Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 301-327

  Sørensen, Rune J ^a  

^a BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032186467     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00409     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Austen-Smith, D. & Wright, J.R. (1994). Counteractive lobbying, American Journal of Political Science 38: 25-44.
2. Becker, G.S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99: 371-400.
3. Becker, G.S. (1985). Public policies, pressure groups, and deal weight costs, Journal of Public Economics 28: 329-347.
4. Bender, B. & Lott, J.R. (1996). Legislator voting and shirking: A critical review of the literature, Public Choice 87: 67-100.
5. Bjørklund, T. & Sørensen, R.J. (1990). Politisk deltakelse - avhengig av kommunestørrelse. Rapport til kommuneinndelingsutvalget, Norwegian School of Management (B), Report No. 1990/3.
6. Borge, L.E., Rattsø, J. & Sørensen, R.J. (1995). Local government service production: The politics of allocative sluggishness, Public Choice 82: 135-157.
7. Borrelli, S.A. & Royed, T.J. (1995). Government 'strength' and budget deficits in advanced democracies, European Journal of Political Research 28: 225-260.
8. Courant, P., Gramlich, E. & Rubinfeld, D. (1979). Public employee market power and the level of government spending, American Economic Review 69: 806-817.
9. Craig, S.G. & Inman, R.P. (1988). Education, welfare and the new federalism: State budgeting in a federalist public economy, in H.S. Rosen (ed.), Fiscal federalism: Quantitative studies. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
10. Grain, W.M., Deaton, T. & Tollison, R.D. (1997). Legislators as taxicabs: In the value of seats in the U.S. House of representatives, Economic Inquiry 15: 298-302.
11. Denzau, A. & Hunger, M. (1986). Legislators and interest groups: How unorganized interests get represented, American Political Science Review 80: 89-106.
12. Edin, P.-E. & Ohlsson, H. (1991). Political determinants of budget deficits: Coalition effects versus minority effects, European Economic Review 35: 1597-1603.
13. Falch, T. & Rattsø, J. (1995). The politics of resource use in high schools: Investigating the variation between Norwegian countries. Paper presented at the Institute of Public Finance, Lisbon, 21-24 August 1995.
14. Grier, K.B. & Munger, M.C. (1991). Committee assignments, constituent preferences and campaign contributions, Economic Inquiry 19: 24-43.
15. Hall, R.L. & Wyman, F.W. (1990). Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in Congressional Committees, American Political Science Review 84: 797-820.
16. Høvik, S. (1993). Dei frivillige organisasjonane - støysendarar eller informasjonskanalar frå lokalsamfunnet? in H. Baldersheim (ed.), Ledelse og innovasjon i kommunene. Oslo: Tano.
17. Inglehart, I. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18. Kalseth, J., Rattsø, J. (1995). Spending and overspending in local government administration: The minimum requirement approach applied to Norway, European Journal of Political Economy 11: 239-251.
19. Lindbeck, A. (1995). Welfare state disincentives with endogenous habits and norms, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97: 477-501.
20. Maddala, G.S. (1983). Qualitative and limited dependent variable models in econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
21. Mitchell, W.C. & Munger, M.C. (1991). Economic models of interest groups: An introductory survey, American Journal of Political Science 35: 512-546.
22. Mueller, D.C. and Murrell, P. (1986). Interest groups and the size of government, Public Choice 48: 125-145.
23. Mueller, D.C. (1989). Public Choice II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24. Mueller, D.C. & Murrell, P. (1986). Interest groups and the size of government, Public Choice 48: 125-145.
25. Murrell, P. (1984). An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries, Public Choice 43: 151-171.
26. Potters, J. & Sloof, R. (1996). Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence, European Journal of Political Economy 12: 403-442.
27. Rattsø, J. (1989). Local government allocation of labor and the grant system, Government and Policy 7: 273-284.
28. Rongen, G. (1995). Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway. European Journal of Political Economy 11: 253-264.
29. Roubini, N. & Sachs, J. (1989). Government spending and budget deficits in the industrial countries, Economic Policy 8: 100-132.
30. Topf, R. (1995). Beyond electoral participation, in H.-D. Klingemann & D. Fuchs (eds.), Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31. Sørensen, R. (1995). The demand for local government goods: The impact of parties, committees, and public sector politicians, The European Journal of Political Research 27: 119-141.
32. van Winden, F. (1997). On the economic theory of interest groups. Towards a group of reference in political economics, invited paper to the European Public Choice Society Meeting, Prague, April 1997.
33. Wittman, D. (1989). Why democracies produce efficient results, Journal of Political Economy 97: 543-572.