An asymmetric-information model of litigation

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 153-175

  Hylton, Keith N ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information model; Due care standard; Litigation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036334369     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(02)00085-6     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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