What kind of democrat was Spinoza?

Political Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 6-27

  Smith, Steven B ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Conatus; Exemplar; Parallelism empowerment; Rational nature

Indexed keywords

EID: 12944275405     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591704268640     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. Steven B. Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); see also Hillel Fradkin, "The 'Separation' of Religion and Politics: Spinoza's Paradoxes," Review of Politics 4 (1988): 603-27; and Richard Popkin Spinoza (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2004), 76.
2. Steven B. Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); see also Hillel Fradkin, "The 'Separation' of Religion and Politics: Spinoza's Paradoxes," Review of Politics 4 (1988): 603-27; and Richard Popkin Spinoza (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2004), 76.
3. Steven B. Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); see also Hillel Fradkin, "The 'Separation' of Religion and Politics: Spinoza's Paradoxes," Review of Politics 4 (1988): 603-27; and Richard Popkin Spinoza (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2004), 76.
4. José Faur, "Spinoza and the Secularization of Western Society," in In the Shadow of History; Jews and Conversos at the Dawn of Modernity (Albany: SUNY, 1992), 142-75, esp. 172-75; for the authoritarian dimension of Spinoza, see also Stanley Rosen, "Spinoza's Argument for Political Freedom," Cardozo Law Review 2 (2003): 729-40.
5. José Faur, "Spinoza and the Secularization of Western Society," in In the Shadow of History; Jews and Conversos at the Dawn of Modernity (Albany: SUNY, 1992), 142-75, esp. 172-75; for the authoritarian dimension of Spinoza, see also Stanley Rosen, "Spinoza's Argument for Political Freedom," Cardozo Law Review 2 (2003): 729-40.
6. Jonathan Israel, The Radical Enlightenment: The Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 262-64; and Hans Blom, "Virtue and Republicanism: Spinoza's Political Philosophy in the Context of the Dutch Republic," in Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. H. G. Koenigsberger (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1988), 195-212.
7. Jonathan Israel, The Radical Enlightenment: The Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 262-64; and Hans Blom, "Virtue and Republicanism: Spinoza's Political Philosophy in the Context of the Dutch Republic," in Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. H. G. Koenigsberger (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1988), 195-212.
8. Etienne Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, trans. Peter Snowden (London: Verso, 1998), 50.
9. See Leo Strauss, "How to Read Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 142-201,esp. 177-201; the issues of the rhetoric and the audience for the TTP has recently been discussed by André Tosel, Spinoza ou le crepescule de la servitude (Paris: Aubier, 1984), 50-56; S teven Frankel, "Politics and Rhetoric: The Intended Audience of Spinoza's 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,'" Review of Metaphysics 52 (June 1999): 897-924; and Michael Rosenthal, "Persuasive Passions: Rhetoric and the Interpretation of Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 3 (2003): 249-68.
10. See Leo Strauss, "How to Read Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 142-201,esp. 177-201; the issues of the rhetoric and the audience for the TTP has recently been discussed by André Tosel, Spinoza ou le crepescule de la servitude (Paris: Aubier, 1984), 50-56; S teven Frankel, "Politics and Rhetoric: The Intended Audience of Spinoza's 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,'" Review of Metaphysics 52 (June 1999): 897-924; and Michael Rosenthal, "Persuasive Passions: Rhetoric and the Interpretation of Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 3 (2003): 249-68.
11. See Leo Strauss, "How to Read Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 142-201,esp. 177-201; the issues of the rhetoric and the audience for the TTP has recently been discussed by André Tosel, Spinoza ou le crepescule de la servitude (Paris: Aubier, 1984), 50-56; S teven Frankel, "Politics and Rhetoric: The Intended Audience of Spinoza's 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,'" Review of Metaphysics 52 (June 1999): 897-924; and Michael Rosenthal, "Persuasive Passions: Rhetoric and the Interpretation of Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 3 (2003): 249-68.
