Politics and rhetoric: The intended audience of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 52, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 897-924

  Frankel, Steven ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PARIS   (France)

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EID: 0039185488     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (202)

1. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in vol. 3 of Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Verlag, 1925), 1-267. TTP references are given according to chapter number, Latin page. Wherever possible, I have also used Edwin Curley's A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
2. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in vol. 3 of Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Verlag, 1925), 1-267. TTP references are given according to chapter number, Latin page. Wherever possible, I have also used Edwin Curley's A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
3. TTP, preface, 12.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. See Leo Strauss, Persecution and The Art of Writing (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), 162-3.
7. Strauss, Persecution, 184.
8. Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 2:347: "Spinoza broke away from traditional theology and started a new kind of theology and a new kind of rationalism." Richard McKeon also treats Spinoza as the last of the scholastics in his The Philosophy of Spinoza (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928).
9. Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 2:347: "Spinoza broke away from traditional theology and started a new kind of theology and a new kind of rationalism." Richard McKeon also treats Spinoza as the last of the scholastics in his The Philosophy of Spinoza (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928).
10. Wolfson argues that Spinoza's "reputed God-intoxification was really nothing but a hang-over of an earlier religious jag"; Wolfson, Philosophy of Spinoza, 348.
11. Wolfson, Philosophy of Spinoza, 330. do not mean to suggest that Strauss and Wolfson had identical positions on the question of the TTP's intended audience. Indeed, Strauss mocks some of Wolfson's claims, such as this one, in Persecution and The Art of Writing, 192.
12. Wolfson, Philosophy of Spinoza, 330. do not mean to suggest that Strauss and Wolfson had identical positions on the question of the TTP's intended audience. Indeed, Strauss mocks some of Wolfson's claims, such as this one, in Persecution and The Art of Writing, 192.
13. Wolfson, Philosophy of Spinoza, 330. do not mean to suggest that Strauss and Wolfson had identical positions on the question of the TTP's intended audience. Indeed, Strauss mocks some of Wolfson's claims, such as this one, in Persecution and The Art of Writing, 192.
14. In contrast to Wolfson, Robert McShea argues that Spinoza's political philosophy has been neglected because "his political thought is too radically enlightened." McShea means by this that Spinoza's attacks on revealed religion, natural law, and the rights of man were too radical for the moderate enlightenment as well as for modern political theorists. See The Political Philosophy of Spinoza (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 10.
15. John Aubrey, Brief Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 1:357.
16. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
17. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
18. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
19. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
20. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
21. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
22. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
23. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
24. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
25. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
26. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
27. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
28. Wolfson, of course, was not the first modern scholar to accuse Spinoza of using Scriptural language as a means of shielding his heterodoxy from the church. Pollock, for instance, argues that the Tractatus is a "work of conciliation" (p. 336) but is unwilling simply to dismiss the "unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism of the Tractatus . . . and the thorough-going speculation of the Ethics." See Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), 339. Wolfson's description of the TTP as the product of an accommodation to the tradition and to vestigial intellectual and religious influences has also been reiterated by subsequent scholars who reject its philosophical and political content because it is "embedded in a mass of Biblical investigation" which distorts its philosophical value. See T. E. J. Jessop, Spinoza on Freedom of Thought (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1962), ix. See also Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): 'The Theological-Political Treatise' as a Prolegomenon to the 'Ethics,'" in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), fn.#16.) Similarly, Jonathan Bennett's well-known study of Spinoza begins by asserting that the Ethics "is Spinoza's one indisputable masterpiece" while dismissing the TTP because it does not improve our understanding of the Ethics; see Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7. As a result of this disjunction between Spinoza's true philosophy and his accommodation to prevailing religious opinion, Bennett believes (like Wolfson) that Spinoza fails in his attempt to disseminate philosophy in the TTP. In fact, the claim that religion is irrelevant to Spinoza's true thought has contributed to there being a relatively small amount of secondary literature on the TTP. According to Edwin Curley, the neglect of the work is due to the difficulty in separating the various strands of philosophy, politics, and theology which are tightly intertwined within the TTP. See Curley, "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece," 135 and 143. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the neglect of the TTP by modern scholars results from the common view that the theological claims are irrelevant to Spinoza's thought.
29. Errol Harris, "Is There an Esoteric Doctrine in the TTP?" Vanwege het Spinozahuis: Medelingen 38 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), 3 and 14.
30. Alan Donagan, Spinoza (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 13-32, and 180-3. See Richard Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 238.
31. Alan Donagan, Spinoza (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 13-32, and 180-3. See Richard Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 238.
32. Donagan is not the first scholar to argue that Spinoza's treatment of religion is sincere. Lewis Feuer, for example, had previously argued that Spinoza meant what he wrote in the TTP but only because he could not conceive of an alternative: "[Spinoza] denied the doctrine of the separation of church and state, and made the state sovereign in all matters of religion. Liberalism today makes an essential tenet of the separation of church and state. But in Spinoza's day, when social institutions were in violent conflict, the idea of pluralistic compromise had not been conceived"; Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 98. In general, Feuer sees Spinoza as a thinker who was unable to articulate a coherent version of liberalism because Spinoza was "caught in the coil of his own formulae of God and nature, of power and right" as a result of his "masochistic submission to the powers of nature"; Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 110-11. Such a claim reduces Spinoza merely to a product of his time and thereby renders him less interesting as a thinker. I have therefore focused instead on Donagan's position which entertains the possibility that Spinoza's philosophy is true: "Spinoza is unique among seventeenth-century philosophers. Even today, it is possible to seriously wonder whether his philosophy . . . is substantially true"; Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, xi.
33. Donagan is not the first scholar to argue that Spinoza's treatment of religion is sincere. Lewis Feuer, for example, had previously argued that Spinoza meant what he wrote in the TTP but only because he could not conceive of an alternative: "[Spinoza] denied the doctrine of the separation of church and state, and made the state sovereign in all matters of religion. Liberalism today makes an essential tenet of the separation of church and state. But in Spinoza's day, when social institutions were in violent conflict, the idea of pluralistic compromise had not been conceived"; Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 98. In general, Feuer sees Spinoza as a thinker who was unable to articulate a coherent version of liberalism because Spinoza was "caught in the coil of his own formulae of God and nature, of power and right" as a result of his "masochistic submission to the powers of nature"; Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 110-11. Such a claim reduces Spinoza merely to a product of his time and thereby renders him less interesting as a thinker. I have therefore focused instead on Donagan's position which entertains the possibility that Spinoza's philosophy is true: "Spinoza is unique among seventeenth-century philosophers. Even today, it is possible to seriously wonder whether his philosophy . . . is substantially true"; Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, xi.
34. Donagan is not the first scholar to argue that Spinoza's treatment of religion is sincere. Lewis Feuer, for example, had previously argued that Spinoza meant what he wrote in the TTP but only because he could not conceive of an alternative: "[Spinoza] denied the doctrine of the separation of church and state, and made the state sovereign in all matters of religion. Liberalism today makes an essential tenet of the separation of church and state. But in Spinoza's day, when social institutions were in violent conflict, the idea of pluralistic compromise had not been conceived"; Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 98. In general, Feuer sees Spinoza as a thinker who was unable to articulate a coherent version of liberalism because Spinoza was "caught in the coil of his own formulae of God and nature, of power and right" as a result of his "masochistic submission to the powers of nature"; Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 110-11. Such a claim reduces Spinoza merely to a product of his time and thereby renders him less interesting as a thinker. I have therefore focused instead on Donagan's position which entertains the possibility that Spinoza's philosophy is true: "Spinoza is unique among seventeenth-century philosophers. Even today, it is possible to seriously wonder whether his philosophy . . . is substantially true"; Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, xi.
