1990): 84-91.
3. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
4. Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
5. See also Steven D. Roper, "Are All Semi-Presidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes," Comparative Politics 34 (April 2002): 253-72.
6. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 55.
7. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," 55.
8. Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," Journal of Democracy 15 (April 2004): 96-109;
9. and Arturo Valenzuela, "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted," Journal of Democracy 15 (April 2004): 5-19.
10. Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8 (June 1980): 166.
11. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46 (October 1993): 8-9. They identified Finland and Switzerland as examples of "mixed" cases.
12. Robert Elgie, "The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism," in Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, 13.
13. I am grateful to Sophia Moestrup for this point.
14. Even though we can define semipresidentialism in a way that minimizes the subjectivity in determining the set of semipresidential countries, we cannot escape subjective judgments when it comes to identifying the different types of practice that occur within the set of semipresidential countries. So, for example, one author might wish to class Taiwan as a highly presidentialized semipresidential regime, whereas another may class it as a balanced semipresidential regime. In short, we cannot expect all scholars of Taiwan to agree as to the way in which the country operates. The same would be true for scholars of any other country. What we can do is to provide a framework within which it can be agreed that Taiwan is a semipresidential country, however it may operate in practice. In my opinion, this is at least a step in the right direction.
15. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," Comparative Politics 29 (July 1997): 450-51.
16. Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," 102.
17. Iceland is a case where the constitution gives great powers to the president, but where in practice the prime minister exercises those powers. Therefore, Iceland is classed as a system with a ceremonial presidency.
18. Aurel Croissant, "From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization," Democratization 11 (December 2004): 163.
19. Miro Cerar, "Slovenia," in Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, 232-59.
20. It might be noted that the prime minister was not given a great deal of constitutional powers in the final system either, thus marking Slovenia as an anomaly among postcommunist Central and East European systems.
21. See Arturo Valenzuela, "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted," 17. He states: "Preferable to semipresidentialism would be a parliamentary system with a popularly elected but somewhat less powerful president-something closer to the Portuguese rather than the French system." The terminology differs between the analysis here and Valenzuela's article, but the conclusion is the same.
22. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" 55.
23. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation," 413.
24. M. Steven Fish, "The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia's Democratization in Comparative Perspective," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (September 2001): 332.
25. Ania van de Meer Krok-Paszkowska, "Poland," in Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentlalism in Europe, 170-92.
26. Sophia Moestrup, "The Role of Actors and Institutions: The Difficulties of Democratic Survival in Mali and Niger," Democratization 6 (Summer 1999): 171-86.
27. See Oleh Protsyk, "Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies 55 (November 2003): 1077-95.
28. This situation is similar to the so-called prime-ministerial Oedipus complex that has been identified in France. See Pierre Servent, Oedipe à Matignon: Le complexe du premier ministre (Paris: Balland, 1988).