Bargaining power in communication networks

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 69-87

  Calvó Armengol, Antoni ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

Bargaining power; C72; C78; Communication; D20; Graph; Network; Noncooperative bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 18044403476     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00049-4     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. Aumann, R., Myerson, R., Endogenous formation of links between players and coalitions: an application of the Shapley value, in: Roth, A. (Ed.), The Shapley Value. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
2. Bala V., Goyal S. Learning from neighbors. Review of Economic Studies. 224:1998;595-622.
3. Bala, V., Goyal, S., A strategic analysis of network reliability, mimeo, McGill University and Erasmus University, 1998.
4. Bala, V., Goyal, S., A non-cooperative theory of network formation, Econometrica (1999).
5. Binmore, K., Game Theory and the Social Contract. Vol. 2: Just Playing. MIT Press, 1998.
6. Borm P., Owen G., Tijs S. Values of points and arcs in communication situations. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics. 5:1992;305-320.
7. Borm, P., van der Nouweland, V., Tijs, S., Cooperation and communication restrictions: a survey, in: Gilles, R., Ruys, P. (Eds.), Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations. Deventer, Kluwer, 1994.
8. Calvó-Armengol A. A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings. Economics Letters. 65:1999;47-54.
9. Calvó-Armengol, A., On bargaining partner selection when communication is restricted, Pompeu Fabra University and CERAS, 1999.
10. Chae S. The n- person Nash bargaining solution with time preference. Economics Letters. 41:1993;21-24.
11. Chae S., Yang J.-A. An n- person pure bargaining problem. Journal of Economic Theory. 62:1994;86-102.
12. Dutta B., Mutuswami S. Stable networks. Journal of Economic Theory. 76:1997;322-344.
13. Dutta B., van der Nouweland A., Tijs S. Link formation in cooperative situations. International Journal of Game Theory. 27:1998;245-256.
14. Foster D., Young P. Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theoretical Population Biology. 38:1990;219-232.
15. Furth D. The core of the incentive limit of a direct system of economies with a communication structure. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 30:1998;433-472.
16. Goyal, S., Sustainable communication networks, mimeo, Erasmus University, 1993.
17. Greenberg J., Weber S. A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 11:1983;43-55.
18. Grofman B., Owen G. A game-theoretic approach to measuring degree of centrality in social networks. Social Networks. 4:1982;213-224.
19. Gul F. Bargaining foundations of Shapley value. Econometrica. 57:1989;81-95.
20. Haller H. Non-cooperative bargaining of n≥3 players. Economics Letters. 22:1986;11-13.
21. Hamiache G. A value with incomplete communication. Games and Economic Behavior. 26:1999;59-78.
22. Hart S., Mas-Colell A. Bargaining and value. Econometrica. 64:1996;357-380.
23. Herrero, M., N-player bargaining and involuntary unemployment, Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics, 1985.
24. Jackson, M., The stability and efficiency of directed communication networks, mimeo, Caltech, 1999.
25. Jackson, M., Watts, A., The evolution of social and economic networks, mimeo, Caltech and Vanderbilt University, 1998.
26. Jackson M., Wolinsky A. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory. 71:1996;44-74.
27. Jun, B.H., A structural consideration on a 3-person bargaining game, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1987.
28. Kandori M., Mailath G.J., Rob R. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica. 61:1993;29-56.
29. Kirman A., Oddou C., Weber S. Stochastic communication and coalition formations. Econometrica. 54:1986;129-138.
30. Krishna V., Serrano R. Multilateral bargaining. Review of Economic Studies. 63:1996;61-80.
31. Myerson R. Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operation Research. 2:1977;225-229.
32. Myerson R. Conference structures and fair allocation rules. International Journal of Game Theory. 9:1980;169-182.
33. Okada A. A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers. Games and Economic Behavior. 16:1996;97-108.
34. Owen G. Values of graph-restricted games. SIAM Journal on Algebraic Discrete Methods. 7:1986;210-220.
35. Rosenthal E. Communication networks and their role in cooperative games. Social Networks. 10:1988;255-263.
36. Rosenthal E. Communication and its cost in graph-restricted games. Theory and Decision. 25:1988;275-286.
37. Rosenthal E. Coalitions under limited communication. Games and Economic Behavior. 4:1992;402-421.
38. Rubinstein A. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica. 50:1982;97-110.
39. Sáez-Martí M., Weibull J.W. Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model. Journal of Economic Theory. 86:1999;268-279.
40. Skvoretz J., Willer D. Exclusion and power: a test of four theories of power in exchange networks. American Sociological Review. 58:1993;801-818.
41. Ståhl, I., Bargaining Theory, Economics Research Institute, Stockholm, 1972.
42. Vásquez-Brage M., García-Jurado I., Carreras F. The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication. Games and Economic Behavior. 12:1996;42-53.
43. Wasserman, S., Faust, K., Social network analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
44. Young H.P. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica. 61:1993;57-84.
45. Young H.P. An evolutionary model of bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory. 59:1993;145-168.