12. See Leo Strauss, "How to Read Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 142-201,esp. 177-201; the issues of the rhetoric and the audience for the TTP has recently been discussed by André Tosel, Spinoza ou le crepescule de la servitude (Paris: Aubier, 1984), 50-56; S teven Frankel, "Politics and Rhetoric: The Intended Audience of Spinoza's 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,'" Review of Metaphysics 52 (June 1999): 897-924; and Michael Rosenthal, "Persuasive Passions: Rhetoric and the Interpretation of Spinoza's 'Theologico-Political Treatise,'" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 3 (2003): 249-68.
13. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001); references are to the chapter and page number.
14. Spinoza, "Political Treatise," in The Political Works, trans. A. G. Wernham (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1958); references are to chapter and section number
15. For a recent attempt to read the TP as introducing "a comprehensive theory of democracy," see Willi Goetschel, Spinoza's Modernity: Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 66-81; I approve of the author's efforts to take the TP seriously, but I do not believe that the final unfinished portion on democracy provides what it is the author set out to do.
16. The translation used is Edwin Curley, ed., The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); citations to the Ethics refer to the part (= Roman numeral), proposition (= p), demonstration (= d), scholium (= s), corollary (= c), appendix (= ap), preface (= pref), and definition (= def). Page numbers refer to the Gebhardt edition of the Spinoza Opera, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925).
17. The translation used is Edwin Curley, ed., The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); citations to the Ethics refer to the part (= Roman numeral), proposition (= p), demonstration (= d), scholium (= s), corollary (= c), appendix (= ap), preface (= pref), and definition (= def). Page numbers refer to the Gebhardt edition of the Spinoza Opera, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925).
18. For some notable exceptions, see Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988), 287-354; Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, 76-98; Steven B. Smith, Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the "Ethics" (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 123-53.
19. For some notable exceptions, see Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988), 287-354; Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, 76-98; Steven B. Smith, Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the "Ethics" (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 123-53.
20. For some notable exceptions, see Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988), 287-354; Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, 76-98; Steven B. Smith, Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the "Ethics" (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 123-53.
21. For the conception of Spinoza as a Stoic, see P. O. Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" History of European Ideas 5 (1984): 1-15; Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in The Rise of Modem Philosophy: The New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289-316; and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 500-10. 12. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin, 1975), 192: "The barrier between twentieth-century readers and Spinoza is the conception of historical change which is associated with the methodical study of history; this is something which neither Spinoza nor Hobbes nor any philosopher of their age fully envisaged." Hampshire does not explain why this stricture disables Spinoza's political philosophy but not his ethics or his philosophy of mind. In point of fact, Spinoza has a deeper historical sense than is generally imagined, see André Tosel, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie du progrès historique de Spinoza?" in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 306-26; James C. Morrison, "Spinoza and History," in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1980), 173-95; and Norman O. Brown, "Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics," Political Theory 14 (1986): 195-213.
22. For the conception of Spinoza as a Stoic, see P. O. Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" History of European Ideas 5 (1984): 1-15; Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in The Rise of Modem Philosophy: The New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289-316; and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 500-10. 12. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin, 1975), 192: "The barrier between twentieth-century readers and Spinoza is the conception of historical change which is associated with the methodical study of history; this is something which neither Spinoza nor Hobbes nor any philosopher of their age fully envisaged." Hampshire does not explain why this stricture disables Spinoza's political philosophy but not his ethics or his philosophy of mind. In point of fact, Spinoza has a deeper historical sense than is generally imagined, see André Tosel, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie du progrès historique de Spinoza?" in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 306-26; James C. Morrison, "Spinoza and History," in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1980), 173-95; and Norman O. Brown, "Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics," Political Theory 14 (1986): 195-213.
23. For the conception of Spinoza as a Stoic, see P. O. Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" History of European Ideas 5 (1984): 1-15; Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in The Rise of Modem Philosophy: The New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289-316; and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 500-10. 12. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin, 1975), 192: "The barrier between twentieth-century readers and Spinoza is the conception of historical change which is associated with the methodical study of history; this is something which neither Spinoza nor Hobbes nor any philosopher of their age fully envisaged." Hampshire does not explain why this stricture disables Spinoza's political philosophy but not his ethics or his philosophy of mind. In point of fact, Spinoza has a deeper historical sense than is generally imagined, see André Tosel, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie du progrès historique de Spinoza?" in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 306-26; James C. Morrison, "Spinoza and History," in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1980), 173-95; and Norman O. Brown, "Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics," Political Theory 14 (1986): 195-213.
