The democratic path to peace

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1997, Pages

  Ray, James Lee ^a,b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 18744427880     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.1997.0031     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. "The notion that democracies rarely wage wars against one another has gained remarkable acceptance in scholarly and policy circles." See Etel Solingen, "Democratization in the Middle East: Quandaries of the Peace Process," Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 139.
2. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624-38; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Important recent precursors are: Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March 1989): 3-35; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability," International Interactions 17 (1992): 245-67; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (June 1992): 309-41.
3. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624-38; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Important recent precursors are: Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March 1989): 3-35; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability," International Interactions 17 (1992): 245-67; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (June 1992): 309-41.
4. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624-38; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Important recent precursors are: Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March 1989): 3-35; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability," International Interactions 17 (1992): 245-67; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (June 1992): 309-41.
5. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624-38; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Important recent precursors are: Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March 1989): 3-35; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability," International Interactions 17 (1992): 245-67; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (June 1992): 309-41.
6. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624-38; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Important recent precursors are: Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March 1989): 3-35; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability," International Interactions 17 (1992): 245-67; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (June 1992): 309-41.
7. Joseph Kruzel, "More a Chasm Than a Gap, but Do Scholars Want to Bridge It?" Mershon International Studies Review 38 (April 1994): 180.
8. R.J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War, 5 vols. (New York and Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975-81). The quoted passage is from 4:374.
9. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35; Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983): 323-57. Both the five volumes by Rummel and the pair of articles by Doyle reappeared in modified form in the middle 1980s, in somewhat more visible outlets. R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and Interstate Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983): 27-71; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (September 1985): 419-55; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-70.
10. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35; Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983): 323-57. Both the five volumes by Rummel and the pair of articles by Doyle reappeared in modified form in the middle 1980s, in somewhat more visible outlets. R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and Interstate Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983): 27-71; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (September 1985): 419-55; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-70.
11. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35; Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983): 323-57. Both the five volumes by Rummel and the pair of articles by Doyle reappeared in modified form in the middle 1980s, in somewhat more visible outlets. R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and Interstate Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983): 27-71; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (September 1985): 419-55; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-70.
12. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35; Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983): 323-57. Both the five volumes by Rummel and the pair of articles by Doyle reappeared in modified form in the middle 1980s, in somewhat more visible outlets. R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and Interstate Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983): 27-71; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (September 1985): 419-55; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-70.
13. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35; Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983): 323-57. Both the five volumes by Rummel and the pair of articles by Doyle reappeared in modified form in the middle 1980s, in somewhat more visible outlets. R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and Interstate Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983): 27-71; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (September 1985): 419-55; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-70.
14. Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 617-48; Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 649-64.
15. Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 617-48; Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 649-64.
16. Rummel himself has pointed out that although he "did not expect it to be a hit," he was "not prepared, however, for Understanding Conflict and War being so widely ignored." See R.J. Rummel, "Roots of Faith II," in Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Journeys Through World Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), 311-28.
17. One analysis of the origins of the democratic peace idea claims that it was William Godwin, in his 1797 "Enquiry Concerning Political Justice," who "may have been the first author to extol the peaceful nature of democracy." Scott Gates, Torbjorn Knutsen, and Jonathan Moses, "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 6. Kant's famous essay can be found in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings, 2nd ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
18. One analysis of the origins of the democratic peace idea claims that it was William Godwin, in his 1797 "Enquiry Concerning Political Justice," who "may have been the first author to extol the peaceful nature of democracy." Scott Gates, Torbjorn Knutsen, and Jonathan Moses, "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 6. Kant's famous essay can be found in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings, 2nd ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
19. Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A Modern History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 196.
20. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 49, 52, 54.
21. Dean Babst, "A Force for Peace," Industrial Research 14 (April 1972): 55-58;
22. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (Summer 1976): 50-69.
23. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), 55.
24. Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," Journal of Peace Research 32 (November 1995): 469-82.
