Identity, interest and emergent rationality: An evolutionary synthesis

Rationality and Society

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 427-448

  Macy, Michael W ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruism; Evolution; Identity; Learning; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 21944438297     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/104346397009004003     Document Type: Article

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