24. For the conception of Spinoza as a Stoic, see P. O. Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" History of European Ideas 5 (1984): 1-15; Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in The Rise of Modem Philosophy: The New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289-316; and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 500-10. 12. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin, 1975), 192: "The barrier between twentieth-century readers and Spinoza is the conception of historical change which is associated with the methodical study of history; this is something which neither Spinoza nor Hobbes nor any philosopher of their age fully envisaged." Hampshire does not explain why this stricture disables Spinoza's political philosophy but not his ethics or his philosophy of mind. In point of fact, Spinoza has a deeper historical sense than is generally imagined, see André Tosel, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie du progrès historique de Spinoza?" in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 306-26; James C. Morrison, "Spinoza and History," in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1980), 173-95; and Norman O. Brown, "Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics," Political Theory 14 (1986): 195-213.
25. For the conception of Spinoza as a Stoic, see P. O. Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" History of European Ideas 5 (1984): 1-15; Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in The Rise of Modem Philosophy: The New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289-316; and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 500-10. 12. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin, 1975), 192: "The barrier between twentieth-century readers and Spinoza is the conception of historical change which is associated with the methodical study of history; this is something which neither Spinoza nor Hobbes nor any philosopher of their age fully envisaged." Hampshire does not explain why this stricture disables Spinoza's political philosophy but not his ethics or his philosophy of mind. In point of fact, Spinoza has a deeper historical sense than is generally imagined, see André Tosel, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie du progrès historique de Spinoza?" in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 306-26; James C. Morrison, "Spinoza and History," in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1980), 173-95; and Norman O. Brown, "Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics," Political Theory 14 (1986): 195-213.
26. For the conception of Spinoza as a Stoic, see P. O. Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" History of European Ideas 5 (1984): 1-15; Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in The Rise of Modem Philosophy: The New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289-316; and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 500-10. 12. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin, 1975), 192: "The barrier between twentieth-century readers and Spinoza is the conception of historical change which is associated with the methodical study of history; this is something which neither Spinoza nor Hobbes nor any philosopher of their age fully envisaged." Hampshire does not explain why this stricture disables Spinoza's political philosophy but not his ethics or his philosophy of mind. In point of fact, Spinoza has a deeper historical sense than is generally imagined, see André Tosel, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie du progrès historique de Spinoza?" in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 306-26; James C. Morrison, "Spinoza and History," in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1980), 173-95; and Norman O. Brown, "Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics," Political Theory 14 (1986): 195-213.
27. For the conception of Spinoza as a Stoic, see P. O. Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" History of European Ideas 5 (1984): 1-15; Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in The Rise of Modem Philosophy: The New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289-316; and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 500-10. 12. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin, 1975), 192: "The barrier between twentieth-century readers and Spinoza is the conception of historical change which is associated with the methodical study of history; this is something which neither Spinoza nor Hobbes nor any philosopher of their age fully envisaged." Hampshire does not explain why this stricture disables Spinoza's political philosophy but not his ethics or his philosophy of mind. In point of fact, Spinoza has a deeper historical sense than is generally imagined, see André Tosel, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie du progrès historique de Spinoza?" in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 306-26; James C. Morrison, "Spinoza and History," in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1980), 173-95; and Norman O. Brown, "Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics," Political Theory 14 (1986): 195-213.
28. Gilles Deleuze, "Spinoza and the Three 'Ethics,'" in The New Spinoza, ed. Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 27; the idea that the Ethics contains complex layers of rhetoric and self-concealment was pioneered by Harry A. Wolfson, "Behind the Geometrical Method," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), 3-24; and Ephraim Shmueli, "The Geometrical Method, Personal Caution, and the Idea of Tolerance, " in Spinoza: New Perspectives, ed. Robert W. Shahan and J. I. Biro (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 197-215.
