Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government? The Effects of Separation of Powers and Lobbying

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 379-389

  Mazza, Isidoro ^a   Van Winden, Frans ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CATANIA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Centralization; European Union decision making; Lobbying; Separation of powers; Size of government

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348246213     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016559801671     Document Type: Article

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