35. Donagan is not the first scholar to argue that Spinoza's treatment of religion is sincere. Lewis Feuer, for example, had previously argued that Spinoza meant what he wrote in the TTP but only because he could not conceive of an alternative: "[Spinoza] denied the doctrine of the separation of church and state, and made the state sovereign in all matters of religion. Liberalism today makes an essential tenet of the separation of church and state. But in Spinoza's day, when social institutions were in violent conflict, the idea of pluralistic compromise had not been conceived"; Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 98. In general, Feuer sees Spinoza as a thinker who was unable to articulate a coherent version of liberalism because Spinoza was "caught in the coil of his own formulae of God and nature, of power and right" as a result of his "masochistic submission to the powers of nature"; Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 110-11. Such a claim reduces Spinoza merely to a product of his time and thereby renders him less interesting as a thinker. I have therefore focused instead on Donagan's position which entertains the possibility that Spinoza's philosophy is true: "Spinoza is unique among seventeenth-century philosophers. Even today, it is possible to seriously wonder whether his philosophy . . . is substantially true"; Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, xi.
36. Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 15.
37. Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 21.
38. TTP, preface, 5.
39. Regarding superstition, Spinoza is primarily concerned with the attribution of agency or volition to nature. Elsewhere, Spinoza describes the origins of superstition exclusively in these terms: "Ordinary people have found no stronger proof of God's providence and rule than that based on the ignorance of causes. This shows clearly that they have no knowledge at all of the nature of God's will, and that they have attached a human will to him, that is, a will really distinct from the intellect. I think this misconception has been the sole cause of superstition, and perhaps of much knavery"; Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, pt. 2, chap. 7, in Spinoza Opera, 1:261, emphasis added.
40. Spinoza distinguishes true religion or "the religion that used to be" (antiquae Religionis nihil manserit) from superstition. By "true religion" Spinoza means the teaching contained original meaning of the speeches of the Prophets and Apostles. Since the Bible has been corrupted by theologians, these original speeches have been misconstrued; consequently, Biblical religion has become virtually indistinguishable from the superstitions of the pagans. Because of this confusion, Spinoza only appears to use the terms "religion" and "superstition" interchangeably. In fact, the TTP explains the authentic teachings of Scripture, namely obeying God and loving one's neighbor, and insists that they constitute the true religion (see TTP, 8:168). Spinoza accepts any tenets in his true religion which promote the love of one's neighbor (see TTP, 12:160), including false ones (see TTP, 15:185). Ultimately, true religion emerges as the collection of those prejudices which Spinoza is willing to accept, in contrast to superstition, which represents those prejudices which Spinoza emphatically rejects (see TTP, 14:175-8).
41. Spinoza distinguishes true religion or "the religion that used to be" (antiquae Religionis nihil manserit) from superstition. By "true religion" Spinoza means the teaching contained original meaning of the speeches of the Prophets and Apostles. Since the Bible has been corrupted by theologians, these original speeches have been misconstrued; consequently, Biblical religion has become virtually indistinguishable from the superstitions of the pagans. Because of this confusion, Spinoza only appears to use the terms "religion" and "superstition" interchangeably. In fact, the TTP explains the authentic teachings of Scripture, namely obeying God and loving one's neighbor, and insists that they constitute the true religion (see TTP, 8:168). Spinoza accepts any tenets in his true religion which promote the love of one's neighbor (see TTP, 12:160), including false ones (see TTP, 15:185). Ultimately, true religion emerges as the collection of those prejudices which Spinoza is willing to accept, in contrast to superstition, which represents those prejudices which Spinoza emphatically rejects (see TTP, 14:175-8).
42. Spinoza distinguishes true religion or "the religion that used to be" (antiquae Religionis nihil manserit) from superstition. By "true religion" Spinoza means the teaching contained original meaning of the speeches of the Prophets and Apostles. Since the Bible has been corrupted by theologians, these original speeches have been misconstrued; consequently, Biblical religion has become virtually indistinguishable from the superstitions of the pagans. Because of this confusion, Spinoza only appears to use the terms "religion" and "superstition" interchangeably. In fact, the TTP explains the authentic teachings of Scripture, namely obeying God and loving one's neighbor, and insists that they constitute the true religion (see TTP, 8:168). Spinoza accepts any tenets in his true religion which promote the love of one's neighbor (see TTP, 12:160), including false ones (see TTP, 15:185). Ultimately, true religion emerges as the collection of those prejudices which Spinoza is willing to accept, in contrast to superstition, which represents those prejudices which Spinoza emphatically rejects (see TTP, 14:175-8).
43. Spinoza distinguishes true religion or "the religion that used to be" (antiquae Religionis nihil manserit) from superstition. By "true religion" Spinoza means the teaching contained original meaning of the speeches of the Prophets and Apostles. Since the Bible has been corrupted by theologians, these original speeches have been misconstrued; consequently, Biblical religion has become virtually indistinguishable from the superstitions of the pagans. Because of this confusion, Spinoza only appears to use the terms "religion" and "superstition" interchangeably. In fact, the TTP explains the authentic teachings of Scripture, namely obeying God and loving one's neighbor, and insists that they constitute the true religion (see TTP, 8:168). Spinoza accepts any tenets in his true religion which promote the love of one's neighbor (see TTP, 12:160), including false ones (see TTP, 15:185). Ultimately, true religion emerges as the collection of those prejudices which Spinoza is willing to accept, in contrast to superstition, which represents those prejudices which Spinoza emphatically rejects (see TTP, 14:175-8).
44. Spinoza distinguishes true religion or "the religion that used to be" (antiquae Religionis nihil manserit) from superstition. By "true religion" Spinoza means the teaching contained original meaning of the speeches of the Prophets and Apostles. Since the Bible has been corrupted by theologians, these original speeches have been misconstrued; consequently, Biblical religion has become virtually indistinguishable from the superstitions of the pagans. Because of this confusion, Spinoza only appears to use the terms "religion" and "superstition" interchangeably. In fact, the TTP explains the authentic teachings of Scripture, namely obeying God and loving one's neighbor, and insists that they constitute the true religion (see TTP, 8:168). Spinoza accepts any tenets in his true religion which promote the love of one's neighbor (see TTP, 12:160), including false ones (see TTP, 15:185). Ultimately, true religion emerges as the collection of those prejudices which Spinoza is willing to accept, in contrast to superstition, which represents those prejudices which Spinoza emphatically rejects (see TTP, 14:175-8).
45. TTP, 3:46.
46. In the TTP, Spinoza distinguishes between the attainment of moral and theoretical perfection and things affecting the preservation of the body and its security. The former faculties are controlled "chiefly by man's power alone," while the latter are dependent on fortune (see TTP, 3:46; cf. TTP, 3:47).
