The inefficiency of splitting the bill

Economic Journal

Volumn 114, Issue 495, 2004, Pages 265-280

  Gneezy, Uri ^a   Haruvy, Ernan ^a   Yafe, Hadas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; ECONOMIC THEORY; EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT;

EID: 1942424069     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00209.x     Document Type: Article

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