25. James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
26. See, for example, Bruce Russett, "And Yet It Moves," International Security 19 (Spring 1995): 164-75.
27. Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security 20 (Fall 1995): 145.
28. Stuart Bremer, for example, in "Dangerous Dyads" analyzes all pairs of states in the international system for the years from 1816 to 1965. Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict," analyze the time period from 1816 to 1976.
29. For case studies claiming to demonstrate the pacifying impact of democracy in individual cases, see, for example, Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, ch. 4, and John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 87-125. Case studies with results tending to discredit the democratic peace proposition can be found in Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 5-41; and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
30. For case studies claiming to demonstrate the pacifying impact of democracy in individual cases, see, for example, Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, ch. 4, and John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 87-125. Case studies with results tending to discredit the democratic peace proposition can be found in Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 5-41; and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
31. For case studies claiming to demonstrate the pacifying impact of democracy in individual cases, see, for example, Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, ch. 4, and John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 87-125. Case studies with results tending to discredit the democratic peace proposition can be found in Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 5-41; and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
32. For case studies claiming to demonstrate the pacifying impact of democracy in individual cases, see, for example, Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, ch. 4, and John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 87-125. Case studies with results tending to discredit the democratic peace proposition can be found in Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 5-41; and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
33. R.J. Rummel points out flaws in several important sources on this issue in "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 454-79. Ken Benoit reanalyzes the data earlier utilized by Erich Weede in "Democracy and War Involvement" and comes to a different conclusion in "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996): 636-58. As Rummel points out, evidence in favor of the idea that democratic states are more peaceful in their behavior in general can be found in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In one of the more recent attempts to address this issue, Randolph M. Siverson establishes quite convincingly that "wars initiated by democratic leaders are significantly less lethal than wars initiated by non-democratic leaders." See his essay "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1 (December 1995): 481-89. David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth report that "democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states" (emphasis added). See their essay "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 90 (September 1996): 527.
34. R.J. Rummel points out flaws in several important sources on this issue in "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 454-79. Ken Benoit reanalyzes the data earlier utilized by Erich Weede in "Democracy and War Involvement" and comes to a different conclusion in "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996): 636-58. As Rummel points out, evidence in favor of the idea that democratic states are more peaceful in their behavior in general can be found in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In one of the more recent attempts to address this issue, Randolph M. Siverson establishes quite convincingly that "wars initiated by democratic leaders are significantly less lethal than wars initiated by non-democratic leaders." See his essay "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1 (December 1995): 481-89. David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth report that "democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states" (emphasis added). See their essay "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 90 (September 1996): 527.
35. R.J. Rummel points out flaws in several important sources on this issue in "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 454-79. Ken Benoit reanalyzes the data earlier utilized by Erich Weede in "Democracy and War Involvement" and comes to a different conclusion in "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996): 636-58. As Rummel points out, evidence in favor of the idea that democratic states are more peaceful in their behavior in general can be found in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In one of the more recent attempts to address this issue, Randolph M. Siverson establishes quite convincingly that "wars initiated by democratic leaders are significantly less lethal than wars initiated by non-democratic leaders." See his essay "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1 (December 1995): 481-89. David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth report that "democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states" (emphasis added). See their essay "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 90 (September 1996): 527.
36. R.J. Rummel points out flaws in several important sources on this issue in "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 454-79. Ken Benoit reanalyzes the data earlier utilized by Erich Weede in "Democracy and War Involvement" and comes to a different conclusion in "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996): 636-58. As Rummel points out, evidence in favor of the idea that democratic states are more peaceful in their behavior in general can be found in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In one of the more recent attempts to address this issue, Randolph M. Siverson establishes quite convincingly that "wars initiated by democratic leaders are significantly less lethal than wars initiated by non-democratic leaders." See his essay "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1 (December 1995): 481-89. David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth report that "democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states" (emphasis added). See their essay "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 90 (September 1996): 527.