47. In the TTP, Spinoza distinguishes between the attainment of moral and theoretical perfection and things affecting the preservation of the body and its security. The former faculties are controlled "chiefly by man's power alone," while the latter are dependent on fortune (see TTP, 3:46; cf. TTP, 3:47).
48. In the TTP, Spinoza distinguishes between the attainment of moral and theoretical perfection and things affecting the preservation of the body and its security. The former faculties are controlled "chiefly by man's power alone," while the latter are dependent on fortune (see TTP, 3:46; cf. TTP, 3:47).
49. See Ethics, bk. 3, proposition 31, corallary, and p. 32 for more on the causes of ambition and envy. The Latin version of the Ethics is in vol. 2, of Spinoza Opera. Wherever possible, I have used Edwin Curley's A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
50. See Ethics, bk. 3, proposition 31, corallary, and p. 32 for more on the causes of ambition and envy. The Latin version of the Ethics is in vol. 2, of Spinoza Opera. Wherever possible, I have used Edwin Curley's A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
51. See Ethics, bk. 3, proposition 31, corallary, and p. 32 for more on the causes of ambition and envy. The Latin version of the Ethics is in vol. 2, of Spinoza Opera. Wherever possible, I have used Edwin Curley's A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
52. TTP, preface, 5.
53. By "true blessedness," Spinoza means "true knowledge and love of God"; see TTP, 4:59. Also see Ethics, 4:28 where Spinoza explains that "[k]nowledge of God is the mind's greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God." For a more general discussion on the relationship between political philosophy and philosophy, see Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 10-12.
54. By "true blessedness," Spinoza means "true knowledge and love of God"; see TTP, 4:59. Also see Ethics, 4:28 where Spinoza explains that "[k]nowledge of God is the mind's greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God." For a more general discussion on the relationship between political philosophy and philosophy, see Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 10-12.
55. By "true blessedness," Spinoza means "true knowledge and love of God"; see TTP, 4:59. Also see Ethics, 4:28 where Spinoza explains that "[k]nowledge of God is the mind's greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God." For a more general discussion on the relationship between political philosophy and philosophy, see Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 10-12.
56. Spinoza's concern with relieving the misery of the multitude is both genuine and profound. His treatment of religion must be view in light of this concern: for instance, later in the TTP, when Spinoza considers the benefits of religion, he mentions first the fact that religion "is a great source of comfort to those who cannot exert much power by reason"; TTP, 15:187.
57. TTP, preface, 5; emphasis added.
58. TTP, preface, 8.
59. See Ethics, 1, appendix: "All the prejudices [that is, superstitions] I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end, for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God."
60. A similar point is made by F. Mignini in "Theology as the Work and Instrument of Fortune," in Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought, ed. C. De Deugd (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1984), 130. Mignini argues that reason can never have very much control over the passions and therefore religion is always necessary, even for rational men: "[T]he imagination is the instrument and impassable limit of fortune; if it is founded upon the relation between the human body and other bodies, as the representative structure of affectiones, one can understand why Spinoza affirmed that reason, considered as true knowledge, has no power of the imagination and can do nothing against the course of fortune and the emotions which it produces."
61. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
62. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
63. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
64. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
65. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
66. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
67. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
68. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example, Ethics, 4.17) since the TTP's claims about the relation between reason and imagination are based on the demonstrations made there. The precise delineation of power between the imaginative or affective life and the life based on reason is complex, but Spinoza summarizes it as follows: "[W]e have seen that the road which reason teaches us to follow is very difficult, so that those who are persuaded that the masses . . . can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason are dreaming of the golden age of the Poets or of a myth." See Political Treatise (hereafter, "PT"), introduction, paragraph 5 in Spinoza Opera, 3:271-360. Also see Ethics, 5.42 on the difficulty of following reason and Ethics, 5.1-10 on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics, 4.4, a human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he "is necessarily always subject to passions"; Ethics, 4c. See TTP, 16.190.
69. Verifying such a claim would require research into the strength of reason particularly with respect to the nature of fortune and the extent of its dominion. The place for such an investigation is the Ethics (for example,
70. See TTP, 5.77-80.
71. See PT, 1.5. See also PT, 7.4: "[H]uman nature is so constituted that everyone seeks with the utmost passion his own advantage, and judges those laws to be more equitable, which he thinks necessary to preserve and increase his substance and defend another's cause so far only as he thinks he is thereby establishing his own."
72. See PT, 1.5. See also PT, 7.4: "[H]uman nature is so constituted that everyone seeks with the utmost passion his own advantage, and judges those laws to be more equitable, which he thinks necessary to preserve and increase his substance and defend another's cause so far only as he thinks he is thereby establishing his own."
73. See PT, 16.190. See also George Gross, Universal Ethics: Constitutionalism and Counsel in Spinoza's Political Treatise (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1991), 140: "[Spinoza] establishes the universality of the principle of self interest as the basis for legislation." Gross further points out that Spinoza proposes "laying the foundations of the state in such a way that the majority will be led by those passions which are most useful to the republic"; Universal Ethics, 193. See also A. G. Wernham, Spinoza: The Political Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 40-1.
74. See PT, 16.190. See also George Gross, Universal Ethics: Constitutionalism and Counsel in Spinoza's Political Treatise (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1991), 140: "[Spinoza] establishes the universality of the principle of self interest as the basis for legislation." Gross further points out that Spinoza proposes "laying the foundations of the state in such a way that the majority will be led by those passions which are most useful to the republic"; Universal Ethics, 193. See also A. G. Wernham, Spinoza: The Political Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 40-1.
75. See PT, 16.190. See also George Gross, Universal Ethics: Constitutionalism and Counsel in Spinoza's Political Treatise (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1991), 140: "[Spinoza] establishes the universality of the principle of self interest as the basis for legislation." Gross further points out that Spinoza proposes "laying the foundations of the state in such a way that the majority will be led by those passions which are most useful to the republic"; Universal Ethics, 193. See also A. G. Wernham, Spinoza: The Political Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 40-1.
76. See PT, 16.190. See also George Gross, Universal Ethics: Constitutionalism and Counsel in Spinoza's Political Treatise (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1991), 140: "[Spinoza] establishes the universality of the principle of self interest as the basis for legislation." Gross further points out that Spinoza proposes "laying the foundations of the state in such a way that the majority will be led by those passions which are most useful to the republic"; Universal Ethics, 193. See also A. G. Wernham, Spinoza: The Political Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 40-1.
77. For a more detailed description of the relationship between Spinoza's three major works, see Stanley Rosen's "Spinoza," in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987), 474.
78. PT, 2.4 and 2.6.
79. Spinoza repeats this argument in chapter sixteen of the TTP, where he expresses the same thought with the memorable example, "big fish eat little fish"; TTP, 189.
80. Spinoza repeats this argument in chapter sixteen of the TTP, where he expresses the same thought with the memorable example, "big fish eat little fish"; TTP, 189.
81. See PT, 2.5. In the Ethics, Spinoza shows how conatus gives rise to hope and fear, the former referring to anything that promotes our striving for self-preservation while the latter concerns anything that hinders our conatus. These two emotions play a significant role in the TTP because of their prominence in social and political affairs. For instance, in chapter sixteen, where Spinoza argues that the social contract is maintained largely from fear of the evil consequences of anarchy (see TTP, 16.191-198 and 17.202). See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus," Studia Spinozana 10 (1994): 43-68.
