Armies of snow and armies of sand: The impact of Soviet military doctrine on Arab militaries 1

Middle East Journal

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2001, Pages

  Eisenstadt, Michael ^a   Pollack, Kenneth M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040431371     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (120)

1. This article was originally drafted for the project on Diffusion of Military Knowledge, Technology and Practices: International Consequences of Military Innovations, led by Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason. The authors are grateful for their permission to publish this piece independent of the project. The authors would also like to thank David Isby, Amnon Sella, Dov Tamari, Steve Zaloga, and the members of the project for commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors of fact or interpretation that remain are the responsibility of the authors.
2. Interviews with Israeli military officers, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, September 1996.
3. By the end of the first day and night of combat, Israeli forces had destroyed some 60 Iraqi tanks, while losing four of their own, though the timely Iraqi intervention prevented a major Arab reversal on the Syrian front.
4. The Soviets used the term "doctrine" in a very precise sense, to refer to the entire body of military thought based on "scientific" Marxist-Leninist principles, including small unit tactics, operational art, strategy, and national security policy. By contrast, Anglo-American usage of the term is typically much less precise, and "doctrine" is often used interchangeably to refer to tactics, techniques and procedures, operations, and/or strategy. This paper will employ the latter usage, which is probably more familiar to most of its readers.
5. Quoted in Roger Owen, "The Role of the Army in Middle East Politics: A Critique of Existing Analyses," Review of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, 1978, p. 70.
6. Jon D. Classman, Arms for the Arabs, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 50.
7. For a pioneering work on this subject, which provided much of the inspiration for this study, see Amnon Sella, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Arab War Aims," in Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, From June to October: The Middle East Between 1967 and 1973 (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 77-92.
8. The Czech arms deal provided Egypt with 230 tanks (primarily T-34/85s), 200 APCs (mostly BTRs), 100 Su-100 self-propelled guns, 500 artillery pieces, 200 jet combat aircraft (120 MiG-15s, 50 Il-28s, and 20 Il-14s), as well as several destroyers, submarines and motor torpedo boats. This constituted an important change in the balance of power between Egypt and Israel, and contributed to the Western refusal to help build the Aswan High Dam and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Prior to the deal, both Egypt and Israel had fewer than 200 tanks apiece. Similarly, before the Russian deal, Egypt possessed 80 old British jet aircraft (mostly Vampires) while Israel boasted only 50 early-model French jets (Ouragans and Meteors). Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, First Paperback edition, (NY: Shocken Books, 1967), pp. 4-5; and Nadav Safran, From War to War, (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 209.
9. The Czech arms deal provided Egypt with 230 tanks (primarily T-34/85s), 200 APCs (mostly BTRs), 100 Su-100 self-propelled guns, 500 artillery pieces, 200 jet combat aircraft (120 MiG-15s, 50 Il-28s, and 20 Il-14s), as well as several destroyers, submarines and motor torpedo boats. This constituted an important change in the balance of power between Egypt and Israel, and contributed to the Western refusal to help build the Aswan High Dam and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Prior to the deal, both Egypt and Israel had fewer than 200 tanks apiece. Similarly, before the Russian deal, Egypt possessed 80 old British jet aircraft (mostly Vampires) while Israel boasted only 50 early-model French jets (Ouragans and Meteors). Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, First Paperback edition, (NY: Shocken Books, 1967), pp. 4-5; and Nadav Safran, From War to War, (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 209.
10. The former figure does not include 15,000-18,000 Soviet air defense personnel in Egypt during and after the 1969-70 Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition.
11. In the words of one analyst, "the magnitude of the Soviet commitment was unprecedented, surpassing in both quantity and quality the aid given to North Vietnam and exceeding the rate at which aid had hitherto been given to allied or friendly countries." Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 30.
12. Rubinstein, ibid, p. 30; Efraim Karsh, "Soviet Arms for the Love of Allah," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1984, p. 48. Numbers provided by various Egyptian sources vary considerably. Former Egyptian Chief of Operations during the 1973 War, Field Marshal 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy, puts the total Soviet presence at about half this number - about 850 advisors, and 100 technicians; former Minister of War Lt. Gen. Muhammad Fawzi puts the number of Soviet advisors in 1970 at 1,200; while the authoritative Egyptian journalist Muhammad Heikal puts the number of Soviet advisors and technicians in Egypt after the 1967 war at 1,500. Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1989), p. 146; Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat 1967-1970: Mudhakkirat al-Fariq Awwal Muhammad Fawzi (The Three Years War: 1967-1970: Memoirs of General Muhammad Fawzi) (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1983), p. 357; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 41.
