Iraq's chemical weapons legacy: What others might learn from Saddam

Middle East Journal

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 187-208

  Russell, Richard L ^a  

^a NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHEMICAL WEAPON; NATION STATE; STRATEGIC APPROACH; WAR;

ASIA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; IRAQ; MIDDLE EAST; WORLD;

EID: 19344372458     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/59.2.11     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. The documents are posted on GulfLink, a website maintained by the Office of the Assistant for Gulf War Illness, Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense, located at http:// www.gulflink.osd.mil.
2. Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD, Comprehensive Report, 3 Volumes (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004). Available at http:// www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html. Hereafter referred to as Iraq Survey Group (ISG).
3. For an analysis that critiques the Arab view that Soviet-built weapons were largely responsible for poor Arab military battle performances, see Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries," Middle East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 549-578.
4. Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 574.
5. Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 574.
6. Michael Eisenstadt, "The Military Dimension," Chapter 4 in Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt, Eliyahu Kanovsky, and David Menashri (eds.), Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), p. 74.
7. Steven L. Spiegel, "Arms Control: In the Region's Future?," Chapter 10 in Judith S. Yaphe (ed.), The Middle East in 2015 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 197-198.
8. Susan B. Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics: The Real Military Revolution," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2002), p. 85.
9. Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 3, 33, and 37.
10. For a more recent treatment, see Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press, 1997).
11. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), p. 9.
12. W. Andrew Terrill, "The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War," Comparative Strategy, No. 10 (April/June 1991), p. 109.
13. Terrill, "The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War," p. 115.
14. Terrill, "The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War," p. 115.
15. Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 92.
16. Directorate of Central Intelligence, Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11/50/37-82), Volume II, Supporting Analysis, February 1982, p. 22. The document is made available by the National Security Archive, a library and archive of declassified US documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, at http:// nsarchive.chadwyck.com/.
17. Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals, Supporting Analysis, p. 22.
18. Directorate of Central Intelligence, Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Special National Intelligence Estimate Memorandum to Holders, March 1983, p. 4. This report is also made available by the National Security Archives.
19. Terrill, "The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War," p. 116.
20. Terrill, "The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War," p. 117.
21. Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1998), p. 50.
22. Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," p. 51.
23. ISG, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program," p. 63.
24. ISG, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program," p. 61.
25. ISG, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program," p. 10.
26. ISG, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program," p. 9.
27. GulfLink, CIA, Director of Intelligence, Intelligence Assessment, "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War," Undated.
28. Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," Chapter 2 in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Witz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 61.
29. Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 62.
30. GulfLink, "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War."
31. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War , Volume II (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 516.
32. GulfLink, "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War."
33. GulfLink, "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War."
34. ISG, "Regime Strategic Intent," p. 24.
35. GulfLink, CIA Research Paper, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly," August 1990.
36. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 64.
37. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 64.
38. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 63.
39. GulfLink, "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War."
40. GulfLink, "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War."
41. GulfLink, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly."
42. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," pp. 64-65.
43. GulfLink, "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War."
44. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, p. 518.
45. Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 264-265.
46. Quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Great Terror," The New Yorker, March 25, 2002.
47. Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 22.
48. Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, p. 262.
49. Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, p. xvii.
50. Goldberg, "The Great Terror."
51. Goldberg, "The Great Terror."
52. Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraqs Crime of Genocide, p. 1.
53. Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, p. 35.
54. Goldberg, "The Great Terror."
55. Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, p. 12.
56. George H. W. Bush, "Letter to Saddam Hussein," January 5, 1991, Gulf War Exhibit, George Bush Presidential Library, Texas A&M University.
57. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 69.
58. Charles A. Duelfer, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, 27 February 2002, available on the Center for Strategic and International Studies' website at http://www.csis.org.
59. GulfLink, CIA Memorandum, "Why WMD Were Withheld," March 1991.
60. GulfLink, "Why WMD Were Withheld."
61. GulfLink, CIA Intelligence Report, "Comments on Iraq's Non-Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons During the Gulf War," August 1995.
62. GulfLink, "Why WMD Were Withheld."
63. Amatzia Baram, "An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 33.
64. Duelfer, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. Emphasis in original.
65. Duelfer, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.
66. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 58. Emphasis in original.
67. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 71.
68. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 77.
69. ISG, "Regime Strategic Intent," pp. 98-99.
70. GulfLink, "Why WMD Were Withheld."
71. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 37.
72. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 170-171.
73. GulfLink, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly," August 1990.
74. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 70.
75. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 72.
76. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," p. 52.
77. GulfLink, "Why WMD Were Withheld."
78. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 264-265.
79. ISG, "Regime Strategic Intent," p. 25.
80. Excerpts from "Key Judgments: Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction," National Intelligence Estimate, October 2002 made available in a White House background briefing on July 18, 2003. The text is available from the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html. Also see the NIE with graphics at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd /Iraq_Oct_2002.htm.
81. "Key Judgments," National Intelligence Estimate.
82. ISG, "Regime Strategic Intent," pp. 34-35.
83. "Key Judgments," National Intelligence Estimate.
84. Kenneth Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 293, No. 1 (January-February 2004), p. 82.
85. David Kay, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons Learned and Unlearned," Miller Center Report, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring /Summer 2004), p. 8.
86. ISG, "Regime Strategic Intent," p. 59.
87. ISG, "Regime Strategic Intent," p. 59.
88. Barton Gellman, "Iraq's Arsenal of Ambitions," Washington Post, January 7, 2004, p. A1.
89. Steve Coll, "Hussein Was Sure of Own Survival," Washington Post, November 3, 2003, p. A1.
90. Coll, "Hussein Was Sure of Own Survival," p. A1.
91. For a treatment of this issue, see Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-115
92. and William M. Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 3-18.