82. See PT, 2.5. In the Ethics, Spinoza shows how conatus gives rise to hope and fear, the former referring to anything that promotes our striving for self-preservation while the latter concerns anything that hinders our conatus. These two emotions play a significant role in the TTP because of their prominence in social and political affairs. For instance, in chapter sixteen, where Spinoza argues that the social contract is maintained largely from fear of the evil consequences of anarchy (see TTP, 16.191-198 and 17.202). See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus," Studia Spinozana 10 (1994): 43-68.
83. See PT, 2.5. In the Ethics, Spinoza shows how conatus gives rise to hope and fear, the former referring to anything that promotes our striving for self-preservation while the latter concerns anything that hinders our conatus. These two emotions play a significant role in the TTP because of their prominence in social and political affairs. For instance, in chapter sixteen, where Spinoza argues that the social contract is maintained largely from fear of the evil consequences of anarchy (see TTP, 16.191-198 and 17.202). See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus," Studia Spinozana 10 (1994): 43-68.
84. See PT, 2.5. In the Ethics, Spinoza shows how conatus gives rise to hope and fear, the former referring to anything that promotes our striving for self-preservation while the latter concerns anything that hinders our conatus. These two emotions play a significant role in the TTP because of their prominence in social and political affairs. For instance, in chapter sixteen, where Spinoza argues that the social contract is maintained largely from fear of the evil consequences of anarchy (see TTP, 16.191-198 and 17.202). See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus," Studia Spinozana 10 (1994): 43-68.
85. See PT, 2.5. In the Ethics, Spinoza shows how conatus gives rise to hope and fear, the former referring to anything that promotes our striving for self-preservation while the latter concerns anything that hinders our conatus. These two emotions play a significant role in the TTP because of their prominence in social and political affairs. For instance, in chapter sixteen, where Spinoza argues that the social contract is maintained largely from fear of the evil consequences of anarchy (see TTP, 16.191-198 and 17.202). See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus," Studia Spinozana 10 (1994): 43-68.
86. See PT, 2.6 and 2.18-20.
87. PT, 2.6.
88. See also Ethics, 4.37.
89. It is interesting to note that Spinoza uses the Bible here to refute the interpretation of the theologians and to support his own claims. He concludes that the "historical account of the first man establishes that [the claims of theologians] are false"; Ethics, 4.37. In the TTP, Spinoza will also present himself as the defender of Scripture against the perverse interpretations of theologians, on the grounds that he accepts only the historical or literal meaning. It remains to be seen whether his method of literal interpretation (sola scriptura) serves to preserve the integrity of the text (for example, TTP, 7.101 and 106) . However, the fact that Spinoza does not depart in the PT from this claim of the TTP indicates the complementary nature of both works as well as Spinoza's seriousness in preserving this method of Biblical interpretation in his political works.
90. It is interesting to note that Spinoza uses the Bible here to refute the interpretation of the theologians and to support his own claims. He concludes that the "historical account of the first man establishes that [the claims of theologians] are false"; Ethics, 4.37. In the TTP, Spinoza will also present himself as the defender of Scripture against the perverse interpretations of theologians, on the grounds that he accepts only the historical or literal meaning. It remains to be seen whether his method of literal interpretation (sola scriptura) serves to preserve the integrity of the text (for example, TTP, 7.101 and 106) . However, the fact that Spinoza does not depart in the PT from this claim of the TTP indicates the complementary nature of both works as well as Spinoza's seriousness in preserving this method of Biblical interpretation in his political works.
91. It is interesting to note that Spinoza uses the Bible here to refute the interpretation of the theologians and to support his own claims. He concludes that the "historical account of the first man establishes that [the claims of theologians] are false"; Ethics, 4.37. In the TTP, Spinoza will also present himself as the defender of Scripture against the perverse interpretations of theologians, on the grounds that he accepts only the historical or literal meaning. It remains to be seen whether his method of literal interpretation (sola scriptura) serves to preserve the integrity of the text (for example, TTP, 7.101 and 106) . However, the fact that Spinoza does not depart in the PT from this claim of the TTP indicates the complementary nature of both works as well as Spinoza's seriousness in preserving this method of Biblical interpretation in his political works.
92. It is interesting to note that Spinoza uses the Bible here to refute the interpretation of the theologians and to support his own claims. He concludes that the "historical account of the first man establishes that [the claims of theologians] are false"; Ethics, 4.37. In the TTP, Spinoza will also present himself as the defender of Scripture against the perverse interpretations of theologians, on the grounds that he accepts only the historical or literal meaning. It remains to be seen whether his method of literal interpretation (sola scriptura) serves to preserve the integrity of the text (for example, TTP, 7.101 and 106) . However, the fact that Spinoza does not depart in the PT from this claim of the TTP indicates the complementary nature of both works as well as Spinoza's seriousness in preserving this method of Biblical interpretation in his political works.
93. PT, 2.8.
94. See TTP, 16.191. See Wolfgang Bartuschat, "The Ontological Basis of Spinoza's Theory of Politics," in Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought, 31. Bartuschat argues that, for Spinoza, the state "fits into an ontological structure which is independent of all human projects, without being based on a knowledge of this ontological structure."
95. See TTP, 16.191. See Wolfgang Bartuschat, "The Ontological Basis of Spinoza's Theory of Politics," in Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought, 31. Bartuschat argues that, for Spinoza, the state "fits into an ontological structure which is independent of all human projects, without being based on a knowledge of this ontological structure."
96. See TTP, 16.191. Bartuschat argues that irrational man is "unaware of his own intrinsic self, understanding himself merely from relations to externalities which occur to him by chance and which are esteemed to be the very self, which has to be preserved"; ibid.
97. See TTP, 16.191. Bartuschat argues that irrational man is "unaware of his own intrinsic self, understanding himself merely from relations to externalities which occur to him by chance and which are esteemed to be the very self, which has to be preserved"; ibid.
98. According to Robert McShea, the "essence and plight of man [is] that he must pursue his interests on the basis of inadequate information, that what true information he does have is subject to interference, the static of the passions"; Political Philosophy of Spinoza, 48.
99. See TTP, 16.191.
100. See PT, 13-14.
101. See Ethics, 4.33-4.
102. See Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect, in Opera Omnia, 2:5-6. Also see Ethics, 3.55s, Ethics, 4.34.
103. See Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect, in Opera Omnia, 2:5-6. Also see Ethics, 3.55s, Ethics, 4.34.
104. See Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect, in Opera Omnia, 2:5-6. Also see Ethics, 3.55s, Ethics, 4.34.
105. See Ethics, 4.37sl.
106. For more on the "savage hatred" of the Jews, see TTP, 17.214-5.
107. In the PT, Spinoza suggests that the state can solve this problem because it does not base itself on rare occurrences of rationality but rather on the concept of power which is expressed in all men regardless of their rationality. In the Ethics, Spinoza describes an individual's power not in relation to other men but in relation to the power of God. This insight helps alleviate the threat perceived from the power of other men and allows for a more successful strategy of self-preservation. In fact, as Spinoza points out in the TTP, the truly rational man would not even need laws to restrain his passions since the good he desires in order to preserve himself is philosophy, which is not depleted by sharing. See TTP, 5.73 and Ethics, 4.37s2.