13. Rubinstein, ibid, p. 30; Efraim Karsh, "Soviet Arms for the Love of Allah," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1984, p. 48. Numbers provided by various Egyptian sources vary considerably. Former Egyptian Chief of Operations during the 1973 War, Field Marshal 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy, puts the total Soviet presence at about half this number - about 850 advisors, and 100 technicians; former Minister of War Lt. Gen. Muhammad Fawzi puts the number of Soviet advisors in 1970 at 1,200; while the authoritative Egyptian journalist Muhammad Heikal puts the number of Soviet advisors and technicians in Egypt after the 1967 war at 1,500. Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1989), p. 146; Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat 1967-1970: Mudhakkirat al-Fariq Awwal Muhammad Fawzi (The Three Years War: 1967-1970: Memoirs of General Muhammad Fawzi) (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1983), p. 357; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 41.
14. Rubinstein, ibid, p. 30; Efraim Karsh, "Soviet Arms for the Love of Allah," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1984, p. 48. Numbers provided by various Egyptian sources vary considerably. Former Egyptian Chief of Operations during the 1973 War, Field Marshal 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy, puts the total Soviet presence at about half this number - about 850 advisors, and 100 technicians; former Minister of War Lt. Gen. Muhammad Fawzi puts the number of Soviet advisors in 1970 at 1,200; while the authoritative Egyptian journalist Muhammad Heikal puts the number of Soviet advisors and technicians in Egypt after the 1967 war at 1,500. Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1989), p. 146; Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat 1967-1970: Mudhakkirat al-Fariq Awwal Muhammad Fawzi (The Three Years War: 1967-1970: Memoirs of General Muhammad Fawzi) (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1983), p. 357; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 41.
15. Rubinstein, ibid, p. 30; Efraim Karsh, "Soviet Arms for the Love of Allah," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1984, p. 48. Numbers provided by various Egyptian sources vary considerably. Former Egyptian Chief of Operations during the 1973 War, Field Marshal 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy, puts the total Soviet presence at about half this number - about 850 advisors, and 100 technicians; former Minister of War Lt. Gen. Muhammad Fawzi puts the number of Soviet advisors in 1970 at 1,200; while the authoritative Egyptian journalist Muhammad Heikal puts the number of Soviet advisors and technicians in Egypt after the 1967 war at 1,500. Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1989), p. 146; Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat 1967-1970: Mudhakkirat al-Fariq Awwal Muhammad Fawzi (The Three Years War: 1967-1970: Memoirs of General Muhammad Fawzi) (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1983), p. 357; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 41.
16. Rubinstein, ibid, p. 30; Efraim Karsh, "Soviet Arms for the Love of Allah," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1984, p. 48. Numbers provided by various Egyptian sources vary considerably. Former Egyptian Chief of Operations during the 1973 War, Field Marshal 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy, puts the total Soviet presence at about half this number - about 850 advisors, and 100 technicians; former Minister of War Lt. Gen. Muhammad Fawzi puts the number of Soviet advisors in 1970 at 1,200; while the authoritative Egyptian journalist Muhammad Heikal puts the number of Soviet advisors and technicians in Egypt after the 1967 war at 1,500. Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1989), p. 146; Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat 1967-1970: Mudhakkirat al-Fariq Awwal Muhammad Fawzi (The Three Years War: 1967-1970: Memoirs of General Muhammad Fawzi) (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1983), p. 357; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 41.
17. Efraim Karsh, Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970s, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Paper No. 22, December 1983, pp. 23-27; Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon, Disputing Moscow, Says 500 to 1,000 Soviet Advisors are in Iraq," The New York Times, September 26, 1990, p. A6.
18. Efraim Karsh, Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970s, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Paper No. 22, December 1983, pp. 23-27; Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon, Disputing Moscow, Says 500 to 1,000 Soviet Advisors are in Iraq," The New York Times, September 26, 1990, p. A6.
19. Karsh, Soviet Arms Transfers, p. 23.
20. Colonel E.V. Badolato, "A Clash of Cultures: The Expulsion of Soviet Military Advisors from Egypt," Naval War College Review, March-April 1984, pp. 69-81.
21. See, for instance, Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 197-198, 219-221, 225-226, 228-231, 238.
22. Heikal, pp. 181-182. Similar frictions developed between the Soviets and the Syrians and Iraqis. In 1972, the Soviet Ambassador to Damascus fumed that, "These damned Syrians, they will take anything except advice." [Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 72]; Likewise, Soviet advisors often found that cultural factors frustrated their ability to train their charges. Lt. Col. Sergey Ivanovich Belzyudnyy, "Former Soviet Advisor Describes Experiences in Iraq: I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," Komsomolskaya Pravda, February 23, 1991, translated in JPRS-UMA-91-014, 5 June 1991, pp. 62-63.
