The Role of Transfer Price for Coordination and Control within a Firm

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 161-192

  Yeom, Sungsoo ^a   Balachandran, Kashi R ^b   Ronen, Joshua ^b  

^a Chungnam National University   (South Korea)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination; Information asymmetry; Moral hazard; Transfer price

Indexed keywords

EID: 15744405451     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008355713528     Document Type: Article

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