The Overvaluation of Talent: An Interpretation and Application of Rousseau's Amour-Propre

Polity

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 115-138

  McLendon, Michael Locke ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 1842715742     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/POLv36n1ms3235426     Document Type: Review

References (97)

1. Rousseau, Discoure on the Origin of Inequality in The Discourses and Other Early Writings, trans. and ed. Victor Gourevitch ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 165. Hereinafter refered to as the Seconnd Discourse. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Complètes, vol III (Paris: NRF-Editions de la Pléiade, 1959), 168, I have chosen to use both the Gourevitch translations for the Discourses and Christopher Kelly's translation for the Confessions rather than my own translations because they did not substantively differ. I do include the Plèiade page numbers in my cites, which are hereinafter referred to as O.C.
2. Rousseau, Discoure on the Origin of Inequality in The Discourses and Other Early Writings, trans. and ed. Victor Gourevitch ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 165. Hereinafter refered to as the Seconnd Discourse. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Complètes, vol III (Paris: NRF-Editions de la Pléiade, 1959), 168, I have chosen to use both the Gourevitch translations for the Discourses and Christopher Kelly's translation for the Confessions rather than my own translations because they did not substantively differ. I do include the Plèiade page numbers in my cites, which are hereinafter referred to as O.C.
3. Rousseau, Second Discourse, note XV, 218. O.C. vol. III, 219
4. Rousseau, Second Discourse, note XV, 218. O.C. vol. III, 219
5. See Donald Cress's translation of the Second Discourse. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. Donald Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992).
6. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), Book II, footnote 17, 484.
7. N. J. H. Dent, Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 54.
8. I believe this term to be misleading. Egocentrics tend to be concerned only with their own feelings and rarely think of others. Individuals suffering from amour-propre, on the contrary, are obsessed with others' opinions so much so that they do not consult their own intuitions and values. Although amour-propre is a selfish emotion, it is not the same thing as egocentrism. At best, it is a particular form of egocentrism.
9. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 166. O.C. vol. III, 169-70.
10. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 166. O.C. vol. III, 169-70.
11. The phrase being-for-others, which is typically associated with Hegel, first shows up in Rousseau's Emile. See Rousseau, Emile, 39-41. O.C. vol. IV, 249-51. N. J. H. Dent points this out in his Rousseau. See Dent, Rousseau, 56-57.
12. The phrase being-for-others, which is typically associated with Hegel, first shows up in Rousseau's Emile. See Rousseau, Emile, 39-41. O.C. vol. IV, 249-51. N. J. H. Dent points this out in his Rousseau. See Dent, Rousseau, 56-57.
13. The phrase being-for-others, which is typically associated with Hegel, first shows up in Rousseau's Emile. See Rousseau, Emile, 39-41. O.C. vol. IV, 249-51. N. J. H. Dent points this out in his Rousseau. See Dent, Rousseau, 56-57.
14. John Charvet, The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 21.
15. Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 88-90. See also N. J. H. Dent, Rousseau.
16. Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 88-90. See also N. J. H. Dent, Rousseau.
17. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 162. O.C. vol. III, 165-66.
18. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 162. O.C. vol. III, 165-66.
19. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 164. O.C. vol. III, 168.
20. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 164. O.C. vol. III, 168.
21. See the Second Discourse, 141 and 159. O.C. vol. III, 142 and 162.
22. See the Second Discourse, 141 and 159. O.C. vol. III, 142 and 162.
23. It is worth noting that without a sophisticated language, there would not even be a notion of the individual self. For a good post-Rousseau discussion of these matters, see George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, & Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 135. In general, see 42-178.
24. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays On Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 160.
25. Michel de Montaigne, "Our Feelings Reach Out Beyond Us," in Essays, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), 9. See also Robert C. Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 451.
26. Michel de Montaigne, "Our Feelings Reach Out Beyond Us," in Essays, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), 9. See also Robert C. Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 451.
27. In a letter recently discovered by Jean Starobinski, Rousseau in fact echoes Montaigne's words: "we would sooner not exist," Rousseau writes, "than go unnoticed." See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Letter on Virtue, the Individual, and Society." trans. Arthur Goldhammer. The New York Review of Books, 15 May, 2003, 31. (The title of the letter comes from Starobinksi, not Rousseau.)
28. Rousseau, the Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 189. Rousseau states that honor concerning personal qualities are the source of all other inequalities, and therefore the source of misery and conflict. For the time being, I would simply like to point out that Rousseau seems to think that esteem will cause more conflict than property. Also, see the Second Discourse, 154. O.C. vol. III, 157. In enumerating the various causes of conflict, property comes after vanity, esteem, contempt. Although this evidence is not conclusive, it is suggestive.
