Political characteristics, institutional procedures and fiscal performance: Panel data analyses of Norwegian local governments, 1991-1998

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 43-64

  Hagen, Terje P ^a   Vabo, Signy Irene ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE FOR URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13744249417     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00218.x     Document Type: Article

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