37. R.J. Rummel points out flaws in several important sources on this issue in "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 454-79. Ken Benoit reanalyzes the data earlier utilized by Erich Weede in "Democracy and War Involvement" and comes to a different conclusion in "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996): 636-58. As Rummel points out, evidence in favor of the idea that democratic states are more peaceful in their behavior in general can be found in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In one of the more recent attempts to address this issue, Randolph M. Siverson establishes quite convincingly that "wars initiated by democratic leaders are significantly less lethal than wars initiated by non-democratic leaders." See his essay "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1 (December 1995): 481-89. David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth report that "democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states" (emphasis added). See their essay "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 90 (September 1996): 527.
38. R.J. Rummel points out flaws in several important sources on this issue in "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 454-79. Ken Benoit reanalyzes the data earlier utilized by Erich Weede in "Democracy and War Involvement" and comes to a different conclusion in "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996): 636-58. As Rummel points out, evidence in favor of the idea that democratic states are more peaceful in their behavior in general can be found in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In one of the more recent attempts to address this issue, Randolph M. Siverson establishes quite convincingly that "wars initiated by democratic leaders are significantly less lethal than wars initiated by non-democratic leaders." See his essay "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1 (December 1995): 481-89. David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth report that "democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states" (emphasis added). See their essay "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 90 (September 1996): 527.
39. R.J. Rummel points out flaws in several important sources on this issue in "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 454-79. Ken Benoit reanalyzes the data earlier utilized by Erich Weede in "Democracy and War Involvement" and comes to a different conclusion in "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996): 636-58. As Rummel points out, evidence in favor of the idea that democratic states are more peaceful in their behavior in general can be found in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In one of the more recent attempts to address this issue, Randolph M. Siverson establishes quite convincingly that "wars initiated by democratic leaders are significantly less lethal than wars initiated by non-democratic leaders." See his essay "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1 (December 1995): 481-89. David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth report that "democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states" (emphasis added). See their essay "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 90 (September 1996): 527.
40. Etel Solingen, "Democracy, Economic Reform, and Regional Cooperation," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (January 1996): 81-84.
41. The evidence regarding the interrelationships among democracy, trade, international organizations, and peace can be found in Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization in Building Security Communities," in Emanual Adler and Michael Barnet, eds., Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective (forthcoming); and in John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right, Democracy and Interdependence Do Reduce Conflict" (unpubl. ms.). Contrasting evidence regarding the relationship between trade and conflict can be found in two essays by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 29-50, and "Interdependence and the Characteristics of Conflict, 1870-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., 29 August-1 September 1996). The formal model by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson is discussed in "Explaining the Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.). David Lake examines the performance of democracies in wars in "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37. The propensity for democratic regimes to lose power in the wake of lost wars is discussed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 841-55.
42. The evidence regarding the interrelationships among democracy, trade, international organizations, and peace can be found in Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization in Building Security Communities," in Emanual Adler and Michael Barnet, eds., Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective (forthcoming); and in John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right, Democracy and Interdependence Do Reduce Conflict" (unpubl. ms.). Contrasting evidence regarding the relationship between trade and conflict can be found in two essays by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 29-50, and "Interdependence and the Characteristics of Conflict, 1870-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., 29 August-1 September 1996). The formal model by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson is discussed in "Explaining the Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.). David Lake examines the performance of democracies in wars in "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37. The propensity for democratic regimes to lose power in the wake of lost wars is discussed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 841-55.
43. The evidence regarding the interrelationships among democracy, trade, international organizations, and peace can be found in Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization in Building Security Communities," in Emanual Adler and Michael Barnet, eds., Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective (forthcoming); and in John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right, Democracy and Interdependence Do Reduce Conflict" (unpubl. ms.). Contrasting evidence regarding the relationship between trade and conflict can be found in two essays by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 29-50, and "Interdependence and the Characteristics of Conflict, 1870-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., 29 August-1 September 1996). The formal model by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson is discussed in "Explaining the Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.). David Lake examines the performance of democracies in wars in "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37. The propensity for democratic regimes to lose power in the wake of lost wars is discussed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 841-55.