29. Gilles Deleuze, "Spinoza and the Three 'Ethics,'" in The New Spinoza, ed. Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 27; the idea that the Ethics contains complex layers of rhetoric and self-concealment was pioneered by Harry A. Wolfson, "Behind the Geometrical Method," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), 3-24; and Ephraim Shmueli, "The Geometrical Method, Personal Caution, and the Idea of Tolerance, " in Spinoza: New Perspectives, ed. Robert W. Shahan and J. I. Biro (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 197-215.
30. Gilles Deleuze, "Spinoza and the Three 'Ethics,'" in The New Spinoza, ed. Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 27; the idea that the Ethics contains complex layers of rhetoric and self-concealment was pioneered by Harry A. Wolfson, "Behind the Geometrical Method," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), 3-24; and Ephraim Shmueli, "The Geometrical Method, Personal Caution, and the Idea of Tolerance, " in Spinoza: New Perspectives, ed. Robert W. Shahan and J. I. Biro (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 197-215.
31. The "anti-humanist" reading of Spinoza is principally associated with Louis Althusser, "Sur Spinoza," in Éléments d'autocritique (Paris: Hachette, 1974), 65-83; for a provocative restatement of this thesis, see Yitzhak Melamed, "Spinoza's Anti-Humanism" (unpublished).
32. The "anti-humanist" reading of Spinoza is principally associated with Louis Althusser, "Sur Spinoza," in Éléments d'autocritique (Paris: Hachette, 1974), 65-83; for a provocative restatement of this thesis, see Yitzhak Melamed, "Spinoza's Anti-Humanism" (unpublished).
33. Letter #58 to G. H. Schuller, The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 284.
34. For a useful survey of the issues involved, see Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 230-304; for a more recent overview of some of the analytical literature, see Timothy O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
35. For a useful survey of the issues involved, see Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 230-304; for a more recent overview of some of the analytical literature, see Timothy O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
36. R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan, ed. David Boucher (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1992), 8-9.
37. See Marx Wartofsky, "Action and Passion: Spinoza's Construction of a Scientific Psychology," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, 329-53.
38. Roger Scruton, Spinoza (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), 58; see also Donald Davidson, "Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects," in Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (New York: Little Room Press, 1999), 103.
39. Roger Scruton, Spinoza (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), 58; see also Donald Davidson, "Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects," in Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (New York: Little Room Press, 1999), 103.
40. Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone, 1990), 107-11.
41. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), 11-18.
42. It is not altogether clear whether Spinoza restricts his conatus doctrine to animate objects or whether it is intended to have an even broader usage. He presents it initially not as a psychological postulate but as a general consequence of his physics of motion and rest; see David Lachterman, "The Physics of Spinoza's 'Ethics,'" in Spinoza: New Perspectives, 71-111.
43. The debate over Spinoza's use of teleological language has been hotly contested; for a strong denial that Spinoza has any right to the use of teleological terms, see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Indianapolis; Hackett, 1984), 213-26; Bennett's claims have been disputed by Edwin Curley, "On Bennett's Spinoza: The Issue of Teleology," in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, 39-52; for a strong defense of Spinoza's use of teleology, see Martin Linn, "Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza" (unpublished).
44. The debate over Spinoza's use of teleological language has been hotly contested; for a strong denial that Spinoza has any right to the use of teleological terms, see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Indianapolis; Hackett, 1984), 213-26; Bennett's claims have been disputed by Edwin Curley, "On Bennett's Spinoza: The Issue of Teleology," in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, 39-52; for a strong defense of Spinoza's use of teleology, see Martin Linn, "Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza" (unpublished).
45. The debate over Spinoza's use of teleological language has been hotly contested; for a strong denial that Spinoza has any right to the use of teleological terms, see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Indianapolis; Hackett, 1984), 213-26; Bennett's claims have been disputed by Edwin Curley, "On Bennett's Spinoza: The Issue of Teleology," in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, 39-52; for a strong defense of Spinoza's use of teleology, see Martin Linn, "Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza" (unpublished).