23. Heikal, pp. 181-182. Similar frictions developed between the Soviets and the Syrians and Iraqis. In 1972, the Soviet Ambassador to Damascus fumed that, "These damned Syrians, they will take anything except advice." [Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 72]; Likewise, Soviet advisors often found that cultural factors frustrated their ability to train their charges. Lt. Col. Sergey Ivanovich Belzyudnyy, "Former Soviet Advisor Describes Experiences in Iraq: I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," Komsomolskaya Pravda, February 23, 1991, translated in JPRS-UMA-91-014, 5 June 1991, pp. 62-63.
24. Col. D. Povkh, "Courage for Export: Interview with Lt. Col. Nikolai Kutyntsev," Soviet Soldier, No. 11, November 1991, p. 65.
25. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
26. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
27. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
28. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
29. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
30. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
31. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
32. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
33. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
34. This section is based on the following sources: V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1968); William F. Scott, "Changes in Tactical Concepts Within the Soviet Forces," and John Erickson, "Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976); Friedrich Wiener and William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977); John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style'" in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (New York: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd, 1981); Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988); Col. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott (Ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990), pp. 143-185; and Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).
35. IISS, The Military Balance, 1973-1974 (London: IISS, 1974), cited in Jeffrey Record, Sizing Up the Soviet Army (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 12.
36. IISS, The Military Balance, 1973-1974 (London: IISS, 1974), cited in Jeffrey Record, Sizing Up the Soviet Army (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 12.
37. Erickson, "Soviet Theatre-Warfare Capability," p. 125.
38. During World War II, Soviet tactics emphasized the need to mass forces at a small number of breakthrough points. With the development of tactical nuclear weapons, however, the massing of forces in such a way could be dangerous, and led to a modification of the doctrine, calling for the rapid concentration of forces at multiple breakthrough points, followed by their rapid dispersal thereafter.
39. United States Defense Attache Office (USDAO) Tel Aviv, Intelligence Information Report (IIR) 6 849 0094 74, "Egyptian and Syrian Armies and Their Activities During the October 1973 Yom Kippur War," 10 April 1974, p. 11 (declassified under the Freedom of Information Act).
40. The organization of Syrian forces in the 1970s and early 1980s was dictated, to a great extent, by Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad's fear of a military coup. For a number of years after the 1973 war, Asad refused to add new divisions to the army's order of battle or to create an intermediate echelon of command between division commanders and the Syrian General Staff, fearing that corps or army commanders could threaten his grip on power. However, with the consolidation of his rule during the 1970s and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 , Asad reversed himself, creating a number of new divisions and even permitting the formation of 2-3 corps commands in the early-to-mid-1980s.
41. After 1973, however, Asad showed greater sophistication in using the military instrument as a political tool in Lebanon and vis-a-vis Israel. See, for instance, Lt. Col. Daniel Asher, "Ha-Plisha Ha-Surit Le Levanon: Mahlachim Tzvaiim KeMachshir Medini" (The Syrian Invasion of Lebanon: Military Moves as a Political Tool), Ma'arachot, June 1977, pp. 7-16.
42. For concise Arab and Israeli assessments of the fighting on the Golan, see: Lt. Col. Al-Haytham al-Ayyubi (Ed.), "Al-Harb al-'Arabiyya-al-Isra'iliyya al-Rabi'a (1973): Al-Qital 'ala al-Jabha al-Suriyya" (The Fourth Arab Israeli War (1973): (The Fighting on the Syrian Front) in Al-Mawsu'a al-'Askariyya (The Military Encyclopedia), Vol. I (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, 1977), pp. 709-716); Bassam al-'Assali, "Harb al-Jawlan" (The War in the Golan) in Al-Difa' al-Islami, Vol. IV, No. 13, April-June 1985, pp. 20-26; and Lt. Col. (Res.) Tzvi [surname withheld for security reasons], "Ma'arachah Hatkafit Surit BeRamat Ha-Golan," (The Syrian Assault on the Golan in the Yom Kippur War), Ma'arachot, January-February 1989, pp. 21-29.
43. For concise Arab and Israeli assessments of the fighting on the Golan, see: Lt. Col. Al-Haytham al-Ayyubi (Ed.), "Al-Harb al-'Arabiyya-al-Isra'iliyya al-Rabi'a (1973): Al-Qital 'ala al-Jabha al-Suriyya" (The Fourth Arab Israeli War (1973): (The Fighting on the Syrian Front) in Al-Mawsu'a al-'Askariyya (The Military Encyclopedia), Vol. I (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, 1977), pp. 709-716); Bassam al-'Assali, "Harb al-Jawlan" (The War in the Golan) in Al-Difa' al-Islami, Vol. IV, No. 13, April-June 1985, pp. 20-26; and Lt. Col. (Res.) Tzvi [surname withheld for security reasons], "Ma'arachah Hatkafit Surit BeRamat Ha-Golan," (The Syrian Assault on the Golan in the Yom Kippur War), Ma'arachot, January-February 1989, pp. 21-29.