44. The evidence regarding the interrelationships among democracy, trade, international organizations, and peace can be found in Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization in Building Security Communities," in Emanual Adler and Michael Barnet, eds., Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective (forthcoming); and in John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right, Democracy and Interdependence Do Reduce Conflict" (unpubl. ms.). Contrasting evidence regarding the relationship between trade and conflict can be found in two essays by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 29-50, and "Interdependence and the Characteristics of Conflict, 1870-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., 29 August-1 September 1996). The formal model by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson is discussed in "Explaining the Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.). David Lake examines the performance of democracies in wars in "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37. The propensity for democratic regimes to lose power in the wake of lost wars is discussed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 841-55.
45. The evidence regarding the interrelationships among democracy, trade, international organizations, and peace can be found in Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization in Building Security Communities," in Emanual Adler and Michael Barnet, eds., Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective (forthcoming); and in John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right, Democracy and Interdependence Do Reduce Conflict" (unpubl. ms.). Contrasting evidence regarding the relationship between trade and conflict can be found in two essays by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 29-50, and "Interdependence and the Characteristics of Conflict, 1870-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., 29 August-1 September 1996). The formal model by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson is discussed in "Explaining the Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.). David Lake examines the performance of democracies in wars in "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37. The propensity for democratic regimes to lose power in the wake of lost wars is discussed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 841-55.
46. The evidence regarding the interrelationships among democracy, trade, international organizations, and peace can be found in Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization in Building Security Communities," in Emanual Adler and Michael Barnet, eds., Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective (forthcoming); and in John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right, Democracy and Interdependence Do Reduce Conflict" (unpubl. ms.). Contrasting evidence regarding the relationship between trade and conflict can be found in two essays by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 29-50, and "Interdependence and the Characteristics of Conflict, 1870-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., 29 August-1 September 1996). The formal model by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson is discussed in "Explaining the Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.). David Lake examines the performance of democracies in wars in "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37. The propensity for democratic regimes to lose power in the wake of lost wars is discussed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 841-55.
47. The evidence regarding the interrelationships among democracy, trade, international organizations, and peace can be found in Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization in Building Security Communities," in Emanual Adler and Michael Barnet, eds., Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective (forthcoming); and in John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right, Democracy and Interdependence Do Reduce Conflict" (unpubl. ms.). Contrasting evidence regarding the relationship between trade and conflict can be found in two essays by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33 (February 1996): 29-50, and "Interdependence and the Characteristics of Conflict, 1870-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., 29 August-1 September 1996). The formal model by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson is discussed in "Explaining the Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.). David Lake examines the performance of democracies in wars in "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37. The propensity for democratic regimes to lose power in the wake of lost wars is discussed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 841-55.
48. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 74 (May-June 1995): 79-97; and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 5-38.
49. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 74 (May-June 1995): 79-97; and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 5-38.
50. The first analysis is by Andrew Enterline, "Regime Change and Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992" (unpubl. ms.). The second study is Oneal and Russett's as yet unpublished "The Classical Liberals Were Right," mentioned in note 21 above, an earlier version of which they delivered at the 1996 annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Oneal and Russett also find that the significant statistical relationship between regime transitions toward democracy and subsequent conflict disappears when a series of plausible control variables are introduced into their analyses. The findings of this paper regarding the impact of political distance on conflict between them are reinforced in a paper by John Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Tests of Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.), also presented in a preliminary version at the International Studies Association's 1996 meeting.