46. Spinoza's relation to Hobbes remains a deeply vexed problem, but for some of the better treatments see, Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken, 1965), 229-38; Hillel Gilden, "Spinoza and the Political Problem," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, 377-87; Edwin Curley, "Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan," in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 315-42; and Alexandre Matheron, "Le 'droit du plus fort': Hobbes contre Spinoza," Revue philosohique de la France et de l'etranger 110 (1985): 149-76.
47. Spinoza's relation to Hobbes remains a deeply vexed problem, but for some of the better treatments see, Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken, 1965), 229-38; Hillel Gilden, "Spinoza and the Political Problem," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, 377-87; Edwin Curley, "Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan," in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 315-42; and Alexandre Matheron, "Le 'droit du plus fort': Hobbes contre Spinoza," Revue philosohique de la France et de l'etranger 110 (1985): 149-76.
48. Spinoza's relation to Hobbes remains a deeply vexed problem, but for some of the better treatments see, Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken, 1965), 229-38; Hillel Gilden, "Spinoza and the Political Problem," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, 377-87; Edwin Curley, "Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan," in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 315-42; and Alexandre Matheron, "Le 'droit du plus fort': Hobbes contre Spinoza," Revue philosohique de la France et de l'etranger 110 (1985): 149-76.
49. Spinoza's relation to Hobbes remains a deeply vexed problem, but for some of the better treatments see, Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken, 1965), 229-38; Hillel Gilden, "Spinoza and the Political Problem," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, 377-87; Edwin Curley, "Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan," in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 315-42; and Alexandre Matheron, "Le 'droit du plus fort': Hobbes contre Spinoza," Revue philosohique de la France et de l'etranger 110 (1985): 149-76.
50. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), xiii, 6; citations refer to chapter and section number.
51. Yirmiyahu Yovel, "Transcending Mere Survival: From Conatus to Conatus Intelligendi," in Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, 45-61.
52. For this point, see Steven B. Smith, "A Fool for Love: Thoughts on I. B. Singer's Spinoza," Iyyun 51 (2002): 41-50.
53. Nietzsche declared his enthusiasm for Spinoza in a letter to Franz Overbeck: "I have a precursor and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza and that I should have turned to him just now was inspired by 'instinct.' Not only is his overall tendency like mine - but in five main points of his doctrine I recognize myself; see Walter Kaufmann, ed., The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1965), 92.
54. Edwin Curley, "Spinoza's Moral Philosophy," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, 354-76, esp. 363-65; see also Michael Rosenthal, "Why Spinoza Chose the Hebrews," History of Political Thought 18 (1997): 207-41.
55. Edwin Curley, "Spinoza's Moral Philosophy," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, 354-76, esp. 363-65; see also Michael Rosenthal, "Why Spinoza Chose the Hebrews," History of Political Thought 18 (1997): 207-41.
56. The biblical and Talmudic sources of Spinoza's image have been explored in Warren Zev Harvey, "Big Fish - Little Fish" (unpublished); the most obvious biblical source for Spinoza's view is Job 41; see also Pirke Avot, trans. Leonard Kravitz and Kerry M. Olitzky (New York: UAHC, 1993), iii, 2: "Pray for the welfare of the government, for were it not for the fear of it, people would swallow each other alive." See Hobbes, Leviathan, xxviii, 27.
57. The biblical and Talmudic sources of Spinoza's image have been explored in Warren Zev Harvey, "Big Fish - Little Fish" (unpublished); the most obvious biblical source for Spinoza's view is Job 41; see also Pirke Avot, trans. Leonard Kravitz and Kerry M. Olitzky (New York: UAHC, 1993), iii, 2: "Pray for the welfare of the government, for were it not for the fear of it, people would swallow each other alive." See Hobbes, Leviathan, xxviii, 27.
58. The biblical and Talmudic sources of Spinoza's image have been explored in Warren Zev Harvey, "Big Fish - Little Fish" (unpublished); the most obvious biblical source for Spinoza's view is Job 41; see also Pirke Avot, trans. Leonard Kravitz and Kerry M. Olitzky (New York: UAHC, 1993), iii, 2: "Pray for the welfare of the government, for were it not for the fear of it, people would swallow each other alive." See Hobbes, Leviathan, xxviii, 27.
