Key factors of joint-liability loan contracts an empirical analaysis

Kyklos

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 213-238

  Kritikos, Alexander S ^a   Vigenina, Denitsa ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY VIADRINA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FINANCIAL PROVISION; LENDING BEHAVIOR; LIABILITY;

EID: 18844393768     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2005.00286.x     Document Type: Article

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