51. The first analysis is by Andrew Enterline, "Regime Change and Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992" (unpubl. ms.). The second study is Oneal and Russett's as yet unpublished "The Classical Liberals Were Right," mentioned in note 21 above, an earlier version of which they delivered at the 1996 annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Oneal and Russett also find that the significant statistical relationship between regime transitions toward democracy and subsequent conflict disappears when a series of plausible control variables are introduced into their analyses. The findings of this paper regarding the impact of political distance on conflict between them are reinforced in a paper by John Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Tests of Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.), also presented in a preliminary version at the International Studies Association's 1996 meeting.
52. The first analysis is by Andrew Enterline, "Regime Change and Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992" (unpubl. ms.). The second study is Oneal and Russett's as yet unpublished "The Classical Liberals Were Right," mentioned in note 21 above, an earlier version of which they delivered at the 1996 annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Oneal and Russett also find that the significant statistical relationship between regime transitions toward democracy and subsequent conflict disappears when a series of plausible control variables are introduced into their analyses. The findings of this paper regarding the impact of political distance on conflict between them are reinforced in a paper by John Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Tests of Democratic Peace" (unpubl. ms.), also presented in a preliminary version at the International Studies Association's 1996 meeting.
53. The term "third wave" comes from Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The current status of the third wave is evaluated in Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37. In a couple of recent articles - "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49 and "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 28-46 - Huntington has argued forcefully that "end of history" notions that democracy is destined to become the clearly predominant form of government in the world are foolishly optimistic. In "The West: Unique, Not Universal," for example, he asserts that "In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This .... image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world [is] . . . misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous" (p. 28). He may be right about Western culture in general. But those of us more inclined to optimism about the fate of democracy in particular over the coming decades (but who would also not necessarily see this as a triumph of "Western" culture, but rather view the distinction between democratic and autocratic forms of government as more fundamental than, for example, the conflict between "Western" and "Eastern" cultural values) can take heart from two earlier Huntington predictions that democracy had reached its apex in the global system, and that in coming years democratic governments would become more rare. Huntington's first prediction came in an address entitled "The Global Decline of Democracy," which he delivered to officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency on 11 February 1976. It is cited in The Third Wave, 319. His second can be found in his essay "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 195-98.
54. The term "third wave" comes from Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The current status of the third wave is evaluated in Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37. In a couple of recent articles - "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49 and "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 28-46 - Huntington has argued forcefully that "end of history" notions that democracy is destined to become the clearly predominant form of government in the world are foolishly optimistic. In "The West: Unique, Not Universal," for example, he asserts that "In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This .... image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world [is] . . . misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous" (p. 28). He may be right about Western culture in general. But those of us more inclined to optimism about the fate of democracy in particular over the coming decades (but who would also not necessarily see this as a triumph of "Western" culture, but rather view the distinction between democratic and autocratic forms of government as more fundamental than, for example, the conflict between "Western" and "Eastern" cultural values) can take heart from two earlier Huntington predictions that democracy had reached its apex in the global system, and that in coming years democratic governments would become more rare. Huntington's first prediction came in an address entitled "The Global Decline of Democracy," which he delivered to officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency on 11 February 1976. It is cited in The Third Wave, 319. His second can be found in his essay "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 195-98.
55. The term "third wave" comes from Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The current status of the third wave is evaluated in Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37. In a couple of recent articles - "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49 and "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 28-46 - Huntington has argued forcefully that "end of history" notions that democracy is destined to become the clearly predominant form of government in the world are foolishly optimistic. In "The West: Unique, Not Universal," for example, he asserts that "In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This .... image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world [is] . . . misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous" (p. 28). He may be right about Western culture in general. But those of us more inclined to optimism about the fate of democracy in particular over the coming decades (but who would also not necessarily see this as a triumph of "Western" culture, but rather view the distinction between democratic and autocratic forms of government as more fundamental than, for example, the conflict between "Western" and "Eastern" cultural values) can take heart from two earlier Huntington predictions that democracy had reached its apex in the global system, and that in coming years democratic governments would become more rare. Huntington's first prediction came in an address entitled "The Global Decline of Democracy," which he delivered to officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency on 11 February 1976. It is cited in The Third Wave, 319. His second can be found in his essay "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 195-98.