108. In the PT, Spinoza suggests that the state can solve this problem because it does not base itself on rare occurrences of rationality but rather on the concept of power which is expressed in all men regardless of their rationality. In the Ethics, Spinoza describes an individual's power not in relation to other men but in relation to the power of God. This insight helps alleviate the threat perceived from the power of other men and allows for a more successful strategy of self-preservation. In fact, as Spinoza points out in the TTP, the truly rational man would not even need laws to restrain his passions since the good he desires in order to preserve himself is philosophy, which is not depleted by sharing. See TTP, 5.73 and Ethics, 4.37s2.
109. In the PT, Spinoza suggests that the state can solve this problem because it does not base itself on rare occurrences of rationality but rather on the concept of power which is expressed in all men regardless of their rationality. In the Ethics, Spinoza describes an individual's power not in relation to other men but in relation to the power of God. This insight helps alleviate the threat perceived from the power of other men and allows for a more successful strategy of self-preservation. In fact, as Spinoza points out in the TTP, the truly rational man would not even need laws to restrain his passions since the good he desires in order to preserve himself is philosophy, which is not depleted by sharing. See TTP, 5.73 and Ethics, 4.37s2.
110. In the PT, Spinoza suggests that the state can solve this problem because it does not base itself on rare occurrences of rationality but rather on the concept of power which is expressed in all men regardless of their rationality. In the Ethics, Spinoza describes an individual's power not in relation to other men but in relation to the power of God. This insight helps alleviate the threat perceived from the power of other men and allows for a more successful strategy of self-preservation. In fact, as Spinoza points out in the TTP, the truly rational man would not even need laws to restrain his passions since the good he desires in order to preserve himself is philosophy, which is not depleted by sharing. See TTP, 5.73 and Ethics, 4.37s2.
111. In the PT, Spinoza suggests that the state can solve this problem because it does not base itself on rare occurrences of rationality but rather on the concept of power which is expressed in all men regardless of their rationality. In the Ethics, Spinoza describes an individual's power not in relation to other men but in relation to the power of God. This insight helps alleviate the threat perceived from the power of other men and allows for a more successful strategy of self-preservation. In fact, as Spinoza points out in the TTP, the truly rational man would not even need laws to restrain his passions since the good he desires in order to preserve himself is philosophy, which is not depleted by sharing. See TTP, 5.73 and Ethics, 4.37s2.
112. In fact, even the teaching most salutary for the unity of the state, "that each person should love his neighbor as himself," is usually ignored outside houses of worship. See PT, intro, 5.
113. See TTP, 16.191.
114. See Ethics, 4.35: "[I]insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they must always agree among themselves. . . ." Also see PT, 7.2 where Spinoza claims that the main task of any theory is to explain "how men, even when led by passion, may still have fixed and stable laws."
115. See Ethics, 4.35: "[I]insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they must always agree among themselves. . . ." Also see PT, 7.2 where Spinoza claims that the main task of any theory is to explain "how men, even when led by passion, may still have fixed and stable laws."
116. PT, 1.1 and 5.
117. See TTP, 5.74, and in the preface, p. 16.
118. Douglas Den Uyl has analyzed Spinoza's use of the state of nature in both the PT and the TTP and demonstrated that there is no actual historical moment when men leave the state of nature and enter civil society. Rather, Spinoza uses the state of nature in the PT to represent what would come of society if all its shared values dissolved and the individual pursuit of desire went unchecked. In the TTP, Spinoza uses the state of nature somewhat differently to portray the decline of an established authority and the subsequent transition from one sort of society to another. I find this distinction helpful because it highlights the fact that society emerges as a reorganization of power rather than a voluntary transfer of rights. See Den Uyl, Power, State, and Freedom (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1983), especially ch. 3.
119. Douglas Den Uyl has analyzed Spinoza's use of the state of nature in both the PT and the TTP and demonstrated that there is no actual historical moment when men leave the state of nature and enter civil society. Rather, Spinoza uses the state of nature in the PT to represent what would come of society if all its shared values dissolved and the individual pursuit of desire went unchecked. In the TTP, Spinoza uses the state of nature somewhat differently to portray the decline of an established authority and the subsequent transition from one sort of society to another. I find this distinction helpful because it highlights the fact that society emerges as a reorganization of power rather than a voluntary transfer of rights. See Den Uyl, Power, State, and Freedom (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1983), especially ch. 3.
120. Douglas Den Uyl has analyzed Spinoza's use of the state of nature in both the PT and the TTP and demonstrated that there is no actual historical moment when men leave the state of nature and enter civil society. Rather, Spinoza uses the state of nature in the PT to represent what would come of society if all its shared values dissolved and the individual pursuit of desire went unchecked. In the TTP, Spinoza uses the state of nature somewhat differently to portray the decline of an established authority and the subsequent transition from one sort of society to another. I find this distinction helpful because it highlights the fact that society emerges as a reorganization of power rather than a voluntary transfer of rights. See Den Uyl, Power, State, and Freedom (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1983), especially ch. 3.
121. Douglas Den Uyl has analyzed Spinoza's use of the state of nature in both the PT and the TTP and demonstrated that there is no actual historical moment when men leave the state of nature and enter civil society. Rather, Spinoza uses the state of nature in the PT to represent what would come of society if all its shared values dissolved and the individual pursuit of desire went unchecked. In the TTP, Spinoza uses the state of nature somewhat differently to portray the decline of an established authority and the subsequent transition from one sort of society to another. I find this distinction helpful because it highlights the fact that society emerges as a reorganization of power rather than a voluntary transfer of rights. See Den Uyl, Power, State, and Freedom (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1983), especially ch. 3.
122. Douglas Den Uyl has analyzed Spinoza's use of the state of nature in both the PT and the TTP and demonstrated that there is no actual historical moment when men leave the state of nature and enter civil society. Rather, Spinoza uses the state of nature in the PT to represent what would come of society if all its shared values dissolved and the individual pursuit of desire went unchecked. In the TTP, Spinoza uses the state of nature somewhat differently to portray the decline of an established authority and the subsequent transition from one sort of society to another. I find this distinction helpful because it highlights the fact that society emerges as a reorganization of power rather than a voluntary transfer of rights. See Den Uyl, Power, State, and Freedom (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1983), especially ch. 3.
123. But see Ethics, 4.37s2. Also see Rosen: "The state exists as the result of a common agreement by individuals to surrender their power to a sovereign authority for the sake of enhancing each man's power of self-preservation"; Rosen, "Spinoza," 422.
124. But see Ethics, 4.37s2. Also see Rosen: "The state exists as the result of a common agreement by individuals to surrender their power to a sovereign authority for the sake of enhancing each man's power of self-preservation"; Rosen, "Spinoza," 422.
125. But see Ethics, 4.37s2. Also see Rosen: "The state exists as the result of a common agreement by individuals to surrender their power to a sovereign authority for the sake of enhancing each man's power of self-preservation"; Rosen, "Spinoza," 422.