29. Rousseau, the Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 189. Rousseau states that honor concerning personal qualities are the source of all other inequalities, and therefore the source of misery and conflict. For the time being, I would simply like to point out that Rousseau seems to think that esteem will cause more conflict than property. Also, see the Second Discourse, 154. O.C. vol. III, 157. In enumerating the various causes of conflict, property comes after vanity, esteem, contempt. Although this evidence is not conclusive, it is suggestive.
30. Rousseau, the Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 189. Rousseau states that honor concerning personal qualities are the source of all other inequalities, and therefore the source of misery and conflict. For the time being, I would simply like to point out that Rousseau seems to think that esteem will cause more conflict than property. Also, see the Second Discourse, 154. O.C. vol. III, 157. In enumerating the various causes of conflict, property comes after vanity, esteem, contempt. Although this evidence is not conclusive, it is suggestive.
31. Rousseau, the Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 189. Rousseau states that honor concerning personal qualities are the source of all other inequalities, and therefore the source of misery and conflict. For the time being, I would simply like to point out that Rousseau seems to think that esteem will cause more conflict than property. Also, see the Second Discourse, 154. O.C. vol. III, 157. In enumerating the various causes of conflict, property comes after vanity, esteem, contempt. Although this evidence is not conclusive, it is suggestive.
32. I borrowed the metal/rust metaphor from Simon Blackburn. See Simon Blackburn, "Meet the Flintstones," The New Republic, 25 November 2002, 28-29.
33. Arthur Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968) lectures III and IV. Also, see Pierre Manent, The City of Man. Manent argues that Adam Smith is the pivotal figure in changing the predominant view of human nature from one of being dominated by pride and vanity to one of desire for material gain. Pierre Manent, The City of Man, trans. Marc A. Lepain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 86-92.
34. Arthur Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968) lectures III and IV. Also, see Pierre Manent, The City of Man. Manent argues that Adam Smith is the pivotal figure in changing the predominant view of human nature from one of being dominated by pride and vanity to one of desire for material gain. Pierre Manent, The City of Man, trans. Marc A. Lepain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 86-92.
35. Arthur Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968) lectures III and IV. Also, see Pierre Manent, The City of Man. Manent argues that Adam Smith is the pivotal figure in changing the predominant view of human nature from one of being dominated by pride and vanity to one of desire for material gain. Pierre Manent, The City of Man, trans. Marc A. Lepain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 86-92.
36. Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duties of Man and Citizen, ed. James Tully and trans. Michael Silver-thorne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 164-65.
37. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994), 96-97.
38. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 231-32.
39. Leo Strauss also points out the disconnect between Hobbes's psychology and ontology. Strauss's argument is that Hobbes's moral theory was developed in a more or less ad hoc fashion, developing his moral psychology before his materialism. Only later did he try to connect the two up with limited success. See Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.)
40. Dent, Rousseau, 22.
41. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 240.
42. This desire to identify with one's neighbors, as I define it, is mild. I am not suggesting that people take responsibility for or become consumed by their neighbors' problems, just that they empathize with them.
43. Michael Walzer makes a similar argument. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 254.
44. Dent, Rousseau, 43.
45. Asher Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 94.
46. Mead, Mind, Self, & Society, 142.
47. William James, "The Self," in The Philosophy of William James (New York: Random House/The Modern Library, no date given), 128.
48. Not to mention that even if we did respect parenting to a degree proximate to intellectual or economic success, it is too subjective to measure accurately and snugly hidden in private life, safely removed from public observation.
49. Again, Walzer makes a similar argument. He contends that "self-esteem is more nervously held" in democracies, "so that men and women would grasp every opportunity to distinguish themselves from the others." See Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 273.
50. See the Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 183-84.
51. See the Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 183-84.
52. This is the fundamental argument of Dent's Rousseau. Dent relies mostly on Emile to make his case.
53. H. D. F. Kitto, The Greeks (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 247.
54. Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (New York: The Modern Library, 1995), 101. Generally, see pages 100-15.
55. Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 100.
56. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 189.
57. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 183-84. O.C. vol. III, 189.
58. A comparison between Rousseau and de Tocqueville's Democracy in America helps clarify this point.
59. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 184. O.C. vol. III, 189.
60. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 184. O.C. vol. III, 189.
61. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," in The Discourses and Other Early Writings, 23. (Hereinafter referred to as the First Discourse) O.C. vol. III, 25.
62. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," in The Discourses and Other Early Writings, 23. (Hereinafter referred to as the First Discourse) O.C. vol. III, 25.
63. Rousseau, First Discourse, 26. O.C. vol. III, 29.
64. Rousseau, First Discourse, 26. O.C. vol. III, 29.
