Which security Dilemma? Mitigating ethnic conflict: The case of Croatia

Security Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 280-313

  Roe, Paul ^a  

^a CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 20544443920     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410490945901     Document Type: Review

References (116)

1. Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 28.
2. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation," World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 317 (emphasis added).
3. Charles Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 171 (emphasis added).
4. See Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 153-179.
5. See Robert Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (winter 2001): 36-60.
6. See Paul Roe, "Actors' Responsibility in 'Tight,' 'Regular,' or 'Loose' Security Dilemmas," Security Dialogue 32, no. 1 (March 2001): 103-116.
7. See Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars Insecurity and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
8. Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 68.
9. I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for drawing my attention to this point.
10. Nick Wheeler and Ken Booth, "The Security Dilemma," in, Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, ed. John Baylis and Nick Rengger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 64.
11. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 64.
12. Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), 21.
13. See Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
14. Charles Glaser discusses the role of certain institutions within the state (units within the government, think-tanks, and so on) charged with evaluating others' policies. Perceptions, he notes, can be affected not only by the quality of the information these institutions provide, but also by the strong political influence that particular organizations have. In other words, states might misinterpret others' behavior because evaluative capabilities are poor or certain institutions which are dominant in the policy-making process provide misleading information. See Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44, no. 1 (July 1992): 514-518.
15. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 64-65.
16. Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," in, Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 315.
17. Erik Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between Ethnic Groups in an Emerging Anarchy (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Report no. 52, 1999), 21.
18. This borrows from what Kenneth Boulding describes as "two very different kinds of incompatibility.... 'real' incompatibility, where we have two images of the future in which realization of one would prevent realization of the other," and '"illusory' incompatibility, in which there exists a condition of compatibility which would satisfy the real interests of the two parties but in which the dynamics of the situation or illusions of the parties create a situation of ... misunderstandings, which increase hostility simply as a result of the reactions of the parties to each other, not as a result of any basic differences of interests" (Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau [New York: Free Press, 1969], 429-430).
19. Butterfield, History and Human Relations, 19-20.
20. John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 241 (emphasis added).
21. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 80.
22. Ibid., 74.
23. Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (winter 2001): 38.
24. Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 117.
25. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 75.
26. Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy," 501.
27. Ibid., 503-5.
28. Ibid., 504.
29. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy," International Security 25, no. 3, (winter 2000/01): 145.
30. Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 315.
31. Ibid., 316.
32. Jack Snyder and Charles Reynolds also talk of the security dilemma in terms of expansionist states (although they both prefer to use the term "imperialist state"). Reynolds argues that imperialist states will pursue expansionist policies in order to counter their vulnerability to changes in the relative power of their neighbors. Charles Reynolds, Modes of Imperialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 24.
33. Similarly, Snyder argues that while an aggressor (imperialist state) might well begin with the intention of attacking another, because this second state employs countervailing measures, what can then ensue between the two is "a testing of will and capabilities." Snyder claims that in such a situation the fear of being taken advantage of is experienced by both sides. As such, the expansionist state further arms for both defensive (to deter the other) and offensive (a preemptive strike) purposes. Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," 165.
34. Snyder, 155 (emphasis added).
35. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 190.
36. Ibid. I recognize the debate over greedy and non-greedy states might be considered a false one. This is because for some Realists security dilemmas are generated regardless of states' intentionality. Rather, it is structural characteristics and not actors' attributes which culminate in the "tragedy." In this respect, Realists point to the possible scenario of today's friendly neighbors becoming tomorrow's enemies. I certainly cannot dismiss this point, and I am grateful to Ben Frankel for drawing my attention to it. My own categorization of the security dilemma, however, rests not so much with benign/malign intentions but with compatible/incompatible security requirements. In addition, I argue that decision makers who do play it safe with today's friends behave in accordance with what can be called a projecte intentionality, where probabilities concerning what the other's attributes will likely be next year, five years hence, and so forth are considered.
37. Ibid., 191.
38. Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "Evaluating Realist Explanations of Internal Conflict: The Case of Liberia," Security Studies 10, no. 3 (spring 2001): 199.
39. I b i d.
40. Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 28.
41. Ibid., 29. In such circumstances, Posen continues, intentionality is ascertained largely by reference to the historical record. Posen describes how the historical views taken by ethnic groups often turn out to be inaccurate and misleading. First, regimes in multi-ethnic states may well have suppressed or manipulated the historical record in order to consolidate their own position. Second, within the groups themselves old rivalries will have been preserved more in stories, poems, and myths than in codified history, and will thereby have been "magnified in... [their] telling." Third, because of this each group will have difficulty in adhering to another's view of the past. Finally, actors are likely to assume the worst: "as central authority begins to collapse and local politicians begin to struggle for power, they will begin to write down their versions of history in political speeches. Yet stories are likely to be emotionally charged" (ibid., 31).
42. Ibid., 32.
43. I b i d.
44. Ibid., 34.
45. Ibid., 34-35.
46. I b i d.
47. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 148.
48. I b i d.
49. See Roe, "Former Yugoslavia: The Security Dilemma That Never Was?" European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 3 (2000): 373-393.
50. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma," in Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, ed. Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 10.
51. Ibid., 18.
52. Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 2000), 179.
53. Ibid., 25.
54. Han Dorussen, "Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (2001): 252.
55. Ibid., 253.
56. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 150.
57. Ibid., 162.
58. Out of a total population of some 6.3 million, the NDH was home to 1.9 million ethnic Serbs. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994), 176.
59. The number of Serbs (and others) killed by the Ustashe during the Second World War is still keenly contested; however, total Serb casualties between 1941 and 1945 - including fatalities inflicted by the Partisans and the German army - was likely 500,000.
60. John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: There Was Twice a Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 205.
61. Robert Fisk, "Croatian Death Camp Gives Hate a New Twist," The Independent, 20 June 1994.
62. Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy, no. 91 (summer 1993): 10.
63. During the mid-1960s there was, however, a revival of Croatian national consciousness. In 1967, a body of Croatian intellectuals demanded constitutional recognition of a separate Croatian language. The language declaration sparked a mass movement known as Maspok, and the concomitant revival of Croat nationalism was accompanied by the reappearance of some symbols last seen during the period of the NDU. The so-called Croatian Spring lasted until 1972, when it was finally suppressed by Tito.
64. Out ofthe 356 seats in the Sabor, the HDZ won 205 of them outright and gained a further four in coalition with other parties, this despite having received just over 40 percent of the total vote.
65. The majority of Croatia's 600,000 ethnic Serbs were urbanized, living in the republic's major towns and cities.
66. Serb communities had been in Krajina mainly since the period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. During this time, many Serb families driven out of the Serbian Kingdom by the Turks came to settle in the region. In return for pledging their allegiance to Vienna, Serbs were granted religious freedom and a measure of self-government.
67. For example, in July 1989 Serbs in Knin demonstrated in support of their fellow nationals in Kosovo. Their outburst of nationalist sentiment sparked a major confrontation between local Serb leaders and the nationally sensitive communist government in Zagreb. See Leonard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 130.
68. Robert Hislope, "Intra-Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy," East European Quarterly 30, no.4 (1997): 476.
69. The checkerboard pattern, which appears on many of Croatia's symbols, is, in fact, slightly different with the red and white checks reversed from the wartime symbols. Again, I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out.
70. Cultural autonomy entails the granting of certain rights in relation to the means of cultural production: control of one's schools, museums, newspapers, religious institutions, even one's own television and radio broadcasts. Ethnic autonomy is more territorially based and involves self-government along a wider range of issues. This can be manifest in some kind of autonomous region within the state, or, in its most extreme representation, in independence outside the existing state structure.
71. See Cohen, Broken Bonds, 132.
72. Jovic is said to have told the Serbian leadership in Croatia that in his role as Federal President he would be unable to help them in any "official" capacity. Instead, he directed them to Slobodan Milosevic who, Jovic assured them, would be able to offer assistance.
73. Laura Silber and Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1995).
74. Milan Andrejevich, "Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part 1)," RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 14 September 1990, 42-43.
75. According to the referendum, every Serb over the age of 18 who was a resident living in Croatia or held Croatian citizenship while living outside the republic was entitled to vote.
76. Quoted in Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1995). 135.
77. Hislope, 475.
78. See Andrejevich, "Croatia Goes to the Polls," RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 4 May 1990, 36.
79. Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy no. 91 (summer 1993): 18.
80. Robert Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review 51, no. 4 (winter 1992): 672.
81. Essentially, there were three different visions of an independent Croatia: the Yugoslav republic of Croatia, the Banovina Hrvatska (the Croatia created by the 1939 Sporazumen), and the NDH (the 1941-45 Pavelic state). The NDH vision represented the extreme nationalist view, one held by Dobroslav Paraga's Hrvatska Stranka Prava (HSP), or "Croatian Party of [State] Right." The Yugoslav republic of Croatia vision was the least Tudjman could ask for and still get away with; anything less would have likely cost him the presidency, given the degree of Croat nationalist sentiment.
82. Quoted in Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 1992), 14.
83. Ibid., 2.
84. Haakan Wiberg, "Divided Nations and Divided States as a Security Problem; The Case of Yugoslavia," Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) Working Paper, no. 14 (1992): 17.
85. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 12.
86. Ibid., 3.
87. Rural Serbs in living in Krajina and other parts of the Croatian countryside often referred to their fellow nationals in the major cities as Hrbi, a mix of Hrvati (Croats) and Srbi (Serbs).
88. Quoted in Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Mandarin, 1994), 216.
89. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 131.
90. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), 23.
91. For example, Slaven Letica points out that the key Ustashe symbol, the letter "U," was absent from Croatization, and that most symbols - such as the flag, coat of arms, and national anthem - are merely traditional expressions of Croatian statehood, which date back long before the NDH. See Letica, "The Genesis of the Current Balkan War," in Genocide After Emotion, ed. Stepjan G. Mestrovics (London: Routledge, 1996), 111.
92. Many Serbs in Zagreb did see the symbolism of HDZ as threatening. These, however, were mostly Serbs from Serbia proper who had moved to Croatia's major cities after the Second World War in search of work.
93. Quoted in Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1995), 106.
94. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 3.
95. Quoted in Silber & Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1995), 106.
96. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 3.
97. Ibid., 13-14.
98. Quoted in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 130.
99. Ibid., 132.
100. Mark Thompson, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia (London: Vintage, 1992), 260.
101. Ibid., 19.
102. Quoted in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 131.
103. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 19.
104. Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1995), 103.
105. Quoted in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 132.
106. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 132.
107. Andrejevich, "Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I)," 41.
108. I b i d.
109. Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1995), 103.
110. Quoted in Thompson, A Paper House, 271.
111. I b i d.
112. Ibid., 280.
113. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the formerly Yugoslav Republics," 785.
114. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 11.
115. Thompson, A Paper House, 264.
116. For a discussion of security dilemmas that instigate or exacerbate ethnic conflict, see Roe, "Former Yugoslavia: The Security Dilemma That Never Was?"