Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 4 SPEC. ISS., 2005, Pages 675-704

  Bardhan, Pranab ^a   Mookherjee, Dilip ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

Bureaucracy; Corruption; Decentralization; Poverty alleviation; Targeting

Indexed keywords

EID: 14044249479     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.01.001     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Allingham, M.G., Sandmo, A., 1972. Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics. Reprinted in Modern public finance, vol. 1. International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, no. 15, Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield, Vt.: Elgar, 1991, pp. 50-65
2. A. Banerjee A theory of misgovernance Quarterly Journal of Economics 62 1997 1289-1332
3. Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D., 1999. Relative capture of local and national governments: An essay in the political economy of decentralization. Working Paper. Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
4. P. Bardhan D. Mookherjee Capture and governance at local and national levels American Economic Review 2000 135-139
5. D. Baron Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters American Political Science Review 88 1994 33-47
6. Besley, T., Coate, S., 1999. Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: A political economy analysis. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 7084, April 1999
7. Conning, J., Kevane, M., 1999. Community based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets. Mimeo, Department of Economics, Williams College
8. R. Crook J. Manor Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa 1998 Cambridge University Press Cambridge
9. A. Dasgupta Decentralisation Experiments in the State of West Bengal in India 1997 Ministry of Finance, Government of West Bengal Calcutta
10. M. Delli Carpini S. Keeter What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters 1996 Yale University Press New Haven
11. R. Gaiha P.D. Kaushik V. Kulkarni Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, Panchayats, and the Rural Poor Asian Survey 38 1998
12. R. Gaiha P.D. Kaushik V. Kulkarni. In: V. Damodaran M. Unnithan-Kumar (Eds.). Participation or Empowerment of the Rural Poor: The Case of Panchayats in India 2000 Post Colonial India Manohar, Delhi
13. Galasso, E., Ravallion, M., 2000. Distributional outcomes of a decentralized welfare program. Working Paper no. 2316. World Bank Research Department
14. J. Green J.J. Laffont Incentive theory with data compression. In: W. Heller R. Starr D. Starrett (Eds.). Essays in Honor of K.J. Arrow vol. 3 1986 Cambridge Univ. Press
15. J. Green J.J. Laffont Limited communication and incentive compatibility. In: T. Groves R. Radner S. Reiter (Eds.) Information, Incentives and Economic Mechanisms 1987 University of Minnesota Press
16. G. Grossman E. Helpman Electoral competition and special interest politics Review of Economic Studies 63 1996 265-286
17. A. Hamilton J. Madison J. Jay The Federalist (originally published, 1787) 1937 Tudor New York
18. R.P. Inman D.L. Rubinfeld Designing tax policies in federalist economies: An overview Journal of Public Economics 60 1996 307-334
19. R.P. Inman D.L. Rubinfeld Rethinking Federalism Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 4 1997 43-64
20. E. Jimenez Y. Sawada Do community-managed schools work? An evaluation of el Salvador's EDUCO Program World Bank Economic Review 13 3 1999 415-442 (September 1999)
21. J.J. Laffont D. Martimort Collusion and delegation Rand Journal of Economics 1998 280-305 (Summer)
22. P. Lanjouw M. Ravallion Benefit incidence and the timing of program capture World Bank Economic Review 13 2 1999 257-274 (May 1999)
23. N. Melumad D. Mookherjee S. Reichelstein A theory of responsibility centers Journal of Accounting and Economics 15 1992 445-489
24. N. Melumad D. Mookherjee S. Reichelstein Contract complexity, incentives and the value of delegation Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6 2 1997 257-289
25. D. Mookherjee Incentive reforms in developing country bureaucracies: lessons from tax administration. In: J. Stiglitz B. Pleskovic (Eds.). 1997 Annual World Bank Conference in Development Economics 1998 World Bank Washington D.C.
26. Mookherjee, D., 2001. Combating the crisis in government accountability: a review of recent international experience. Working Paper. Institute for Economic Development, Boston University
27. W.E. Oates Fiscal Federalism 1972 Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich New York
28. M. Ravallion Is more targeting consistent with less spending? International Tax and Public Finance 6 1999 411-419
29. S. Rose-Ackerman Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 1999 Cambridge Univ. Press Cambridge
30. S. Rosenstone J. Hansen Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America 1993 Macmillan New York
31. P. Seabright Accountability and decentralization in government: An incomplete contracts model European Economic Review 1996 40
32. J. Tendler Good government in the tropics Johns Hopkins Studies in Development 1997 Johns Hopkins Univ. Press Baltimore
33. Wade, R., 1985. The market for public office: Why the Indian State is not better at development. World Development. In: Fiorentini, G., Zamagni, S. (Eds.), The economics of corruption and illegal markets, vol. 1. The economics of corruption. International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Elgar
34. R. Wade How infrastructure agencies motivate staff: Canal irrigation in India and the Republic of Korea. In: M. Ashoka (Ed.). Infrastructure Strategies in East Asia 1997 World Bank Washington, DC pp 109-130
35. World Bank Entering the 21st Century, World Development Report 1999/2000 2000 World Bank Washington, DC
36. S. Yitzhaki A note on income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis Journal of Public Economics 3 2 1974 201-202