44. For concise Arab and Israeli assessments of the fighting on the Golan, see: Lt. Col. Al-Haytham al-Ayyubi (Ed.), "Al-Harb al-'Arabiyya-al-Isra'iliyya al-Rabi'a (1973): Al-Qital 'ala al-Jabha al-Suriyya" (The Fourth Arab Israeli War (1973): (The Fighting on the Syrian Front) in Al-Mawsu'a al-'Askariyya (The Military Encyclopedia), Vol. I (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, 1977), pp. 709-716); Bassam al-'Assali, "Harb al-Jawlan" (The War in the Golan) in Al-Difa' al-Islami, Vol. IV, No. 13, April-June 1985, pp. 20-26; and Lt. Col. (Res.) Tzvi [surname withheld for security reasons], "Ma'arachah Hatkafit Surit BeRamat Ha-Golan," (The Syrian Assault on the Golan in the Yom Kippur War), Ma'arachot, January-February 1989, pp. 21-29.
45. Jerry Asher with Eric Hammel, Duel for the Golan: The 100-Hour Battle that Saved Israel, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987), pp. 90-91; Col. Trevor N, Dupuy, Elusive Victory; The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 445-447.
46. Jerry Asher with Eric Hammel, Duel for the Golan: The 100-Hour Battle that Saved Israel, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987), pp. 90-91; Col. Trevor N, Dupuy, Elusive Victory; The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 445-447.
47. Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975), p. 75; Charles Wakebridge, "The Syrian Side of the Hill," Military Review, February 1976, pp. 28-29.
48. Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975), p. 75; Charles Wakebridge, "The Syrian Side of the Hill," Military Review, February 1976, pp. 28-29.
49. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 455, 590; Wakebridge, "The Syrian Side of the Hill," pp. 28-29. Syrian anti-tank teams did, however, play a role in harassing Israeli tank laagers at night in the first days of fighting, and in defending the Sa'sa' salient against advancing Israeli forces during the latter phase of the war.
50. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 455, 590; Wakebridge, "The Syrian Side of the Hill," pp. 28-29. Syrian anti-tank teams did, however, play a role in harassing Israeli tank laagers at night in the first days of fighting, and in defending the Sa'sa' salient against advancing Israeli forces during the latter phase of the war.
51. Several explanations for these failures have been offered:
52. advanced Syrian tank units outran fuel and ammo resupply convoys which had been disrupted by Israeli air strikes;
53. having reached their geographic objective for the day, the Syrians halted to consolidate their gains and await additional orders that never came;
54. fearing that their flank was exposed to an Israeli counterattack, the vanguard of the Syrian force halted to allow the rest of the force to catch up (which it never did). Herzog, War of Atonement, p. 104; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 456. Regardless of which explanation is correct, the key consideration is that Syrian tactical commanders lacked the initiative to seize the paramount objectives of their war plan (the bridges on the Jordan) when they were within their grasp. This was an unforgivable violation of Soviet military doctrine, which stressed seizing such war-winning opportunities when they presented themselves.
55. fearing that their flank was exposed to an Israeli counterattack, the vanguard of the Syrian force halted to allow the rest of the force to catch up (which it never did). Herzog, War of Atonement, p. 104; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 456. Regardless of which explanation is correct, the key consideration is that Syrian tactical commanders lacked the initiative to seize the paramount objectives of their war plan (the bridges on the Jordan) when they were within their grasp. This was an unforgivable violation of Soviet military doctrine, which stressed seizing such war-winning opportunities when they presented themselves.
56. USDAO Tel Aviv IIR 6 849 0094 74, p. 2.
57. Lt. Gen. Saad El Shazli, The Crossing of Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 36-37, 111; Ahmed Fakhr, "Sadat and the Transformation of Egyptian National Security," in Jon B. Alterman, ed., Sadat and His Legacy: Egypt and the World, 1977-1997 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, 1998), p. 68.
58. Lt. Gen. Saad El Shazli, The Crossing of Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 36-37, 111; Ahmed Fakhr, "Sadat and the Transformation of Egyptian National Security," in Jon B. Alterman, ed., Sadat and His Legacy: Egypt and the World, 1977-1997 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, 1998), p. 68.
59. Col. (Res.) Daniel Asher, "Me 'Horaah 41' Le-'Tahrir 41': MeTorat Lechima Mitzrit - leMilchamah" (From 'Order 41' to 'Liberation 41': From an Egyptian Combat Doctrine - to War), Ma'arachot, September-October 1993, pp. 46-53.
60. The Egyptians thus reinterpreted the Soviet concept of the "operational pause." In Soviet military thought, a commander might order an operational pause in order to reorganize and reconstitute his forces in anticipation of the resumption of the offensive. In the Egyptian case, the operational pause was intended to facilitate the transition to the defensive and the defeat of Israeli counterattacks.