126. See for example, PT, 2.16 and 21, and 3.2, 5, and 7. Also see PT, 5.7: "Men are to be so led that they think themselves not to be led but to live by their own free opinion."
127. See for example, PT, 2.16 and 21, and 3.2, 5, and 7. Also see PT, 5.7: "Men are to be so led that they think themselves not to be led but to live by their own free opinion."
128. "[E]veryone knows how highly the people value right and authority regarding sacred matters, and how much everyone hangs on the utterance of the one who has it, so much so that we can rightly say that the person who has this authority has the most powerful control over their hearts"; TTP, 19.235. Also see TTP, 16.199-200 where Spinoza describes how the variety of superstition and religious opinion threaten the unity of the state. See Ethics, 4.a15: "Especially necessary to bring people together in love, are the things which concern religion and morality."
129. "[E]veryone knows how highly the people value right and authority regarding sacred matters, and how much everyone hangs on the utterance of the one who has it, so much so that we can rightly say that the person who has this authority has the most powerful control over their hearts"; TTP, 19.235. Also see TTP, 16.199-200 where Spinoza describes how the variety of superstition and religious opinion threaten the unity of the state. See Ethics, 4.a15: "Especially necessary to bring people together in love, are the things which concern religion and morality."
130. "[E]veryone knows how highly the people value right and authority regarding sacred matters, and how much everyone hangs on the utterance of the one who has it, so much so that we can rightly say that the person who has this authority has the most powerful control over their hearts"; TTP, 19.235. Also see TTP, 16.199-200 where Spinoza describes how the variety of superstition and religious opinion threaten the unity of the state. See Ethics, 4.a15: "Especially necessary to bring people together in love, are the things which concern religion and morality."
131. See PT, preface, 6.
132. Paul Bagley argues that "if we understand that Spinoza's theological teaching is fabricated to emphasize almost exclusively a doctrine of obedience to God and care or respect for others, it becomes increasingly clear that his theology is in the service of his political instruction"; See "On the Unity of Spinoza's TTP," Jewish Political Studies Review 7 (1995): 130.
133. See PT, preface, 6. The reason for this emphasis on the toll which religion takes on the leaders of the state (rather than on the multitude) is rhetorical: because the TTP is addressed to clergy and theologians (as we shall see), it begins with an account of how political leaders manipulate clergy and religion in order to secure their own power. Subsequently, the preface argues that political leaders should not be the high priests, an argument with great appeal for the clergy.
134. See PT, preface, 6. The reason for this emphasis on the toll which religion takes on the leaders of the state (rather than on the multitude) is rhetorical: because the TTP is addressed to clergy and theologians (as we shall see), it begins with an account of how political leaders manipulate clergy and religion in order to secure their own power. Subsequently, the preface argues that political leaders should not be the high priests, an argument with great appeal for the clergy.
135. Quintius Curtius, History of Alexander, trans. John Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library (1962).
136. See Curtius, History of Alexander, bk. 7, secs. 7-8.
137. The full quotation reads as follows: "Nothing sways the multitude more effectively than superstition; generally uncontrolled, savage, fickle, when they are victims of vain superstition, they obey soothsayers better than they do their leaders. Therefore, the interpretations of the Egyptians, when they were made public, restored the down-hearted to hope and confidence"; Curtius, History of Alexander, 4.x.7. Not only are the priests extraordinarily successful in restoring public confidence, but as we shall see, their success was actually due to Alexander's clever manipulation.
138. Curtius, History of Alexander, 4.x.4-5.
139. Throughout the TTP, Spinoza makes allusions to classical authors, from Curtius to Tacitus, but rarely does he cite the author and source for his citation. Spinoza does so here in order to direct his careful readers to this example. For more on Spinoza's use of classical authors, see Chaim Wirszubski, "Spinoza's Debt to Tacitus," Scripta Hierosolymitana 2 (1955): 176-86.
140. Throughout the TTP, Spinoza makes allusions to classical authors, from Curtius to Tacitus, but rarely does he cite the author and source for his citation. Spinoza does so here in order to direct his careful readers to this example. For more on Spinoza's use of classical authors, see Chaim Wirszubski, "Spinoza's Debt to Tacitus," Scripta Hierosolymitana 2 (1955): 176-86.
141. Curtius, History of Alexander, 4.x.5.
142. One fundamental tenet running throughout Spinoza's political thought is that all elements of the regime's must be stable without having to rely on extraordinary individuals: "[A] dominion must of necessity be so ordered, that all, governing and governed alike, whether they will or no, shall do what makes for the general welfare. . ."; PT, 6.3.
143. See TTP, 17.205. Also note the following: "What is so strange if the Leaders who are always trying to find a way to get the supreme right of command exclusively for themselves, granted the people everything and introduced new forms of worship, to bind the people to themselves . . ."; TTP, 17.218. In contrast, the dogmas of Spinoza's religion, while not true, do not encourage flights of the imagination or obscure the truth, and therefore do not cause the multitude to descend into barbarism; see also TTP, 20.241.
144. See TTP, 17.205. Also note the following: "What is so strange if the Leaders who are always trying to find a way to get the supreme right of command exclusively for themselves, granted the people everything and introduced new forms of worship, to bind the people to themselves . . ."; TTP, 17.218. In contrast, the dogmas of Spinoza's religion, while not true, do not encourage flights of the imagination or obscure the truth, and therefore do not cause the multitude to descend into barbarism; see also TTP, 20.241.
145. See TTP, 17.205. Also note the following: "What is so strange if the Leaders who are always trying to find a way to get the supreme right of command exclusively for themselves, granted the people everything and introduced new forms of worship, to bind the people to themselves . . ."; TTP, 17.218. In contrast, the dogmas of Spinoza's religion, while not true, do not encourage flights of the imagination or obscure the truth, and therefore do not cause the multitude to descend into barbarism; see also TTP, 20.241.
146. One cause of their confusion is the myths that they inherit from previous rulers and accept as true.
147. TTP, preface, 7, emphasis added.
148. "[N]o dominion has stood so long without any notable change as that of the Turks. . ."; PT, 6.4. Spinoza ultimately rejects this stability in favor of harmony, which consists not simply in the "absence of war but in a union or agreement of minds"; PT, 6.4.
149. "[N]o dominion has stood so long without any notable change as that of the Turks. . ."; PT, 6.4. Spinoza ultimately rejects this stability in favor of harmony, which consists not simply in the "absence of war but in a union or agreement of minds"; PT, 6.4.
150. This further illustrates the weakness of men's reason. To make matters worse, if kings present themselves as prophets or gods, they presumably have the authority to revoke laws at their own whim, a situation which Spinoza takes pains to discourage in chapters six and seven of the PT.
151. Of course, such a regime also hinders the emergence of philosophy.
152. Spinoza doubts that any man can be fully rational under all circumstances; however, political rulers in particular are given to flights of the imagination because of their continual need to persuade and control the multitude.
153. Given the superstitious tendency of the multitude, the ruler's inclination to spin myths about the gods is hardly irrational. The TTP, in fact, is Spinoza's attempt to tell just such a myth about God and his relation to the world.
