Electoral systems: A primer for decision makers

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 115-127

  Horowitz, Donald L ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242382113     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2003.0078     Document Type: Review

References (9)

1. The cumulative vote has been described as a system that contains centrifugal incentives - that is, reasons for candidates to differentiate themselves by taking positions away from the political center. Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34 (November 1990): 903-35.
2. For one among many assessments, see Charles Cameron et al., "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" American Political Science Review 90 (December 1996): 94-812.
3. See Michael F. Thies, "Changing How the Japanese Vote: The Promise and Pitfalls of the 1994 Electoral Reform," in John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and David Newman, eds., How Asia Votes (London: Chatham House, 2002), 92-117.
4. Sartori first made these points in "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism" in Joseph LaPalombara Myron Weiner eds. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 137-76. Sartori pursued this theme in his Parties Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), and has more recently discussed it in Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (2nd ed., New York: New York University Press, 1997). See also Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems" 921-22.
5. Sartori first made these points in "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 137-76. Sartori pursued this theme in his Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), and has more recently discussed it in Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (2nd ed., New York: New York University Press, 1997). See also Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," 921-22.
6. Sartori first made these points in "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 137-76. Sartori pursued this theme in his Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), and has more recently discussed it in Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (2nd ed., New York: New York University Press, 1997). See also Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," 921-22.
7. Sartori first made these points in "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 137-76. Sartori pursued this theme in his Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), and has more recently discussed it in Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (2nd ed., New York: New York University Press, 1997). See also Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," 921-22.
8. Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld, "If You Like the Alternative Vote (a.k.a. the Instant Runoff), Then You'll Really Like the Coombs Rule," unpublished paper, University of California-Irvine, 1 March 2002.
9. Soli Özel, "Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami," Journal of Democracy 14 (April 2003): 80-94.