GPs' payment contracts and their referral practice

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 617-635

  Mariñoso, Begoña Garcia ^a   Jelovac, Izabela ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

GP; Incentives; Moral hazard; Referral; Reimbursement

Indexed keywords

PRIMARY HEALTH CARE;

ARTICLE; CONTRACT; GENERAL PRACTITIONER; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HUMAN; INTERMETHOD COMPARISON; PATIENT REFERRAL; PHYSICIAN INCOME; POPULATION MODEL; PREVENTIVE HEALTH SERVICE;

EID: 17944385036     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(03)00008-0     Document Type: Article

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