Civil-Military Relations in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua

Armed Forces & Society

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 117-139

  Ruhl, J Mark ^a  

^a DICKINSON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2142729868     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0303000105     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. I atio American Monitor: Central America 7 (September, (1990): 812–812.
2. There is no consensus in the civil-military relations literature about how to measure the level of civilian control over the military; however, many scholars have used Stepan's military prerogatives indicators. See Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Bro-il and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 93–97. The 2001-2002 Civil-Military Relations Project directed by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress and the Foreign Military Studies Office employs a measurement system based on Stepan's work. For other examples. see
3. Rhoda Rabkin, “The Aylwin Government and Tutelary Democracy,” Journal ot Interamericcai Studies (nd World Attilirs 34 (Winter 1992-93): 151–166;
4. Jorge Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Autonomy during the Spanish. Argentine and Brazilian Transitions.” Journal of Latin American Studies 25 (1993): 283–299;
5. Mark Ensalaco, “Military Prerogatives and the Stalemate of Chilean Civil-Military Relations,” Arnied Forces aend Society 21 (Winter 1995): 255–270;
6. J. Patrice McSherry. Incomplete Transition: Military Power sand Democracx in Argentinai (New York: St. Martin's Press, (1997), 11, 25-26, 269-291.
7. J. Samuel Fitch, Armed Forces and Democracv in Latin Anmerica (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
8. Luis Humberto Guziman, “Nicaragua's Armed Forces: An Assessment of Their Political Power.” in Bevon(1d Praetoriani?sm: The Latin American Militarv in Transition. eds. Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Biss (Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 1996), 157–158.
9. Richard L. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books), 1978.
10. On the role of the military during the Sandinista regime, see Thomas W. Walker, “The Armed Forces,” in Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 77–100.
11. Guzman, “Nicaragua's Armed Forces,” 160–160.
12. Daniel Premo, “The Redirection of the Armed Forces,” in Nicaragua Without Illusions: Regime Transition and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1997), 66–66.
13. Roberto Cajina, Transicion politica v reconversion militar en Nicaragua, 1990-1995 (Managua: CRIES, (1996). 138–139. Cajina offers the best analysis of Nicaragua's civil-military transition to 1995. See also
14. Markus Schultze-Kraft, “Democratization and Possible Democracy in Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: Civil-Military Relations Under the Chamorro Administration, 1990-1996” (M.A. thesis, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University, (1997).
15. Les de organizacion militar del Ejercito Popular Sandinista (Ley No. 75) as cited in Emilio Alvarez Montalvan, Las fiuerzas armadas en Nicaragua: sinopsils historica, 1821-1994 (Managua: Edicion Jorge Eduardo Arellano, 1994), 100–100.
16. UNO won by a margin of 55 percent to 41 percent.
17. Cajina, Transicion politica, 190–201.
18. Commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Army (ret.) General Joaqufn Cuadra, interview with author, July 2001.
19. Most UNO deputies strongly opposed Chamorro's plans for reconciliation with the FSLN. On the changing political alliances of the Chamorro period, see David Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
20. See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Civil-Military Relations in Nicaragua (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, 1995).
21. This section is based on commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Army (ret.) General Joaquin Cuadra's interviews with author, July 2001 and December 2001, and Major General Roberto Calderon, Army of Nicaragua, interview with author, July 2001. Officers who were dissatisfied with the army's new political orientation departed during the demobilization process.
22. Nearly all data on the size and budget of the Nicaraguan military are from Javier Melendez Quinonez, El gasto de defensa en Nicaragua: la toma de decisions en la asignaci(n de recurso.s (Managua: CEEN/NDI, (2000), 27–28. In 1999, 14,083 persons were employed by the army, including 12,709 soldiers and 1,374 civilians: defense expenditures totaled $26.8 million. Naval and air force units are integral parts of the army rather than separate services.
23. Melendez Quinones, El gasto de de/ensa, 23–23.
24. Cajina. Transiciion politica, 164–164.
25. Commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Army (ret.) General Joaquin Cuadra. intersiew with author, July 2001.
26. Cajina. Traolnsicin politico, 216–216.
27. Cajina. Traolnsicin politico, 216–216.
28. Nicaraguan military expert Roberto Cajina, interview with author. July 2001.
29. Republic of Nicaragua. Codigo de organi. acioii, jurisdccio, I isionl sociwl Inilitar (Bogota: Editorial Hispamer, 1996), 5–5.
30. Republic of Nicaragua. Con stituciai pollticot de Ia Replublica de Nicaragua (Managua: BITECSA, 2000). 28–29.
31. On the constitutional reform conflict, see Close, Nicaragua. 147–161.
32. Melendez Quinones. El gatsto de defeinsa 24. The low salience of civil-military issues with the Nicaraguan mass public was emphasized in discussions with Nicaraguain military politics experts Roberto Cajina and Luis Humberto Guzman. interviews with author. July and December 2001.
33. Major Cynthia Luis-Guerra, United States Air Force, U.S. Military Attache's Office. interview with author. December 2001. See also U.S. Armed Forces to Lend Supprt. Central America Report. 15 March 2002.
34. President Chamorr O held the title of defense minister herself but never established a supporting defense ministry.