65. Rousseau, First Discourse, 9. O.C. vol. III, 9-10.
66. Rousseau, First Discourse, 9. O.C. vol. III, 9-10.
67. This view is so standard it hardly needs citation. For the source of the quote, see Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 213-14.
68. For a nice, brief discussion, see Maurice Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), chapter 9.
69. As François Furet and others have noted, there is little evidence that a class struggle in the strict Marxist sense existed in eighteenth-century France. See François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially pages 100-16. However, it is evident that a "thought bourgeoisie" - a group of individuals from a variety of social classes that professed bourgeois attitudes - played an important role in public discourse in pre-Revolutionary France. For a good, brief discussion of this matter as well as the Furet-Marxist debate, see Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 109-14. For a more standard view, see John Lough, An Introduction to Eighteenth Century France (London: Longman's, Green, & Co., 1960), 92-97.
70. As François Furet and others have noted, there is little evidence that a class struggle in the strict Marxist sense existed in eighteenth-century France. See François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially pages 100-16. However, it is evident that a "thought bourgeoisie" - a group of individuals from a variety of social classes that professed bourgeois attitudes - played an important role in public discourse in pre-Revolutionary France. For a good, brief discussion of this matter as well as the Furet-Marxist debate, see Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 109-14. For a more standard view, see John Lough, An Introduction to Eighteenth Century France (London: Longman's, Green, & Co., 1960), 92-97.
71. As François Furet and others have noted, there is little evidence that a class struggle in the strict Marxist sense existed in eighteenth-century France. See François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially pages 100-16. However, it is evident that a "thought bourgeoisie" - a group of individuals from a variety of social classes that professed bourgeois attitudes - played an important role in public discourse in pre-Revolutionary France. For a good, brief discussion of this matter as well as the Furet-Marxist debate, see Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 109-14. For a more standard view, see John Lough, An Introduction to Eighteenth Century France (London: Longman's, Green, & Co., 1960), 92-97.
72. Denis Diderot, Observations sur le Nakaz in Political Writings, trans. John Hope Mason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 97.
73. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995), 237. O.C. vol I, 283.
74. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995), 237. O.C. vol I, 283.
75. Rousseau, Confessions, 308. O.C. vol. I, 367.
76. Rousseau, Confessions, 308. O.C. vol. I, 367.
77. Rousseau, Confessions, 305 and 327. O.C. vol. I, 363 & 389.
78. Rousseau, Confessions, 305 and 327. O.C. vol. I, 363 & 389.
79. See Dent, Rousseau, 81-82.
80. Karl Marx, The German Ideology in Selected Writings, trans. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat and ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1994), 130.
81. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 251-58.
82. See also Timothy O'Hagan, Rousseau (New York: Routledge, 1999), as well as his "Amour-Propre," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, ed. Timothy O'Hagan (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 66-84. Laurence Cooper has also shown himself sympathetic to this position. See Laurence D. Cooper, "Rousseau on Self-Love: What We've Learned, What We Might Have Learned," Review of Politics 60 (Fall 1998): 661-83.
83. See also Timothy O'Hagan, Rousseau (New York: Routledge, 1999), as well as his "Amour-Propre," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, ed. Timothy O'Hagan (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 66-84. Laurence Cooper has also shown himself sympathetic to this position. See Laurence D. Cooper, "Rousseau on Self-Love: What We've Learned, What We Might Have Learned," Review of Politics 60 (Fall 1998): 661-83.
84. See also Timothy O'Hagan, Rousseau (New York: Routledge, 1999), as well as his "Amour-Propre," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, ed. Timothy O'Hagan (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 66-84. Laurence Cooper has also shown himself sympathetic to this position. See Laurence D. Cooper, "Rousseau on Self-Love: What We've Learned, What We Might Have Learned," Review of Politics 60 (Fall 1998): 661-83.
85. N. J. H. Dent, "An Integral Part of his Species," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, 33.
86. Jonathan Marks, "The Savage Pattern: The Unity of Rousseau's Thought Revisited," Polity 31 (Fall 1998): 75-105. See the Second Discourse, 166-67 for evidence for this claim.
87. Jonathan Marks, "The Savage Pattern: The Unity of Rousseau's Thought Revisited," Polity 31 (Fall 1998): 75-105. See the Second Discourse, 166-67 for evidence for this claim.
88. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 167. O.C. vol. III, 171.
89. Rousseau, Second Discourse, 167. O.C. vol. III, 171.
90. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Observations By Jean-Jacques Rousseau of Geneva: On the Answer made to his Discourse," in The Discourses and Other Early Writings, 33. O.C. vol. III, 36.
91. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Observations By Jean-Jacques Rousseau of Geneva: On the Answer made to his Discourse," in The Discourses and Other Early Writings, 33. O.C. vol. III, 36.
92. Rousseau, First Discourse, 26-27. O.C. vol. III, 29.
93. Rousseau, First Discourse, 26-27. O.C. vol. III, 29.
94. Rousseau, Emile, 339-44. O.C. vol. IV, 671-77.
95. Rousseau, Emile, 339-44. O.C. vol. IV, 671-77.
96. Rousseau, Letter to D'Alembert on the Theatre in Politics and the Arts, trans. Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 131fn.
97. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 86-87.