Communication and delegation in collusive agencies

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 2-3, 1995, Pages 315-344

  Villadsen, Bente ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Contracting; Performance evaluation; Profit centers; Team production

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000082436     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(94)00386-J     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Economically optimal performance evaluation and control systems
2. Collusion in auditing
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4. Decentralized choice of monitoring systems
5. Communication and post-decision information
6. Accounting for stewardship
7. Asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation
8. Regulating trade among agents
9. Theory of accounting measurement
10. Collusion, incentives, and risk sharing
11. Specific and general knowledge, and organizational structure
12. Manager's journal: The right kind of teamwork
13. Equilibrium contracts for syndicates with differential information
14. Collusion in hierarchical agency
15. Pay equality and industrial politics
16. Centralization versus delegation and the value of communication
17. A theory of responsibility centers
18. The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization
19. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem
20. Cooperation versus competition in agency
21. Collusion and noncontrollable cost allocation
22. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations
23. Information efficiency and the core of an economy