Polluters and collective action: Theory and evidence

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 167-185

  Damania, Richard ^a   Fredriksson, Per G ^b   Osang, Thomas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

^b SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23744441715     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20062100     Document Type: Review

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