56. The term "third wave" comes from Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The current status of the third wave is evaluated in Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37. In a couple of recent articles - "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49 and "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 28-46 - Huntington has argued forcefully that "end of history" notions that democracy is destined to become the clearly predominant form of government in the world are foolishly optimistic. In "The West: Unique, Not Universal," for example, he asserts that "In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This .... image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world [is] . . . misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous" (p. 28). He may be right about Western culture in general. But those of us more inclined to optimism about the fate of democracy in particular over the coming decades (but who would also not necessarily see this as a triumph of "Western" culture, but rather view the distinction between democratic and autocratic forms of government as more fundamental than, for example, the conflict between "Western" and "Eastern" cultural values) can take heart from two earlier Huntington predictions that democracy had reached its apex in the global system, and that in coming years democratic governments would become more rare. Huntington's first prediction came in an address entitled "The Global Decline of Democracy," which he delivered to officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency on 11 February 1976. It is cited in The Third Wave, 319. His second can be found in his essay "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 195-98.
57. The term "third wave" comes from Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The current status of the third wave is evaluated in Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37. In a couple of recent articles - "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49 and "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 28-46 - Huntington has argued forcefully that "end of history" notions that democracy is destined to become the clearly predominant form of government in the world are foolishly optimistic. In "The West: Unique, Not Universal," for example, he asserts that "In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This .... image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world [is] . . . misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous" (p. 28). He may be right about Western culture in general. But those of us more inclined to optimism about the fate of democracy in particular over the coming decades (but who would also not necessarily see this as a triumph of "Western" culture, but rather view the distinction between democratic and autocratic forms of government as more fundamental than, for example, the conflict between "Western" and "Eastern" cultural values) can take heart from two earlier Huntington predictions that democracy had reached its apex in the global system, and that in coming years democratic governments would become more rare. Huntington's first prediction came in an address entitled "The Global Decline of Democracy," which he delivered to officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency on 11 February 1976. It is cited in The Third Wave, 319. His second can be found in his essay "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 195-98.
58. The term "third wave" comes from Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The current status of the third wave is evaluated in Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37. In a couple of recent articles - "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49 and "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 28-46 - Huntington has argued forcefully that "end of history" notions that democracy is destined to become the clearly predominant form of government in the world are foolishly optimistic. In "The West: Unique, Not Universal," for example, he asserts that "In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This .... image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world [is] . . . misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous" (p. 28). He may be right about Western culture in general. But those of us more inclined to optimism about the fate of democracy in particular over the coming decades (but who would also not necessarily see this as a triumph of "Western" culture, but rather view the distinction between democratic and autocratic forms of government as more fundamental than, for example, the conflict between "Western" and "Eastern" cultural values) can take heart from two earlier Huntington predictions that democracy had reached its apex in the global system, and that in coming years democratic governments would become more rare. Huntington's first prediction came in an address entitled "The Global Decline of Democracy," which he delivered to officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency on 11 February 1976. It is cited in The Third Wave, 319. His second can be found in his essay "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 195-98.
59. Erich Weede, Economic Development, Social Order and World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 155-56.
60. The point regarding the potentially important impact of the spread of democracy even if it is limited to major powers is made by Weede, Economic Development, Social Order and World Politics, 155-56. The fate of democratic governments outside their traditional stronghold in northwestern Europe and North America is discussed by Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 47-63.
61. The point regarding the potentially important impact of the spread of democracy even if it is limited to major powers is made by Weede, Economic Development, Social Order and World Politics, 155-56. The fate of democratic governments outside their traditional stronghold in northwestern Europe and North America is discussed by Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 75 (November-December 1996): 47-63.