35. Republic of Nicaragua. 01r-gan Eizacijn, (lompetenciat, N' 1:)(cedili1iento.s tei poder i/jetil'o urn t regltento a lI LI k noli. 290 (Managua: BITECSA. 1999). 68–71.
36. On the defense ministry's lack of capacity to cany out its legal functions, see Jaxier Melendez Quinones, Los esenlarilos institicionalesl de lt dektnsla natitiotnll eui Nicaratitgua (Managua: CEEN/NDI. 2000, 29–37. The current defense minister largely agreed with this assessment: Jose Adan Guerra. Nicaragu.an Minister of Defense. interxiew with author, July 2001. Minister Guerra was also the source for intormation on the size and turnover rate of the ministry's staff.
37. Melendez Quinones, Lot. estenarioit, 37–41.
38. David R. Dye. Patchtvtrk Denioti-acsy: Nita-ag/utn Politics Ten Yerls AIfterhe Fall (Cambridge: Hemisphere Initiatives, December (2000), 14–14.
39. See Samuel P. Huntington. ilie Soldier tait the Staite: Tht Threotw tind Politics of Ci(i-Militatir Reltaions (Cambridg-. MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). Informat101 On Alemnsins lack of suLccess WaLS draw-n fi-rom the interviews cited abose with Gieneral Joaquin Cuadra and Nicaralguan scholar Luis Humberto Guziman.
40. Foi s idenice of the Nicara Lguian public's low opinion of President Aleman. see Presidente Aleman recupera puntos, pero siempre en porcenat;je negatix 0.” Lat Pnsreim (Mamna Lia). 24 October 2001.
41. Jose Adarin Cueira. Nicarag Luan Minister otf Defense. interview with author. July 2001.
42. Commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Army (ret.) General Joaquin Cuadra, interview with author, December 2001.
43. Desch argues that the best indicator of the state of civil control is which side prevails when civilian and military leaders' preferences diverge. See Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 4–5.
44. Senior retired Nicaraguan military officer, confidential interview with author, July 2001.
45. Roberto J. Cajina, “Nicaragua: de la seguridad del Estado a la inseguridad ciudadana,” in Gobernabilidad democrdtiica y seguridad ciudadana en Centroamerica: el caso de Nicaragua, Andres Serbin and Diego Ferreyra, eds. (Managua: CRIES, 2000), 14–14.
46. Clifton L. Holland, “Nicaragua,” Mesoamerica 19 (January (2000): 9–9.
47. Maria Guevara Somarriba, “Ejercito designa su proximo jefe,” El Nuevo Diario (Managua), 21 November 1999.
48. On these events, see “Arrest of State Comptroller Called Political Revenge,” Central America Report, 19 November 1999.
49. “The Interbank Controversy Opens Pandora's Box,” Envio (Managua), 19, no. 230 (2000): 3.
50. “The Interbank Controversy,” p. 3.
51. Senior retired Nicaraguan military officer, confidential interview with author, July 2001.
52. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 93–93.
53. My ratings are based on an analysis of the Nicaraguan Constitution, the Military Code, and Law 290 (with its regulatory Decree 71-98), all of which are cited above, as well as on information collected during interviews with Nicaraguan scholars, military officers, and politicians. According to Stepan, the military should be classified as having a low prerogative when de jure and de facto control are exercised by civilian officials and institutions sanctioned by the democratic regime. In cases where the civilian government has de jure legal authority, but the military still has de facto effective control, the military prerogative in question should be classified as moderate. See Stepan, Rethinking Militar' Politics, 93.
54. On the current controversy over Latin American military missions, see David Pion Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers?: Military Missions and Civilian Control in Democratic South America,” Armed Forces and Society 26 (Spring 2000): 413–436.
55. See the report on General Carrion's speech in “Elogian profesionalizacion del Ejercito de Nicaragua,” La Prensa (Managua), 19 December 2001.
56. Melendez Quinonez, Los escenarios, 28–42.
57. Senior Nicaraguan military intelligence officer, confidential interview with author, July 2001.
58. Arnoldo Brenes, Soldados como empr-esarios: los negocios de los mnilitares en Centroamericta (San Jose, Costa Rica: Arias Foundation, 1998).
59. Fitch, Tue Armed Forces, 42–43:
60. J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America: How Do We Know if Anything Has Changed?” in Cili Milita-rv Relaitions in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, (2001), 61–63. McSherry, Incomplete Transition, 25 also divides Stepan's prerogatives into military realm and civilian realm factors.
61. Fitch. The Arnmed Forices, 43–43.
62. The distribution ot prerogatives by category was done in consultation with Samuel Fitch.
63. Fitch. The Armined Foarces, 40–41. Such a ranking would place Nicaragua roughly in the upper middle range of Latin American countries with respect to the level of civilian control attained. Its progress would put it ahead of nations such as Ecuador. where the armed forces are much more involved in civilian politics, but behind countries such as Uruguay and Argentina. w here greater democratic control has been established.
64. See for example, Army of Nicaragua, Memtoia Ejecito de Nicaraga,000 (Managua: Editoria de Arte, (2001). Generalization based on the on-record and confidential interviews with Nicaraguan military officers cited above.
65. See Dye, Pacwloitk Detnoir-acxy;
66. Stephen Kinzer, “Country Without Heroes,” Tle Nen York Rel'iew, 19 July 2001. 31–33. In December 1999. Alemrn and Ortega signed a cynical political pact intended to exclude other political parties, divide spoils, and provide each other with immunity from prosecution. However, in Decemnber 2002, former President Aleman was striped of his immunity, indicted on corruption charges. and placed under house arrest.
67. See Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armied Fortces and Socliety 26 (Fall (1999), 13. Bland argues that the military must be protected from politicians who would use their authority over it to enhance partisan interests and their own power.
68. Nicaieaguan military expert Roberto Cajina, interview with author. December 2001.