Sunflower management and capital budgeting

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 501-527

  Boot, Arnoud W A ^a   Milbourn, Todd T ^b   Thakor, Anjan V ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21144437576     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/427636     Document Type: Article

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