154. TTP, preface, 8.
155. TTP, 8.
156. Similarly, how can religion simultaneously appeal to the imagination without relying upon it completely?
157. See Ethics, 4.35s, 54s, 73.
158. Ethics, 5.79.
159. Ethics, 5.79.
160. Spinoza explains that philosophers are not as effective as the clergy in teaching the multitude because philosophers "connect their arguments or give definitions, according as they serve to connect their arguments better" and thus, philosophers are "intelligible to only a very few men . . ."; Ethics, 5.77.
161. TTP, preface, 8.
162. TTP, preface, 8. In chapter seven, Spinoza rejects both Catholic and Jewish claims of an infallible interpretation of Scripture (via the Holy See or the Oral Law) as historically unfounded TTP, 7.117. Spinoza's terse rejection of these two traditions is evidence for the claim that the TTP aims at influencing a liberal, Protestant tradition and therefore uses Catholicism, and especially Judaism, as straw-men to bolster its argument. For more on the religious characteristics of Spinoza's audience, see J. Samuel Preus, "A Hidden Opponent in Spinoza's Tractatus," Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995): 361-88.
163. TTP, preface, 8. In chapter seven, Spinoza rejects both Catholic and Jewish claims of an infallible interpretation of Scripture (via the Holy See or the Oral Law) as historically unfounded TTP, 7.117. Spinoza's terse rejection of these two traditions is evidence for the claim that the TTP aims at influencing a liberal, Protestant tradition and therefore uses Catholicism, and especially Judaism, as straw-men to bolster its argument. For more on the religious characteristics of Spinoza's audience, see J. Samuel Preus, "A Hidden Opponent in Spinoza's Tractatus," Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995): 361-88.
164. TTP, preface, 8. In chapter seven, Spinoza rejects both Catholic and Jewish claims of an infallible interpretation of Scripture (via the Holy See or the Oral Law) as historically unfounded TTP, 7.117. Spinoza's terse rejection of these two traditions is evidence for the claim that the TTP aims at influencing a liberal, Protestant tradition and therefore uses Catholicism, and especially Judaism, as straw-men to bolster its argument. For more on the religious characteristics of Spinoza's audience, see J. Samuel Preus, "A Hidden Opponent in Spinoza's Tractatus," Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995): 361-88.
165. TTP, preface, 8. In chapter seven, Spinoza rejects both Catholic and Jewish claims of an infallible interpretation of Scripture (via the Holy See or the Oral Law) as historically unfounded TTP, 7.117. Spinoza's terse rejection of these two traditions is evidence for the claim that the TTP aims at influencing a liberal, Protestant tradition and therefore uses Catholicism, and especially Judaism, as straw-men to bolster its argument. For more on the religious characteristics of Spinoza's audience, see J. Samuel Preus, "A Hidden Opponent in Spinoza's Tractatus," Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995): 361-88.
166. TTP, preface, 8.7.97-8. Spinoza describes in the Ethics how those who seek approval of the multitude quickly find themselves in violent quarrels: an individual "who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily, strives, acts, and schemes, in order to preserve his reputation. For the multitude is fickle and inconstant; unless one's reputation is guarded, it is quickly destroyed. Indeed, because everyone desires to secure the applause of the multitude, each one willingly puts down the reputation of the other. And since the struggle is over a good thought to be the highest, this gives rise that this judgment to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible"; Ethics, 4.58s.
167. TTP, preface, 8.7.97-8. Spinoza describes in the Ethics how those who seek approval of the multitude quickly find themselves in violent quarrels: an individual "who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily, strives, acts, and schemes, in order to preserve his reputation. For the multitude is fickle and inconstant; unless one's reputation is guarded, it is quickly destroyed. Indeed, because everyone desires to secure the applause of the multitude, each one willingly puts down the reputation of the other. And since the struggle is over a good thought to be the highest, this gives rise that this judgment to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible"; Ethics, 4.58s.
168. TTP, preface, 8.7.97-8. Spinoza describes in the Ethics how those who seek approval of the multitude quickly find themselves in violent quarrels: an individual "who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily, strives, acts, and schemes, in order to preserve his reputation. For the multitude is fickle and inconstant; unless one's reputation is guarded, it is quickly destroyed. Indeed, because everyone desires to secure the applause of the multitude, each one willingly puts down the reputation of the other. And since the struggle is over a good thought to be the highest, this gives rise that this judgment to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible"; Ethics, 4.58s.
169. TTP, 14.177. Spinoza seems convinced that clergy and theologians will find his theological argument persuasive and thereby eliminate all grounds for "controversy in the Church"; TTP, 14.177. Note that this judgement occurs in chapter fourteen, at the conclusion of Spinoza's theological argument.
170. TTP, 14.177. Spinoza seems convinced that clergy and theologians will find his theological argument persuasive and thereby eliminate all grounds for "controversy in the Church"; TTP, 14.177. Note that this judgement occurs in chapter fourteen, at the conclusion of Spinoza's theological argument.
171. TTP, 12.158.
172. TTP, 15.188, preface, 8.
173. TTP, preface, 8. In the TTP, Spinoza offers very few examples of corrupt Christian theologians. Instead, he presents the Pharisees as examples of quarrelsome and benighted theologians (see, for example, TTP, 3.53, 55). Attacking Jewish theologians was not only safer than attacking Christian theologians, but created a strong association between superstitious interpretations of Scripture and Jewish theologians; TTP, 5.69, 9.136-141.
174. TTP, preface, 8. In the TTP, Spinoza offers very few examples of corrupt Christian theologians. Instead, he presents the Pharisees as examples of quarrelsome and benighted theologians (see, for example, TTP, 3.53, 55). Attacking Jewish theologians was not only safer than attacking Christian theologians, but created a strong association between superstitious interpretations of Scripture and Jewish theologians; TTP, 5.69, 9.136-141.
175. TTP, preface, 8. In the TTP, Spinoza offers very few examples of corrupt Christian theologians. Instead, he presents the Pharisees as examples of quarrelsome and benighted theologians (see, for example, TTP, 3.53, 55). Attacking Jewish theologians was not only safer than attacking Christian theologians, but created a strong association between superstitious interpretations of Scripture and Jewish theologians; TTP, 5.69, 9.136-141.
176. TTP, preface, 8. In the TTP, Spinoza offers very few examples of corrupt Christian theologians. Instead, he presents the Pharisees as examples of quarrelsome and benighted theologians (see, for example, TTP, 3.53, 55). Attacking Jewish theologians was not only safer than attacking Christian theologians, but created a strong association between superstitious interpretations of Scripture and Jewish theologians; TTP, 5.69, 9.136-141.
177. TTP, preface, 8.
178. Ibid.
179. TTP, 18.222.
180. TTP, preface, 9, see also 19.237.
181. TTP, 13.168.
182. Although Spinoza claims that philosophy and religion are unrelated, as I argue elsewhere, he quietly indicates that Scripture does contain doctrines consistent with the teachings of philosophy. For example, Spinoza's theology subtly reveals that Jesus and his disciples, particularly Paul, teach that being truly pious or loving God requires knowledge. Such a philosophical teaching was compromised, according to Spinoza, because the disciples were forced to accommodate their message to the multitude. In this example, they were forced to equate true piety with obedience instead of knowledge.