61. Each Egyptian infantry division - in addition to its four organic tank battalions, one BMP battalion, and one ATGM battalion - was reinforced with a tank brigade, an antitank gun (SU-100) battalion, and an ATGM battalion, and hundreds of other antitank weapons taken from second echelon units and army level reserves. Shazli, Crossing of Suez, pp. 225, 258.
62. See Heikal, Road to Ramadan, p. 184.
63. Col. (Res.) Daniel Asher, "Ha-Neged -Tank KeMa'anah: Tichnon Haf'alat Ha-Emtza'im Neged-Tank Al-Yadei Ha-Mitzrim BeMilchemet Yom Ha-Kippurim" (Antitank Weapons as Response: The Employment of Antitank Weapons by the Egyptians During the Yom Kippur War), Ma'arachot, February 1996, pp. 6-10.
64. Avraham (Bren) Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (San Francisco: Presidio Press, 1980), pp 64-65.
65. Mohammed Heikal, "An Interview with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Isma'il, Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1974, pp. 217-219; Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, pp. 34-37; Charles Wakebridge, "The Egyptian Staff Solution," Military Review, March 1975, pp. 6-7; Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978), pp. 27-30, 338.
66. Mohammed Heikal, "An Interview with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Isma'il, Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1974, pp. 217-219; Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, pp. 34-37; Charles Wakebridge, "The Egyptian Staff Solution," Military Review, March 1975, pp. 6-7; Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978), pp. 27-30, 338.
67. Mohammed Heikal, "An Interview with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Isma'il, Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1974, pp. 217-219; Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, pp. 34-37; Charles Wakebridge, "The Egyptian Staff Solution," Military Review, March 1975, pp. 6-7; Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978), pp. 27-30, 338.
68. Mohammed Heikal, "An Interview with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Isma'il, Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1974, pp. 217-219; Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, pp. 34-37; Charles Wakebridge, "The Egyptian Staff Solution," Military Review, March 1975, pp. 6-7; Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978), pp. 27-30, 338.
69. Herzog, The War of Atonement, pp. 34-37; O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished, pp. 27-30.
70. Herzog, The War of Atonement, pp. 34-37; O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished, pp. 27-30.
71. Al-Gamasy, October War, p. 139.
72. Adan, Banks of the Suez, p. 237.
73. For accounts of the offensive of October 14, see: Adan, Banks of the Suez, pp. 232-242; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 486-491; Gamasy, October War, pp. 276-280; Herzog, War of Atonement, pp. 205-206.
74. For accounts of the offensive of October 14, see: Adan, Banks of the Suez, pp. 232-242; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 486-491; Gamasy, October War, pp. 276-280; Herzog, War of Atonement, pp. 205-206.
75. For accounts of the offensive of October 14, see: Adan, Banks of the Suez, pp. 232-242; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 486-491; Gamasy, October War, pp. 276-280; Herzog, War of Atonement, pp. 205-206.
76. For accounts of the offensive of October 14, see: Adan, Banks of the Suez, pp. 232-242; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 486-491; Gamasy, October War, pp. 276-280; Herzog, War of Atonement, pp. 205-206.
77. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 488-489.
78. Maj. Gen. Amnon Reshef, interview, September 1996, Reshef was a brigade commander in Mendler's (later Magen's) ugdah (roughly, division), facing the Egyptian Third Army.
79. Maj. Doron [surname withheld for security reasons], "Krav Ha-14 BeOctober BeGizrat Vadi Mabuk" ("The Battle of 14 October in the Wadi Mabuk Sector"), Ma'arachot, November 1978, pp. 23, 26-27. The Egyptians were also hindered by the mechanistic implementation of Soviet doctrine. For instance, before 1973, Soviet doctrine called for tank platoon leaders to designate a single target, which the entire platoon would fire at until destroyed. The platoon leaders would then identify a new target to engage. The Soviets calculated that, given the gunnery skills of their crews, it normally would take three salvoes from the platoon (nine rounds) to kill an enemy tank at the preferred range of engagement. Rather than seeing this as a general guide for action, the Egyptians turned it into a hard-and-fast rule and taught all of their tank platoons to fire three rounds at the designated target and then proceed to the next. Egyptian gunnery skills were often so poor that often none of the three salvoes hit home. Nevertheless, because they had been taught to fire three rounds and then move on, tank platoon leaders would generally shift fires to the next target even though they had not actually destroyed the first one. In this way, the Egyptians lost a great many tank duels to the Israelis. Interviews with retired Israeli military officers, 1992-1994.
80. Tzvi Ofer, (Ed.) Tzva 'Iraq BaMilchemet Yom Hakippurim, (The Iraqi Army in the October War) (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1986), p. 33; National Training Center (NTC), The Iraqi Army: Organization and Tactics, Handbook 100-91, January 3, 1991, pp. 1, 35, 37, 110, 112, 117, 128, 133, 152, 159, 173; Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," p. 62. The Iraqis basically retained the old World War II-version of British doctrine (this was the last period of time that Iraqi troops had been trained by the British) and many of their manuals captured during the 1991 Gulf War were translations of old British Sandhurst manuals. However, while the doctrine of the Iraqi army remained overwhelmingly British, its execution was uniquely Iraqi.