59. See Walter Eckstein, "Rousseau and Spinoza: Their Political Theories and Their Conceptions of Freedom," Journal of the History of Ideas 3 (1944) ; 259-91; and Paul Vernière, Spinoza et la pensée francaise avant la révolution, vol. 2 (Paris: PUF, 1954), 475-94.
60. See Walter Eckstein, "Rousseau and Spinoza: Their Political Theories and Their Conceptions of Freedom," Journal of the History of Ideas 3 (1944) ; 259-91; and Paul Vernière, Spinoza et la pensée francaise avant la révolution, vol. 2 (Paris: PUF, 1954), 475-94.
61. For the Kantian overtones of this formula, see Spinoza, Collected Works, 587.
62. For a recent consideration of some of these themes, see Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
63. The fifth and final part of the Ethics has been widely derided by contemporary philosophers. An extreme, albeit telling, example is Bennett, who calls Spinoza's views here "unintelligible" and "pretty certainly worthless," "rubbish which causes others to write rubbish"; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's "Ethics," 372, 374; for a more sympathetic reading of some of the same passages, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Third Kind of Knowledge as Alternative Salvation," in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, 157-75; and Lee Rice, "Love of God in Spinoza, " Jewish Themes in Spinoza's Philosophy, ed. Heidi Raven and Lenn Goodman (Albany: SUN Y Press, 2002), 93-106; for a (perhaps) surprising appreciation, see also Louis Althusser, "The Only Materialist Tradition," The New Spinoza, 3-19, esp. 7-10.
64. The fifth and final part of the Ethics has been widely derided by contemporary philosophers. An extreme, albeit telling, example is Bennett, who calls Spinoza's views here "unintelligible" and "pretty certainly worthless," "rubbish which causes others to write rubbish"; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's "Ethics," 372, 374; for a more sympathetic reading of some of the same passages, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Third Kind of Knowledge as Alternative Salvation," in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, 157-75; and Lee Rice, "Love of God in Spinoza, " Jewish Themes in Spinoza's Philosophy, ed. Heidi Raven and Lenn Goodman (Albany: SUN Y Press, 2002), 93-106; for a (perhaps) surprising appreciation, see also Louis Althusser, "The Only Materialist Tradition," The New Spinoza, 3-19, esp. 7-10.
65. The fifth and final part of the Ethics has been widely derided by contemporary philosophers. An extreme, albeit telling, example is Bennett, who calls Spinoza's views here "unintelligible" and "pretty certainly worthless," "rubbish which causes others to write rubbish"; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's "Ethics," 372, 374; for a more sympathetic reading of some of the same passages, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Third Kind of Knowledge as Alternative Salvation," in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, 157-75; and Lee Rice, "Love of God in Spinoza, " Jewish Themes in Spinoza's Philosophy, ed. Heidi Raven and Lenn Goodman (Albany: SUN Y Press, 2002), 93-106; for a (perhaps) surprising appreciation, see also Louis Althusser, "The Only Materialist Tradition," The New Spinoza, 3-19, esp. 7-10.
66. The fifth and final part of the Ethics has been widely derided by contemporary philosophers. An extreme, albeit telling, example is Bennett, who calls Spinoza's views here "unintelligible" and "pretty certainly worthless," "rubbish which causes others to write rubbish"; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's "Ethics," 372, 374; for a more sympathetic reading of some of the same passages, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Third Kind of Knowledge as Alternative Salvation," in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, 157-75; and Lee Rice, "Love of God in Spinoza, " Jewish Themes in Spinoza's Philosophy, ed. Heidi Raven and Lenn Goodman (Albany: SUN Y Press, 2002), 93-106; for a (perhaps) surprising appreciation, see also Louis Althusser, "The Only Materialist Tradition," The New Spinoza, 3-19, esp. 7-10.
67. Goetschel overstates again when he remarks, "Breaking off at this point the Political Treatise does not necessarily signal a failure in the argument. Instead, the interruption suggests a critical resistance to a premature closure"; Goetschel, Spinoza and Modernity, 81.