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Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 643-652

A transaction cost primer on farm organization

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EID: 17644423171     PISSN: 00083976     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1744-7976.2000.tb00418.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (8)

References (33)
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