183. This becomes the central theological teaching of chaps. 11-15, that were it not for Scripture's popular teaching, the multitude would not be saved.
184. TTP, 4.65.
185. For more on why Spinoza, or any philosopher, would want to share his knowledge with other potential philosophers, see Ethics 4.37sl. Also see Daniel Garber, "Dr. Fischelson's Dilemma: Spinoza on Freedom and Sociability" (forthcoming).
186. For more on why Spinoza, or any philosopher, would want to share his knowledge with other potential philosophers, see Ethics 4.37sl. Also see Daniel Garber, "Dr. Fischelson's Dilemma: Spinoza on Freedom and Sociability" (forthcoming).
187. TTP, 15.188; see also TTP, 15.182. Notice that Spinoza does not recognize this group of theologians until chap. 15, the very end of his theological argument. Spinoza's rhetorical strategy in the preface is to present theologians two models: wildly-ambitious, benighted and impious clergy whom he describes as "the worst men" and moderate, philosophical, and sincere clergy whom he describes as "learned ecclesiastics." Obviously, despite their hostility toward philosophy, most theologians will want to identify themselves with the latter group. Spinoza then devotes fifteen chapters to persuading those non-rational theologians that philosophy poses no threat whatsoever to religion. Finally, in chap. 15, perhaps the TTP's most rhetorically-charged chapter, Spinoza introduces and ridicules those theologians who fear philosophy. By that time, if Spinoza has succeeded in disarming the threat of philosophy, such theologians will join wholeheartedly in ridiculing unenlightened clergy. This explains why Spinoza chooses to begin the TTP with an ambiguous description of his audience since the TTP appeals to theologians only after an extensive theological argument.
188. TTP, 15.188; see also TTP, 15.182. Notice that Spinoza does not recognize this group of theologians until chap. 15, the very end of his theological argument. Spinoza's rhetorical strategy in the preface is to present theologians two models: wildly-ambitious, benighted and impious clergy whom he describes as "the worst men" and moderate, philosophical, and sincere clergy whom he describes as "learned ecclesiastics." Obviously, despite their hostility toward philosophy, most theologians will want to identify themselves with the latter group. Spinoza then devotes fifteen chapters to persuading those non-rational theologians that philosophy poses no threat whatsoever to religion. Finally, in chap. 15, perhaps the TTP's most rhetorically-charged chapter, Spinoza introduces and ridicules those theologians who fear philosophy. By that time, if Spinoza has succeeded in disarming the threat of philosophy, such theologians will join wholeheartedly in ridiculing unenlightened clergy. This explains why Spinoza chooses to begin the TTP with an ambiguous description of his audience since the
189. TTP, 15.188; see also TTP, 15.182. Notice that Spinoza does not recognize this group of theologians until chap. 15, the very end of his theological argument. Spinoza's rhetorical strategy in the preface is to present theologians two models: wildly-ambitious, benighted and impious clergy whom he describes as "the worst men" and moderate, philosophical, and sincere clergy whom he describes as "learned ecclesiastics." Obviously, despite their hostility toward philosophy, most theologians will want to identify themselves with the latter group. Spinoza then devotes fifteen chapters to persuading those non-rational theologians that philosophy poses no threat whatsoever to religion. Finally, in chap. 15, perhaps the TTP's most rhetorically-charged chapter, Spinoza introduces and ridicules those theologians who fear philosophy. By that time, if Spinoza has succeeded in disarming the threat of philosophy, such theologians will join wholeheartedly in ridiculing unenlightened clergy. This explains why Spinoza chooses to begin the TTP with an ambiguous description of his audience since the TTP appeals to theologians only after an extensive theological argument.
190. TTP, 15.188; see also TTP, 15.182. Notice that Spinoza does not recognize this group of theologians until chap. 15, the very end of his theological argument. Spinoza's rhetorical strategy in the preface is to present theologians two models: wildly-ambitious, benighted and impious clergy whom he describes as "the worst men" and moderate, philosophical, and sincere clergy whom he describes as "learned ecclesiastics." Obviously, despite their hostility toward philosophy, most theologians will want to identify themselves with the latter group. Spinoza then devotes fifteen chapters to persuading those non-rational theologians that philosophy poses no threat whatsoever to religion. Finally, in chap. 15, perhaps the TTP's most rhetorically-charged chapter, Spinoza introduces and ridicules those theologians who fear philosophy. By that time, if Spinoza has succeeded in disarming the threat of philosophy, such theologians will join wholeheartedly in ridiculing unenlightened clergy. This explains why Spinoza chooses to begin the TTP with an ambiguous description of his audience since the TTP appeals to theologians only after an extensive theological argument.
191. TTP, 15.188; see also TTP, 15.182. Notice that Spinoza does not recognize this group of theologians until chap. 15, the very end of his theological argument. Spinoza's rhetorical strategy in the preface is to present theologians two models: wildly-ambitious, benighted and impious clergy whom he describes as "the worst men" and moderate, philosophical, and sincere clergy whom he describes as "learned ecclesiastics." Obviously, despite their hostility toward philosophy, most theologians will want to identify themselves with the latter group. Spinoza then devotes fifteen chapters to persuading those non-rational theologians that philosophy poses no threat whatsoever to religion. Finally, in chap. 15, perhaps the TTP's most rhetorically-charged chapter, Spinoza introduces and ridicules those theologians who fear philosophy. By that time, if Spinoza has succeeded in disarming the threat of philosophy, such theologians will join wholeheartedly in ridiculing unenlightened clergy. This explains why Spinoza chooses to begin the TTP with an ambiguous description of his audience since the TTP appeals to theologians only after an extensive theological argument.
192. One should not neglect the role of vanity in appealing to such theologians. Spinoza argues that educated men who have "a clear and distinct conception" of God are "more blessed than the multitude" and can be said to have "a gift of God"; TTP, 5.78.
193. TTP, 1.25.
194. TTP, 15.188.
195. TTP, 14.177.
196. TTP, 10.150-1.
197. TTP, 7.99-117.
198. TTP, 14.176, see also 12.160. Spinoza also makes a theological case against such men by attributing the destruction of Biblical theocracy as well as the corruption of the original religion to the priests' great ambitions for political power; see also TTP, 18.222-223.
199. TTP, 14.176, see also 12.160. Spinoza also makes a theological case against such men by attributing the destruction of Biblical theocracy as well as the corruption of the original religion to the priests' great ambitions for political power; see also TTP, 18.222-223.
200. See Ethics, 4.58s on the incessant desire of theologians to be esteemed by the multitude.
201. Because the TTP's extensive theological is aimed at believers, I reject Alan Donagan's claim that Spinoza hopes to reform states rather than churches: "Spinoza believed that the best hope of bringing an end the persecutions that had made Christianity infamous was not that Christian Churches would become enlightened, but that enlightened states would deprive them of the power to persecute"; Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 31.
202. Because the TTP's extensive theological is aimed at believers, I reject Alan Donagan's claim that Spinoza hopes to reform states rather than churches: "Spinoza believed that the best hope of bringing an end the persecutions that had made Christianity infamous was not that Christian Churches would become enlightened, but that enlightened states would deprive them of the power to persecute"; Donagan, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, 31.