81. Tzvi Ofer, (Ed.) Tzva 'Iraq BaMilchemet Yom Hakippurim, (The Iraqi Army in the October War) (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1986), p. 33; National Training Center (NTC), The Iraqi Army: Organization and Tactics, Handbook 100-91, January 3, 1991, pp. 1, 35, 37, 110, 112, 117, 128, 133, 152, 159, 173; Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," p. 62. The Iraqis basically retained the old World War II-version of British doctrine (this was the last period of time that Iraqi troops had been trained by the British) and many of their manuals captured during the 1991 Gulf War were translations of old British Sandhurst manuals. However, while the doctrine of the Iraqi army remained overwhelmingly British, its execution was uniquely Iraqi.
82. Tzvi Ofer, (Ed.) Tzva 'Iraq BaMilchemet Yom Hakippurim, (The Iraqi Army in the October War) (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1986), p. 33; National Training Center (NTC), The Iraqi Army: Organization and Tactics, Handbook 100-91, January 3, 1991, pp. 1, 35, 37, 110, 112, 117, 128, 133, 152, 159, 173; Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," p. 62. The Iraqis basically retained the old World War II-version of British doctrine (this was the last period of time that Iraqi troops had been trained by the British) and many of their manuals captured during the 1991 Gulf War were translations of old British Sandhurst manuals. However, while the doctrine of the Iraqi army remained overwhelmingly British, its execution was uniquely Iraqi.
83. For instance, according to a Soviet air force advisor based in Iraq prior to the 1991 war, "many Iraqi pilots had been trained in Western countries, France or England. . .. Correspondingly, the organization of the units as well as the tactics of air combat followed Western models very distinct from ours. But ours was a very narrow, specific task and we focused all our attention on instructing the Iraqis in piloting techniques, without imposing our own notions about air force tactics." Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," p. 62.
84. William Staudenmaier, "Iran-Iraq, (1980-)," in Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman, The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 218; and John S. Wagner, "Iraq: A Combat Assessment," in Fighting Armies in the Middle East, edited by Richard Gabriel (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1983), p. 67.
85. William Staudenmaier, "Iran-Iraq, (1980-)," in Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman, The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 218; and John S. Wagner, "Iraq: A Combat Assessment," in Fighting Armies in the Middle East, edited by Richard Gabriel (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1983), p. 67.
86. NTC, The Iraqi Army, pp. 5, 11.
87. Michael Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The Future of Iraqi Military Power (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, 1993), p. 84.
88. Michael R. Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), pp. 104-105; United States Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Part I: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 75-77. For the travails of one Soviet pilot sent as an adviser to Iraq to teach air-to-air operations, see Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," pp. 62-63. For descriptions of Gulf War aerial combat, see United States Air Force, GWAPS, Vol. II, Part II: Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 1993), pp. 119-130.
89. Michael R. Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), pp. 104-105; United States Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Part I: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 75-77. For the travails of one Soviet pilot sent as an adviser to Iraq to teach air-to-air operations, see Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," pp. 62-63. For descriptions of Gulf War aerial combat, see United States Air Force, GWAPS, Vol. II, Part II: Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 1993), pp. 119-130.
90. Michael R. Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), pp. 104-105; United States Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Part I: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 75-77. For the travails of one Soviet pilot sent as an adviser to Iraq to teach air-to-air operations, see Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," pp. 62-63. For descriptions of Gulf War aerial combat, see United States Air Force, GWAPS, Vol. II, Part II: Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 1993), pp. 119-130.
91. Michael R. Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), pp. 104-105; United States Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Part I: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 75-77. For the travails of one Soviet pilot sent as an adviser to Iraq to teach air-to-air operations, see Belzyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," pp. 62-63. For descriptions of Gulf War aerial combat, see United States Air Force, GWAPS, Vol. II, Part II: Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 1993), pp. 119-130.
92. "Saddam's al-Faw Anniversary Meeting; Part II," Iraqi News Agency, April 20, 1993, translated in FBIS-NES-93-075, 21 April 1993, pp. 23-24.
93. "Saddam's al-Faw Anniversary Meeting, Part IV," Al-Thawra, April 23, 1993, pp. 2-3, translated in FBIS-NES-93-081, April 29, 1993, p. 30.
