On the formation of industry lobby groups

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 315-335

  Damania, Richard ^a   Fredriksson, Per G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Collective action; Collusion; H2; L13; L2; L5; Lobby group formation; Pollution tax; Q2

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037789886     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00079-7     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Abreu D. Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames. Journal of Economic Theory. 39:1986;191-225.
2. Aidt T.S. Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy. Journal of Public Economics. 69:1998;1-16.
3. Andres, G.J., 1985. Business involvement in campaign finance: Factors influencing the decision to form a corporate PAC, PS 18.
4. Axelrod R. The emergence of cooperation among egoists. American Political Science Review. 75:1981;306-318.
5. Bernheim B.D., Whinston M.D. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 101:1986;1-31.
6. Davidson C., Martin L. General equilibrium tax incidence under imperfect competition: a quantity-setting supergame analysis. Journal of Political Economy. 93:1985;1212-1223.
7. Dixit A., Grossman G.M., Helpman E. Common agency and coordination: general theory and application to government policy making. Journal of Political Economy. 105:1997;752-769.
8. Esty D.C., Caves R.E. Market structure and political influence: new data on political expenditures activity and success. Economic Inquiry. 21:1983;24-38.
9. Fredriksson P.G. The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 33:1997;44-58.
10. Friedman J. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies. 38:1971;1-12.
11. Grier K.B., Munger M.C., Roberts B.E. The industrial organization of corporate political participation. Southern Economic Journal. 57:1991;727-738.
12. Grossman G.M., Helpman E. Protection for sale. American Economic Review. 84:1994;833-850.
13. Hardin, R., 1982. Collective Action. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
14. Heywood J.S. The structural determinants of corporate campaign activity. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business. 28:1988;39-48.
15. Masters M.F., Keim G.D. Determinants of PAC participation among large corporations. Journal of Politics. 47:1985;1158-1173.
16. McKeown T.J. The epidemiology of corporate PAC formation, 1975-1984. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 24:1994;153-168.
17. Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
18. Pittman R. Rent-seeking and market structure: comment. Public Choice. 58:1988;173-185.
19. Radner R. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting. Review of Economic Studies. 53:1986;43-57.
20. Salamon L.M., Siegfried J.J. Economic power and political influence: the impact of industry structure on public policy. American Political Science Review. 71:1977;1026-1043.
21. Shapiro, C., 1990. Theories of oligopol. In: Schmalensee, R., Willig, R. (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Economics. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
22. Singh N., Vives X. Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. Rand Journal of Economics. 15:1984;546-554.
23. Tirole, J., 1990. The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, New York.
24. Zardkoohi A. On the political participation of the firm in the political process. Southern Economic Journal. 51:1985;804-817.
25. Zardkoohi A. Market structure and campaign contributions: does concentration matter? A reply. Public Choice. 58:1988;187-191.