94. Captain Michael E. Bigelow, "The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 16; Major James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, (NY: Bantam, 1991), pp. 56-57; Aaron Danis, "Iraqi Army Operations and Doctrine," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 12; GWAPS, Volume II, Part I, Operations, p. 64; Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), pp. 47-49; and interviews with General Bernard Trainor, June 1994. The Iraqi solution was almost identical to that devised by the Egyptians prior to the October War. There were considerable numbers of Egyptian military officers attached to the Iraqi armed forces as advisers in the latter part of the Iran-Iraq War, and the Egyptians claim that they taught the Iraqis to script their operations. The Iraqis insist that they hit upon the same method without any input from the Egyptians. Indeed, they claim that Egyptian personnel were only assigned to training commands and so did not have contact with the Iraqi generals who actually formulated this approach.
95. Captain Michael E. Bigelow, "The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 16; Major James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, (NY: Bantam, 1991), pp. 56-57; Aaron Danis, "Iraqi Army Operations and Doctrine," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 12; GWAPS, Volume II, Part I, Operations, p. 64; Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), pp. 47-49; and interviews with General Bernard Trainor, June 1994. The Iraqi solution was almost identical to that devised by the Egyptians prior to the October War. There were considerable numbers of Egyptian military officers attached to the Iraqi armed forces as advisers in the latter part of the Iran-Iraq War, and the Egyptians claim that they taught the Iraqis to script their operations. The Iraqis insist that they hit upon the same method without any input from the Egyptians. Indeed, they claim that Egyptian personnel were only assigned to training commands and so did not have contact with the Iraqi generals who actually formulated this approach.
96. Captain Michael E. Bigelow, "The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 16; Major James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, (NY: Bantam, 1991), pp. 56-57; Aaron Danis, "Iraqi Army Operations and Doctrine," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 12; GWAPS, Volume II, Part I, Operations, p. 64; Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), pp. 47-49; and interviews with General Bernard Trainor, June 1994. The Iraqi solution was almost identical to that devised by the Egyptians prior to the October War. There were considerable numbers of Egyptian military officers attached to the Iraqi armed forces as advisers in the latter part of the Iran-Iraq War, and the Egyptians claim that they taught the Iraqis to script their operations. The Iraqis insist that they hit upon the same method without any input from the Egyptians. Indeed, they claim that Egyptian personnel were only assigned to training commands and so did not have contact with the Iraqi generals who actually formulated this approach.
97. Captain Michael E. Bigelow, "The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 16; Major James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, (NY: Bantam, 1991), pp. 56-57; Aaron Danis, "Iraqi Army Operations and Doctrine," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 12; GWAPS, Volume II, Part I, Operations, p. 64; Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), pp. 47-49; and interviews with General Bernard Trainor, June 1994. The Iraqi solution was almost identical to that devised by the Egyptians prior to the October War. There were considerable numbers of Egyptian military officers attached to the Iraqi armed forces as advisers in the latter part of the Iran-Iraq War, and the Egyptians claim that they taught the Iraqis to script their operations. The Iraqis insist that they hit upon the same method without any input from the Egyptians. Indeed, they claim that Egyptian personnel were only assigned to training commands and so did not have contact with the Iraqi generals who actually formulated this approach.
98. Captain Michael E. Bigelow, "The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 16; Major James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, (NY: Bantam, 1991), pp. 56-57; Aaron Danis, "Iraqi Army Operations and Doctrine," Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, p. 12; GWAPS, Volume II, Part I, Operations, p. 64; Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), pp. 47-49; and interviews with General Bernard Trainor, June 1994. The Iraqi solution was almost identical to that devised by the Egyptians prior to the October War. There were considerable numbers of Egyptian military officers attached to the Iraqi armed forces as advisers in the latter part of the Iran-Iraq War, and the Egyptians claim that they taught the Iraqis to script their operations. The Iraqis insist that they hit upon the same method without any input from the Egyptians. Indeed, they claim that Egyptian personnel were only assigned to training commands and so did not have contact with the Iraqi generals who actually formulated this approach.
99. Lt. Col. Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War," Military Review (February 1992), pp. 26-34; Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, pp. 390-395; BG Robert H. Scales, Jr. Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 261-291.
100. Lt. Col. Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War," Military Review (February 1992), pp. 26-34; Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, pp. 390-395; BG Robert H. Scales, Jr. Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 261-291.
101. Lt. Col. Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War," Military Review (February 1992), pp. 26-34; Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, pp. 390-395; BG Robert H. Scales, Jr. Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 261-291.
102. Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Defense Companies: Profile of a Praetorian Guard Unit," unpublished manuscript, 1989.
103. For much of the Cold War the Soviets tried to discourage their Arab clients from going to war with Israel, fearing that such a conflict could spark a confrontation with the United States (as nearly happened during the 1956 and 1973 wars). Thus, for instance, following Anwar Sadat's assumption of the Presidency in 1970, the Soviet Union repeatedly refused to transfer to Egypt the arms that Cairo thought it needed to go to war with Israel, until finally relenting in early 1973. These weapons included modern SAMs and MiG fighters, heavy bombers, and Scud missiles. Tensions between Moscow and Cairo over this issue were a constant leitmotif of Soviet-Egyptian relations during this period. See, for instance, Heikal, op cit., pp. 117-118, 156-157, 160, 163-164, 173, 183.
104. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness, Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 1996.
105. Pollack, The Influence of Arab Culture, pp. 37-65. Most sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists recognize the validity of such
106. Pollack, The Influence of Arab Culture, pp. 37-65. Most sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists recognize the validity of such generalizations within and across societies, while simultaneously acknowledging that regional, class, national, and other differences are also important. And while all the traits described above may not necessarily apply to any specific Arab individual, they do describe the societal mean around which individual behavior tends to cluster. Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Sania Hamady, The Temperament and Character of the Arabs, (NY: Twayne, 1960).
107. Pollack, The Influence of Arab Culture, pp. 37-65. Most sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists recognize the validity of such generalizations within and across societies, while simultaneously acknowledging that regional, class, national, and other differences are also important. And while all the traits described above may not necessarily apply to any specific Arab individual, they do describe the societal mean around which individual behavior tends to cluster. Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Sania Hamady, The Temperament and Character of the Arabs, (NY: Twayne, 1960).
108. Pollack, The Influence of Arab Culture, pp. 37-65. Most sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists recognize the validity of such generalizations within and across societies, while simultaneously acknowledging that regional, class, national, and other differences are also important. And while all the traits described above may not necessarily apply to any specific Arab individual, they do describe the societal mean around which individual behavior tends to cluster. Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Sania Hamady, The Temperament and Character of the Arabs, (NY: Twayne, 1960).
109. Bezlyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," p. 63.
110. While there are alternative explanations for the relative ineffectiveness of Arab militaries - for instance, socio-economic underdevelopment or civil-military tensions (i.e., praetorianism) - neither of these factors are as important as Arab culture. For an in-depth discussion of the relative importance of these various influences on Arab military effectiveness, see Pollack, op cit., pp. 83-135, 535-580, 661-752.
111. On the limitations on tactical decision-making imposed by the Soviet military system, see John Erickson, Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Captain Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Twentieth Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute, 1984); and John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 183-188 and 193-198.
112. On the limitations on tactical decision-making imposed by the Soviet military system, see John Erickson, Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Captain Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Twentieth Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute, 1984); and John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 183-188 and 193-198.
113. On the limitations on tactical decision-making imposed by the Soviet military system, see John Erickson, Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Captain Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Twentieth Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute, 1984); and John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 183-188 and 193-198.
114. Thus, in an article concerning lessons-learned from the US Central Command BRIGHT STAR 83 exercise, two US army officers observed that "(t)he Egyptians follow the Soviet doctrine of centralized decision-making and are quite bureaucratic in their hierarchy. Rarely is a major decision made below brigade level, and staff decisions routinely require general officer approval before they can be acted upon. Highly structured operations schedules 'drive the train'; even battalion commanders cannot modify them without the approval of higher headquarters. And once briefed to a higher Egyptian authority, a decision or an agreement is difficult to change." Lt. Col. Wolf D. Kutter and Maj. Glenn M. Harned. "Interoperability with Egyptian Forces," Infantry. January-February 1985, p. 15.
115. Interview with US military officer, February 1997.
116. Indeed, in a 1994 article concerning the BRIGHT STAR 94 exercise, a US army officer noted, among the lessons learned, that "The Egyptian's approach to training exercises differs radically from U.S. training training doctrine. . . . The training events for the Egyptians are scripted demonstrations with set times for maneuver, close air support, etc. The U.S. expected a 'free play' maneuver exercise. . . ." Thus, scripting remains a key element of the Egyptian style of warfare. In addition, the author noted that "The Egyptians did not have the authority to establish a Joint Task Force [JTF] with Egyptian forces below the Chief of Services. The Egyptian Task Force Commander had no authority or coordination capability to employ Egyptian Air, Special Forces, or Naval Forces . . . [Consequently], [t]he U.S. JTF commander had to conduct individual coordination with each Egyptian component commanders [sic]. This organizational difference resulted in much more time and effort to coordinate combined operations than originally anticipated." The author attributed these Egyptian idiosyncracies to "cultural/military differences." Captain Jay Stefaney, "Operation BRIGHT STAR 94," Center for Army Lessons Learned "News from the Front!," January 1994, at http://call.army.mil/ products.nftf/jan94/pt5jan94.htm.
117. Cited in Arthur Alexander, Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement, Adelphi Paper 147/8, (London: IISS, 1978/9), p. 28.
118. Donnelly, Red Banner, pp. 29-43, 195, 211.
119. Pollack, The Influence of Arab Culture, pp. 658-660.
120. See for instance, John A. Lynn, "The Heart of the Sepoy: The Adoption and Adaptation of European Military Practice in South Asia, 1740-1805," in Diffusion of Military Knowledge, Technology and Practices: International Consequences of Military Innovations, Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. (forthcoming).